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Summary
Traditionally, the Philosophy of Science has examined the nature of scientific 
discovery. In recent years, Cognitive Science has gathered together work in 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Cognitive Psychology that attempts to understand 
scientific discovery. However, at present, there is no generally accepted account of 
scientific discovery in any of these disciplines.
This thesis aims further to explore the nature of scientific discovery from an AI 
perspective, but does so within a clearly defined Framework, designed to structure 
cognitive science research on scientific discovery. The framework proposes a 
minimum set of components as a guide to the constmction of acceptable accounts of 
scientific discovery. The focal concept is the Research Programme; a body of 
research that investigates a delimited set of phenomena using a Theoretical 
component and an Experimental component. The framework posits: three types of 
theoretical knowledge; three levels of experiments; inferences to apply and generate 
new theoretical & experimental knowledge; criteria for assessing the acceptability of 
theories & the reliability of experiments; and multiple levels of communication 
between the components.
Previous computer models and empirical studies of scientific discovery are 
reviewed. They tend not to offer complete accounts of scientific discovery, as 
defined by the framework. In particular, many completely ignore the crucial role of 
experiments.
The STERN computational model of scientific discovery is introduced. It 
instantiates all the components of the Framework. STERN currently models 
discoveries made by Galileo in the domain of naturally accelerated terrestrial 
motion, although it may be applied more generally. STERN has four main strategies 
that are used to make discoveries: (i) confirming existing hypotheses; (ii) 
generalizing experimental results to form new hypotheses; (iii) generating new 
hypotheses from known hypotheses; and (iv) generating new experiments.
STERN is more complete than previous computational models. As such it allows 
novel heuristics at the level of research programmes to be investigated and high 
level abilities to emerge from its complexity.
For Jo
who in her own way 
made all this possible.
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Preface
Science, in all its many and varied guises, is something that has always fascinated 
me. Its domination of my early adult education is a testament to this. More recently I 
have become interested in science at a meta-level and have examined the nature of 
science as a subject in itself. A brief excursion into the philosophy of science leyft me 
thinking that there must be a better ways to understand the nature of scientific 
discovery than just theoretical speculation based on logic and myths. Thus, I have 
found my way into AI and cognitive science. I now see the real hope of being able 
to treat scientific discovery, scientifically. This thesis is thus a distillation, or 
perhaps the culmination, of all of my past studies in science and of my studies of 
science.
Like all conceptual schemes, the ideas in this thesis have evolved over time. 
Early ideas that lead to the full development of the Framework for scientific 
discovery (presented in Chapter 1) can be found in Cheng (1989a & 1989b) and 
Cheng & Keane (1989a). Some previous speculations about the nature of Cognitive 
Science research on scientific discovery are given in Cheng (1990b). A prototype of 
STERN is to be be found in Cheng (1989b).
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Chapter 1
Introduction: 
Components Of Scientific Discovery
As a human intellectual endeavour science has been successful. It has enabled 
humanity to develop and expand its knowledge of the world, to explore the 
universe, to predict futiu*e events and to found new technologies that manipulate and 
control nature. However, the understanding which science affords us has not been 
reflexive; science has not lead to an understanding of science. There is no generally 
accepted view of how science really works. Philosophers of science have 
propounded radically different views ranging from models based on logical systems 
(e.g. Popper, 1959, 1965; Fiegl, 1970; Suppe, 1977), through to sociologically- 
oriented views which assume less logical foundations (e.g. Kuhn, 1970; 
Feyerabend, 1975).
More recently, an alternative avenue of investigation has opened up, with the 
first attempts in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Cognitive Science to develop 
computer programs that do scientific discovery. Some of these attempts, as we will 
see in Chapter 2, have provided detailed simulations of famous discovery episodes. 
Others have provided programs that will make discoveries, albeit not in a manner 
that mirrors human abilities. However, just as in the Philosophy of Science, no 
general consensus has emerged about the fundamental nature of scientific discovery 
in Cognitive Science, although the concrete nature of the enterprise has provided a 
useful methodology for understanding the phenomenon. However, the roots of the 
lack of consensus in Cognitive Science are quite different to those in the Philosophy 
of Science. Artificial Intelligence research has tended to be technique-driven: that 
is, researchers have taken an AI technique (e.g. data space search using regularity
-I-
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spotters) and tried to build discovery systems based on the technique (e.g. Langley 
etal., 1987; Falkenhainer & Michalski, 1986).
The present thesis is very much within this Cognitive Science tradition with one 
important exception. Rather than be technique driven, I will attempt to propose a 
general framework for scientific discovery, which will then be realized in a 
subsequent set of programs. The idea is to have a more principled approach to AI 
work.
This Framework For Scientific Discovery specifies a set of components that 
seem important for the adequate characterization of scientific discovery. Like any 
framework, it should provide a clear conceptual foundation on which a greater 
understanding can be built. This chapter will lay out the framework. In chapter 2 ,1 
will show how useful the framework is in setting previous AI work in context and 
revealing its limitations. Then much of the remainder of the thesis realizes many 
components of the framework in a discovery program called STERN.
A Framework For Scientific Discovery
The framework views the scientific enterprise as consisting of a single scientist 
or groups of scientists carrying out research programmes. Clearly, the nature of 
these programmes will depend on what is being investigated, the science in 
question, and prior theoretical and experimental developments in the field. 
However, the important abstraction to keep in mind is that a scientific research 
programme involves the investigation of a delimited set of phenomena using both 
theory and experimentation.
This may seem quite obvious but is less so when one considers that 
philosophers of science have only recently begun to acknowledge the role of 
experiment (Hacking, 1983; Galison, 1987; Franklin, 1988; Gooding et.al., 1989) 
and that AI researchers typically do not model experimentation in their computer
-2-
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programs (e.g. Langley et.a l, 1987; Fisher & Zytkow, forthcoming; Thagard, 
1988a, 1989a; Rose, 1988a). However, we clearly need to specify what we mean 
by theory and experimentation.
Within the present framework theory or theoretical knowledge is characterized 
as sets of functions. These functions characterize the behaviour of a phenonienon 
(or event in the world). That is, they relate together the initial conditions and final 
states of the event. The function predicts or explains (accounts for) the way in 
which the initial state of the phenomenon changes into some final state. In 
characterizing theoretical knowledge the framework distinguishes between entities 
that differ in their generality or abstractness. At the most general level there are 
hypotheses, at the next level models and, finally, instances of these models. In 
addition to these aspects of theory the framework also assumes that there are criteria 
for determining the adequacy of theoretical knowledge (called acceptability 
criteria).
The second main aspect of the framework is experim entation. In the 
framework, experiments are characterized as "black boxes", with input parameters 
that constitute manipulated/controlled variables and output parameters that are the 
observations and measurements that a scientist makes. Again, as in the case of 
theory, experiments are defined at three levels of generality involving experimental 
paradigms, experimental set-ups, experimental tests. Two important issues I 
will consider in this component are how new experiments are invented and how 
scientists establish the reliability of experimental results.
One of the final things that the framework is centrally concerned with, is the 
way in which the two main components of a research programme - theory and 
experiment - interact, correspond and communicate with one another.
Let us now consider the framework in more detail.
Introduction
1.1 SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
A scientific research programme involves the directed use of both theory and 
experiment to investigate a delimited set of phenomena. In a brand new research 
programme the phenomena are identified by pre-theoretic or even pre-scientific 
means. However, typically research programmes occur within an established field. 
In this case the phenomena may be specified as a topic within that field.
In this thesis individual scientists working more or less in isolation are typically 
considered. Thus the major role of research programmes, here, is to bring together 
the main theoretical and experimental components. (Research programmes wül have 
an even more substantial role when cooperative and competitive investigations 
amongst many scientists are considered - multiple parallel research programmes will 
need to be modelled.)
1.2 THEORY
The theory component of the framework is composed of four sub-components. 
These four sub-components characterize the general nature of theoretical 
knowledge, the types or levels of knowledge, definitions of theoretical inferences, 
and acceptability criteria.
1.2.1 Theoretical Knowledge
Theoretical knowledge attempts to explain or predict the behaviour of a 
phenomenon as it changes in a natural or experimental environment. The changes 
considered are variations to the characteristic conditions, properties and quantities 
(attributes in general) of the phenomenon. A set of values for these attributes at a 
specific time constitutes a state of the phenomenon. For example, we may be 
investigating the free fall of bodies under the effect of gravity, in which case 
magnitudes of quantities like height, speed and weight, and properties like the shape 
and material of the body and the medium it travels through, may help to define the 
state at a given time.
4-
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Given the characterization of phenomena in a state-based way, the nature of 
theoretical knowledge can be conceptualized as a state transformation function, 
expressed mathematically as,
T{Si )= S 2 ,  . . . ( 1 . 1 )
where is the initial state of the phenomenon defined in terms of specific values 
of the characteristic attributes, and S2  is the final state with similar attributes but 
different values. T  is the transformation function: a mathematical or propositional 
formalism that states how Sj is related to S2 . Simply, T describes, predicts or 
explains how the initial values of the attributes change into their final values.
Consider Galileo's law of free fall as an example. The attributes considered by 
the law are speed and height and they are related by the equation:
speed = c . height^/^, . . . (1.2)
where c is a constant, say 10. Now, given that the magnitude of both height and 
speed  are zero in the initial state, then for a final state in which the height 
(measured downwards) is 4 we may calculate that the speed is 20 (ie. 10.V4). This 
is a rather trivial example, but it succinctly illustrates the transformation function 
idea.
1.2.2 Three Types Of Theoretical Knowledge
Given the above general formulation of theory it is important to distinguish 
between types of theoretical knowledge with a view to understanding the 
complexities of theory in scientific discovery. These three types of theoretical 
knowledge of are; hypotheses, models and instances.
Hypotheses are the most general type of theoretical knowledge. Their state 
transformation functions attempt to be universal accounts for all relevant 
manifestations of the phenomenon in the differing situations defined by the research 
programme. For example, we may attempt to apply Galileo's law not only to bodies 
in free fall, but to swinging pendulums, projectiles, and balls rolling down ramps.
-5-
• Introduction
That is, to all naturally accelerated terrestrial bodies.
Models are a more specific type of theoretical knowledge than hypotheses. 
They attempt only to account for the phenomenon in one of the many situations 
defined by the research programme. A model's state transformation function is not 
expected to be applicable to other situations. For example, we may use the "law of 
free fall" hypothesis to infer the shape of the path described by projectiles as they 
fly through the air. The function defining the trajectory is a model, and as such has 
no relevance to the explanation of other situations; e.g. the motion of balls as they 
roll down ramps.
The instance type of theoretical knowledge is even less general than a model. 
An instance comprises a series of states of the phenomenon in just one situation and 
relates to a single event In other words the values of the attributes characterizing the 
phenomena are specified before, during and after the event. For example the 
prediction that a ball rolhng down a ramp will have travelled 10,40, and 90 cm after 
0.1, 0.2 and 0.3 seconds respectively, when the inclination of the ramp is 2°, is an 
instance. A term is a variable standing for some attribute, for example distance or 
inclination, that may be assigned a specific value at a particular moment. When one 
term is varied so that values of another may be calculated, they are called the 
independent (Si) and dependent (8%) terms, respectively.
The relationship between the three types of knowledge is one of partial 
instantiation; that is, models are more specific manifestations of hypotheses and 
instances are specific versions of models. Exactly why the instantiation is partial 
will be seen later (in Chapter 4).
1.2.3 Origins Of Theories And The Nature Of Theoretical Inferences
The nature and types of state transformation functions have been considered, 
but how they come into being and what use they are put to needs to be discussed. 
For example, new functions can be generalized from data or generated from existing 
functions, and known functions allow predictions to be made or explanations to be
-6-
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given. Consider the genesis of transformation functions first
The inference to new state transformation functions may take many different 
forms but two common ones are (i) the generalization from data, and (ii) generation 
from one or more existing functions by modification or combination. Finding a two 
term mathematical function (like equation 1.2) for a series of related Cartesian 
coordinates is an example of the generalization to a transformation function from 
data. As an example of the second form of this type of inference, consider a 
scientist whose is given the following two laws that describe different aspects of the 
same phenomenon using equations that refer to theoretical terms:
A.B = C ...(1.3a)
and
A.D = E. ...(1.3b)
The generation of a new function by combining the two equations may yield, as one 
of many possibilities, the following:
A:B.D = C.E. _(1.3c)
Understanding how and why scientists make certain types of modifications or 
combinations of functions is of course part of the investigation of the nature of 
scientific discovery. Other forms of new function generation may require the use of 
background knowledge or even the borrowing of formalisms from other research 
programmes by the use of analogy.
Like the genesis of state transformation functions, the different ways in which 
they are used or applied are many and varied. Consider just two forms of inference, 
(i) Prediction occurs when the initial state of the phenomenon is given and the 
function is used to work out what the final state will be. For example, knowing
equation (1.2) it is possible to predict that the speed after a fall of 4 metres from
rest WÜ1 be 20 m/s. (ii) Explanation requires knowledge of both the initial and final 
states, and the function is used to demonstrate or elucidate the way in which they 
are related. For example, concluding that the speed of a body falling from rest is 20
-7-
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m/s after 4 metres is explained by Equation (4.2), which tells us that speed is in 
proportion to the square root of height.
The generation of new state transformation functions and their application to 
phenomenon by prediction and explanation is a central part of the theoretical side of 
scientific discovery.
1.2.4 Acceptability Criteria For Theories
Assessing the acceptability of theoretical knowledge is another integral part of 
this component of scientific discovery. In the framework, I assume that the main, 
but not the only, index of the acceptability of a theory is the number or range of 
different phenomena to which it is applicable (ie. which it successfully predicts or 
adequately explains). This has variously been referred to as the explanatory breadth 
(Thagard, 1989a), consilience (Thagard, 1988a), or predictive scope (McAllister, 
1989). Other acceptability criteria to consider are pragmatic considerations in the 
development of theories, and in particular, the tractability or ease with which 
inferences can be made from a theory.
1.3 EXPERIMENT
The treatment of experimentation within a research framework can be broken up 
in much the same way as the treatment of theoretical knowledge. A general abstract 
conception of experiments is given, that is then broken up into a three-levelled 
scheme which parallels the hypothesis, model and instance levels of the theory 
component. There are also related issues in this component about the genesis of 
experiments and their reliability.
1.3.1 The Structure Of Experiments
Under the framework experiment is viewed as a mechanism that treats a 
phenomenon as a "black box". The scientist investigates the underlying nature of 
the phenomenon via a set of specified inputs and outputs. The inputs attempt to
Introduction
control some aspects of the phenomenon and manipulate others, whilst the outputs 
reveal the changes that result from these particular inputs.
In an experiment, a phenomenon is instantiated in a manner that allows input 
parameters (Inputs-M) to be manipulated and output parameters (Outputs) to be 
measured or observed. Some input parameters are fixed (Inputs-C), their values 
held constant to tightly control the experimental environment. The form of 
experiments can thus be represented by the equation:
E (Inputs-M/Inputs-C) = Outputs . . .  (1.4)
where the phenomenon in the black box determines the hidden functional relation, 
E, between Inputs-M/Inputs-C and Outputs. In this scheme, the experimental 
apparatus is required to instantiate and manipulate the phenomenon, and instmments 
are needed for measurement and observation. This conception of experimentation is 
depicted diagrammatically in Figure 1.1. Ideally just one Input-M should be 
manipulated at a time when performing an experiment to prevent ambiguity over the 
extent to which a parameter affects the phenomenon.
The relationship between theories as state transformation functions and 
experiments as black boxes (i.e. the similarity between equations 1.1 and 1.4) is at 
the heart of the framework. The Independent and Dependent theoretical terms 
represent experimental Input-M and Output parameters, respectively. The hidden 
experimental relationship, E, is of course the thing that remains to be discovered 
and characterized by theoretical state transformation functions. Hence, under the 
framework, the aim of scientific discovery can be characterized as the finding of 
state transformation functions that are ever closer approximations to the underlying 
nature of the phenomenon.
For example, in one experiment Galileo rolled balls down a ramp. The Input-M 
parameter was the distance down the ramp and examples of the Input-C parameters 
were the inclination of the ramp, and the weight and size of the ball. The Output, 
time, was measured using a water clock. Hence, the underlying nature of the
-9-
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Introduction
phenomenon was described by the "law of free fall" state transformation function.
The majority of experiments can be characterized in a similar way. The 
exceptions are cases where manipulative control is absent, because the phenomenon 
only occurs naturally and cannot be instantiated in an experimental environment. In 
such cases mere observation occurs, that yield results that are much less reliable 
than those formed in "normal" experiments. Examples of fields in which this 
typically occurs are astronomy, geology and areas of biology.
1.3.2 The Levels Of Experiments
More specifically, the above general characterization of experiment is treated at 
three levels of generality in the framework: as experimental paradigms, experimental 
setups, and experimental tests.
At the most general level, within most sciences there are distinguishable classes 
of experimental situations, which are used to investigate the phenomena within a 
research programme. These classes of experiments are called experimental 
paradigms. An example of one of Galileo's experimental paradigms was the 
inclined plane paradigm, in which balls were rolled down a smooth straight ramp. 
This constitutes one class of experiments, because many different configurations of 
the apparatus and entities can be used to perform different tests.
At a more specific level there are experimental setups. These are instantiated 
experimental paradigms, that is manufactured experimental apparatus and equipment 
for manipulating input parameters and instruments for observing and measuring 
output parameters. Galileo considered several experimental setups given the inclined 
plane experimental paradigm. One setup used the inclined plane to investigate the 
length of time for the ball to roll different distances with the ramp at a constant 
inclination. Another examined the relation between speed and inclination for a fixed 
height. Thus, different experimental setups provide different means of instantiating, 
manipulating and observing the phenomenon with resultant variations of the input 
and output parameters.
-10-
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Finally, at the most detailed level one has specific experimental tests. An 
experimental test refers to a particular experimental trial on a specific manifestation 
of the phenomenon. In an experimental test an experimental setup is selected and 
particular parameters are chosen to be the Input-M, Input-Cs and Output 
parameters. The experiment is then performed with a series of input values for 
which output values are recorded. As such, experimental tests are partial 
instantiations of experimental setups, which in turn are partial instantiations of 
experimental paradigms. The exact sense in which the relations hold will become 
clear in subsequent chapters when we deal with these components in detail.
1.3.3 Experimental Processes
Given this view of three levels of experiment, there are two main sets of 
processes needed to complete the picture.
One concerns those processes required to carry out an experiment. These 
processes involve (i) the selection of a particular experimental paradigm pven an 
appropriate manifestation of the phenomenon being investigated and (ii) the 
instantiation of this paradigm in an experimental setup that permits one to carry out 
experimental tests. Clearly, when a theory is being tested these processes are carried 
out with close reference to appropriate theoretical knowledge (as we shall see later).
The other type of process concerns the genesis of experiments. All the possible 
experimental paradigms in a research programme do not simply exist but must be 
conceived and manufactured by scientists. Experimental paradigms may already 
exist in another domain that a scientist may simply borrow and use in the domain of 
interest. However, scientists must also sometimes invent new experiments to carry 
out or continue a research program. I will not provide a full account of how new 
experiments are invented, since this is very much an open question. However, I 
will consider one method that has been used by scientists in the past, which 
involves the novel combination of two existing experimental paradigms to form a
-11-
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new paradigm. Other methods are left to future investigations and some no doubt 
are yet to be discovered.
1.3.4 Reliability Of Experiments
One of the important cornerstones of acceptable theoretical knowledge is the 
acceptability or trustworthiness of the experimental evidence on which the theory is 
based. Hence, there are important techniques for determining the reliability of 
experimental results. Specifically, it is essential to ensure that the input 
manipulations (inputs-M) are solely responsible for the changes to the phenomenon 
measured in the outputs. In terms of the black box conception of experimentation, 
other influences such as noise, artifactual events and errors, may affect the 
phenomenon rather than the Inputs-M, or may cause false readings in instruments 
measuring the outputs. The strategies to deal with such potential sources of errors 
have recently begun to be considered by philosophers of science (Hacking, 1983; 
Galison, 1987; Franklin, 1988; Gooding et.al.y 1989) and no complete model of 
scientific discovery can ignore them. We will see some of the techniques that have 
been used to overcome background noise, one common type of extraneous variable 
in experiments.
A Convenient Representation for the Structure O f Scientific Knowledge
Since research programmes are constituted by the combination of theory and 
experiment and the three types of theory and three levels experiment are related by 
partial instantiation, the framework can conveniently be represented as the hierarchy 
shown in Figure 1.2. However, for completeness, we also need some indication of 
the fact that the theory and experiment components communicate in various ways 
with one another.
1.4 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
The communication of the theory and experiment components is a central part 
of the process of scientific discovery. As theory and experiment each have three
-12-
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Introduction
different types of component there is substantial scope for many different levels and 
types of information transfer.
The most direct connection between theory and experiment occurs at the most 
specific level of each component As mentioned above, the terms of instances in the 
theory component directly represent experimental parameters in expeiimental^tests. 
Such terms and parameters may correspond to each other only if they are of the 
same type; that is, theoretical terms for quantities like time and distance refer directly 
to experimental parameters that measure time and distance. This acknowledges that 
quantitative physical scales of measurement, founded on base units (such as the 
metre, kilogram, second. Ampere etc.) defined by international convention, are 
universally adopted throughout the physical sciences (at least). The simplifying 
consequences of this view are that no special interpretation is needed to recognize a 
parameter given a term, or vice versa, and that numerical values of corresponding 
entities have the same magnitude. The role of this level of correspondence will be 
seen in the chapters below, along with many other types of communication between 
the two sides of scientific research programmes.
1.5 FRAM EW ORK SUMMARY, ORIGINS AND SCOPE
Figure 1.3 shows a graphical summary of the components of the framework. 
The framework permits a high level description of scientific discovery to be stated: 
In a scientific research programme a delimited set o f phenomena is investigated by 
experiment and characterized by theory. Experiment treats phenomena as black- 
boxes, manipulating the input parameters to observe the effects on output 
parameters. Theoretical knowledge consists o f state transformation functions that 
account fo r  the hidden contents o f the black boxes, inferred by the direct 
correspondence between theoretical instance terms and experimental test 
parameters. A t a more general level, models and hypotheses are formed, 
accounting for the phenomena across different experimental setups and paradigms.
-13-
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Introduction
This theoretical knowledge is assessed by acceptability criteria, which is influenced 
by the reliability o f the eyperiments carried out.
The framework is composed of a number of different concepts that have been 
moulded into an integrated whole. The sources of the ideas are many and varied, 
but some can be more clearly identified than others. The concept of research 
programmes in science is one that is well established in the philosophy of science 
(e.g. Lakatos, 1974). Research programmes are central to Lakatos's view of the 
methodology of science. However, research programmes in the framework are 
quite different in that they are defined not only in terms of the theoretical knowledge 
that is present but also with regard to the available experiments. Treating 
experiments as black boxes has its origins in Cheng (1988) that uses this 
conceptualization to compare the strategies used by experimenters with concepts 
from modem engineering control theory. The importance of independent and 
dependent theoretical terms is widely acknowledged throughout science. However, 
the development of the framework's state transformation function view of 
theoretical knowledge was influenced, in a very general way, by Holland et.al's  
(1986) representation of theories as clusters of rules. The idea that there are types of 
theory and levels of experiments comes, in part, from the different levels of 
constraint that Galison (1987) sees in theories and experiments. Finally, the 
correspondence level of communication between theory and experiments is closely 
related to scales of measurement, defined in terms of base units, that are ubiquitous 
in science and engineering.
It is clear that the framework is quite a general characterization of the nature of 
science. The framework can be applied to a great range of important scientific 
fields. In particular, the quantitative physical sciences can be dealt with most 
directly by the framework - it is this type of scientific research that we will consider 
in this thesis. However, other fields of science may also be considered. For
-14-
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instance, behaviourism in psychology seems likely to be amenable to a treatment by 
the framework. Nevertheless, we must mindful of potential exceptions to the 
framework. For example, Darwin's theory of evolution explains how species 
evolve by the environmental selection of individuals that differ due to random 
variations (the survival of the fittest). Further work will be required to show 
whether or not the Darwinian view of the evolutionary process can be expressed in 
terms of inputs and outputs to a state transformation function.
1.6 THESIS OVERVIEW
A framework for the characterization of scientific discovery has been 
introduced. The work throughout this thesis relies heavily on the framework. It is 
used: (i) to organize and analyse previous work; (ii) as the basis of a computational 
scientific discovery system; and (iii) to help address issues on the nature of research 
in cognitive science concerning scientific discovery.
1.6.1 Review Of Previous Work
There has been much previous work on scientific discovery in the fields of 
philosophy of science, cognitive psychology and AI. However, only the concrete 
work from cognitive science and AI is reviewed in this thesis (Chapter 2). 
Cognitive psychologists have performed empirical studies to investigate how 
humans perform particular scientific tasks and how they behave in simulated 
scientific discovery environments. Researchers in AI have built many computational 
systems that solve real scientific problems or that model episodes of discovery from 
the history of science. Work in both fields can be classified using four categories 
derived from the framework. The categories are defined in terms of which types of 
theoretical knowledge are given as initial conditions and what is done with that 
knowledge. The categories are: (i) the instance-driven formation of models; (ii) the 
hypothesis and model-driven generation of instances; (iii) assessing the acceptability 
of known hypothesis; and (iv) multiple-process systems that encompass all the
-15-
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previous categories. We will see that all of this work is limited in various ways, but 
one major deficit stands out: they all ignore the crucial role of experiments in 
scientific discovery.
1.6.2 Galileo's Discoveries On Natural Motion
Galileo is perhaps the first scientist in the modem sense of the term, because he 
not only theorized about the nature of phenomena, but performed experiments in 
which phenomena could be manipulated and accurately measured. A major part of 
this thesis is concerned with the computational modelling of Galileo's discoveries in 
the domain of the naturally accelerated motion of terrestrial bodies. We wül consider 
the experiments that Galileo used and the theories he postulated (in Chapter 3). 
Galileo manufactured experimental paradigms and used setups to design 
experimental tests. But more than that, he also invented novel experimental 
paradigms based on the ones he already had. Galileo initially assumed that laws 
originating from Aristotle were correct but soon found, by experimental testing, that 
they were unacceptable. Galileo then used various experiment-led and theory-led 
approaches to investigate natural motion. He obtained a deep understanding of the 
phenomenon in a qualitative manner, from which he eventually inferred his law of 
free fall. This law was tested using further experiments and shown to be the only 
generally acceptable hypothesis in the domain.
1.6.3 STERN The Discovery System
STERN (Scientific Theorist and Experimental Researcher, version N=0) is a 
computational model of scientific discovery (Chapter 4). It fully implements all of 
the aspects of the framework. STERN has a hierarchy of frames to instantiate the 
types of theory and the levels of experiment. Other frames represent theoretical 
terms and experimental parameters. This permits the modelling of communication 
between the theoretical and experimental components. The criteria for the 
acceptability of theories used in STERN is based on the relative success of instances
-16-
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and models, as applied to experimental setups and paradigms.
STERN models the Galilean episode, so it is given knowledge representations 
specific to that domain. Equations and special qualitative representations are used. A 
sub-program is invoked by STERN to simulate the performance of experiments. 
The experimental results produced by the simulator contain levels of noise that are 
realistic compared to the Galilean motion experiments.
Discovery processes in STERN are instantiated as rules (productions). A 
scheme based on the framework is used for the definition of the conditions and 
action of rules in a principled manner. Similarly, tasks comprising groups of rules 
are defined using the same scheme, with a clear distinction between domain-specific 
and domain-independent rules. STERN possesses 64 rules, grouped into 16 
classes, organized into a task hierarchy.
STERN successfully models the Galilean episodes of discovery. Given the 
Aristotelian laws as input it finds that they are unacceptable. STERN then goes on 
to perform experiments to obtain a body of results for generalizing into hypotheses. 
At this stage STERN makes what is arguably a "genuine" discovery - the law 
governing the period of swing of pendulums. All the hypotheses obtained by 
generalization are then analysed in order to discover the correct law of free fall. To 
show that this law is generally acceptable, STERN has to invent new experiments. 
The discovery path followed by STERN resembles closely the course that Galileo 
took.
1.6.4 STERN'S Discovery Strategies
STERN'S discovery abilities can be considered as four main strategies or tasks 
(subprograms). The most frequently used strategy is the confirmation of existing 
hypotheses (Chapter 5). This attempts to assess known hypotheses by generating 
models and instances with respect to particular experimental paradigms and setups. 
The degree of match between the predictive instances and the experimental tests
-17-
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forms the basis of the assessment of the acceptability of models, and in turn 
hypotheses.
STERN obtains new hypotheses using one of two strategies, (i) The data-led 
approach generalizes experimental results into hypotheses (Chapter 6). 
Experimental paradigms and setups are selected by STERN and experimental, tests 
are designed. The tests are performed and the results interpreted into instances. The 
instances are then generalized into hypotheses via models, (ii) The second method is 
the theory-led generation of new hypotheses from existing hypotheses (Chapter 7). 
Qualitative and quantitative hypotheses are used and they range over the whole 
spectrum of acceptability. The free fall law is found using this new hypothesis 
generation strategy.
STERN tries to confirm the new free fall hypothesis, but is unable to, since the 
hypothesis is intractable, given the original experimental paradigms that are 
available. Specifically, a wholly theoretical term in the free fall law cannot be 
replaced by some expression with only directly measurable terms. STERN chooses 
to employ the fourth strategy to overcome this problem. The strategy involves the 
invention of new experimental paradigms (Chapter 8). The new experiments bring 
together novel ways of combining experimental parameters, which in turn allows 
STERN to get around the theoretical terms that could not be eliminated.
These four strategies allow STERN to successfully model the Galilean episode. 
However, it is not simply that STERN possesses them that makes the system so 
successful; what is particularly important is the way in which the strategies interact 
overtime.
1.6.5 The Cognitive Science Of Scientific Discovery
The framework has been used to analyse previous work and it forms the basis 
of the STERN discovery system. This much shows that it has great utility. 
Furthermore, it can be used to analyse the nature of the scientific discovery in 
cognitive science, in a reflexive way (Chapter 9). We will see how all the entities
-18-
Introduction
and types of studies in cognitive psychology and AI map neatly on to the 
components in the framework. This provides a particular useful way of considering 
interesting issues about how scientific discovery has so far been studied in cognitive 
science. We will see in a general way why STERN is a significant advance on 
previous models. In particular, STERN is a much more complete model of scientific 
discovery. As such STERN shows that there are likely to be interesting discovery 
heuristics and abilities that only emerge when systems attain a certain level of 
complexity.
-19-
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Chapter 2
Previous Work
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Within Cognitive Science, scientific discovery is now a well-established and 
steadily growing area. However, research in the field has been far from 
homogenous; three distinct approaches can be discerned. First, some researchers 
have attempted to produce computational models that simulate discovery episodes 
from the history of science with varying degrees of fidelity (e.g. Langley et.al., 
1987; Kulkami & Simon, 1988). Others have attempted to solve existing scientific 
problems, using the power of computer technology, with no pretence to model 
human discovery abilities (e.g. Buchanan & Feigenbaum, 1978). Finally, there are 
empirical studies of people's discovery abilities carried out in simulated scientific 
domains where the phenomena are under the control of the experimenter (e.g. 
Gerwin, 1974; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). All of this work is relevant in some sense 
to the present thesis and will be called upon in the body of this chapter. However, 
the central concern of this thesis is the characterization of scientific discovery in 
computational systems -  modelling the processes of discovery. Hence, the first 
category of research, the computational models, wül predominate in the review.
2.1.1 Computational Models Of Discovery
Although only a fairly new field in AI, numerous discovery systems have 
already been developed. The number of programs is not only large (approximately 
twenty will be considered here) but the variety between them also great. There are 
many ways we can divide up the body of work formed by these programs. For 
example, one could group them in terms of the representations they adopt for 
scientific knowledge; ranging from ECHO'S (Thagard, 1989a) propositional
-20-
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representation to STAHL's (Langley et.al, 1987) predicate-attribute-value triples 
to the frames of IDS (Nordhausen & Langley, 1987). One could also classify the 
systems in terms of the architectures they adopt; whether it be production system 
(BACON, Langley et.al, 1987) or a parallel system (ECHO, Thagard, 1989a).
However, this review will be organized with respect to the processes of scientific 
discovery that emerge from the proposed framework (see Chapter 1). From this 
perspective four main concerns can be identified in the literature:
(§2.2) Data Driven Formation O f Models. These programs and empirical 
investigations are concerned with the processes that generate theoretical 
knowledge, typically laws, from empirical data. In terms of the framework, 
the processes generalize one or more instances to form a model.
(§2.3) Theory Driven Model And Instance Generation. These studies are 
concerned with processes that use theoretical knowledge often in conjunction 
with observational data, to generate new theoretical knowledge. Thus, this 
includes the formation of models from hypotheses and instances.
(§2.4) Assessing Hypothesis Acceptability. This is work that models the way the 
acceptability of hypotheses is assessed in isolation.
(§2.5) Multiple-Process Models. Programs in this category aU model a rich variety 
of discovery processes. They typically combine several of the individual 
processes considered above.
Each of these will be considered in turn later in the chapter. However, before we 
look at the programs and other research in detail it is worth considering some of the 
alternative general descriptions of scientific discovery in Cognitive Science that have 
been proposed.
2.1.2 General Accounts Of Scientific Discovery
The high level description of science has not been solely the province of 
philosophers of science. Some AI research has proposed general characterizations
-21-
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of scientific discovery.
Langley et.al. (1987, 18-20) consider scientific discovery to have four main 
phases which operate in a cyclical fashion to uncover new scientific knowledge: (i) 
data is gathered; (ii) parsimonious descriptions of the data are sought; (iii) 
explanatory theories are formulated; and (iv) these theories are tested. Since testing 
requires more data the procedure loops back to the first data gathering stage. The 
middle two phases can sometimes be condensed into a single stage when the 
parsimonious description acts as an explanatory theory. Furthermore, the data 
gathering phase comes in two forms: the observation of natural events; and the 
production of phenomena in experimental apparatus.
Reimann (1990) also considers the process of scientific discovery as a cycle, but 
one which only consists of three stages. Initially, theories are formulated and 
predictions are derived from them; then, the data is gathered that bears on the 
theory; and finally, the theories are tested by comparing the predictions with the 
data.
The similarity between the cyclical views is plain to see, but this means they also 
suffer from the same problem. Both characterizations are very general -  so general 
that they do not further our understanding of how scientific discovery occurs. At 
some vague abstract level the creative process can be said to be cyclical, but to hold 
that all discovery exactly fits this mould is not a tenable view.
A very different approach to these cyclic views is taken by Holland et.al. 
(1986). They view scientific discovery as a particular form of induction within their 
Framework for Induction. In this framework, models are represented as condition- 
action rules and hypotheses are clustered together. Scientific knowledge improves 
by modifying the strength of rules and hence heightening the likelihood of them 
being used. It also improves through the generation of rules under special triggering 
conditions. These conditions, such as the failure of predictions, help to ensure that 
new rules are relevant. Rules compete or cooperate by a principle of limited
-22-
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parallelism, and background knowledge plays a role in inference processes. The 
induction framework is coherent but it is too much like an algorithmic specification 
of a particular class of programs that are aimed at solving a limited range of 
problems. It is therefore not particularly revealing about the underlying character of 
scientific discovery. Further, it is a framework for induction in general, not just 
scientific discovery, so tends to emphasize some processes that are of minor 
significance whilst missing out others that may be unique to scientific discovery. 
These points wül become clearer when we consider the PI program later.
These descriptions of science are fairly process-oriented, that is they concentrate 
on how things happen in discovery. The framework presented in Chapter 1 is 
different in that it proposes a minimum set of components. The framework leaves 
open questions such as the specific order of discovery processes to be settled by 
computational modelling. Some general constraints are placed on the types of 
processes that can be considered, thus avoiding the vagueness of cyclical 
descriptions, but not to an extent that rigidly defines the processes even before the 
investigation has really begun, as in the Induction Framework. The present 
Framework sails between the two extremes.
But let us now look at the computational models of of scientific discovery in 
detail, starting with the ones that generalize instances to form models.
2.2 DATA DRIVEN FORMATION OF MODELS
A substantial proportion of work in AI on scientific discovery has concentrated 
on the generalization of instances (often called data) into models (typically referred 
to as laws) in situations where no prior theoretical knowledge of the domain exists. 
In this case the instances are interpreted experimental results, known to 
philosophers of science as empirical facts. Models are consequently parsimonious 
descriptions that summarize one or more instances. In this section we will see that 
the programs modelling this task vary greatly in their abilities. We wül also see that
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in and of themselves they give rather a sparse view of scientific discovery in 
general. A good proportion of these programs have been developed together under a . 
common approach, which I will call the BACON  school. It will be considered 
first.
2.2.1 The BACON School
The collection of programs developed by Langley et.al. (1987) is called the 
BAC O N  school after BACON, the best known program produced by these 
investigators. BACON has numerous versions and a suite of sibling programs: 
GLAUBER, STAHL, DALTON, FAHRENHEIT (Koehn & Zytkow, 1986; 
Zytkow, 1987) and GELL-MANN (Fisher & Zytkow, forthcoming). Figure 2.1 
shows the relationship between the various programs. All were developed under a 
common AI orientation that has been variously described in Langley et.al.{\9Zl, 
281-301), Zytkow & Simon (1988) and Langley & Zytkow (1989). It views 
scientific discovery as a problem solving task to be solved by heuristic search. This 
is a dramatic shift from their general view of scientific discovery as a cycle of 
various phases, described above. The need to adopt a different approach for the 
computation implementation only goes to further emphasize the vacuity of the cyclic 
view. The problem-solving-by-heuristic-search approach is most suitable for well 
defined tasks that have states that can be recursively generated and searched by a 
limited set of rules. The finding of parsimonious descriptions of data is ideal. All 
the BACON school of programs perform some variation on this basic theme and 
can be divided into two main groups depending on whether they deal with 
quantitative or qualitative data. Each class is described in turn.
22.1.1 Quantitative Programs - Five Versions O f BACON Plus FAHRENHEIT 
The BACON program, one of the best known scientific discovery systems, was
developed by Langley et.al. (1987) and has progressed though six versions. Some 
are built upon previous versions, but others are substantially independent (see
-24-
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Figure 2.1). All versions attempt to find quantitative laws that parsimoniously 
describe a series of numerical data, the exception being BAC0N.6 which will be 
considered later in §2.3.1.1.
The first version of the program, BACON. 1, finds a law describing the relation 
between just two quantitative terms. The sixteen production rules used are grouped 
into four main categories: data gathering and storage rules; regularity generators; 
higher-level term generators; and house keeping rules. Data gathering and storage 
mainly involves preparing variables and recording the series of values that have 
been obtained from the program user. The regularity generator heuristics examine 
the pairs of terms for certain types of regularities: (i) linearity, the terms are 
proportionally related; (ii) increasing, the magnitudes of both terms are 
monotonically increasing; (iii) decreasing, the magnitudes of one terms is 
monotonically increasing whilst the other is decreasing; and (iv) constancy, one 
term is (approximately) constant. Depending on the regularity spotted, the define 
new terms and calculate values group of heuristics forms new terms and calculates 
their values from the existing terms. The goal is to define a new term that has 
constant values or that is closer to constancy. For example, when the term P ranges 
over the values (1, 8, 27) and D ranges over the corresponding series (1,4, 9), the 
increasing regularity obtains and a new term is defined as the ratio of the terms, 
that is DIP. The values of the new term are then calculated and the regularity 
spotting process repeated for the D and DIP terms. A law is found when the new 
term has values that are constant. In the example, when the term D^iP^ is 
generated.
Any noise in the data is dealt with during the search for the constancy of a term. 
This involves a test in which all the calculated values must be within a specified 
maximum percentage deviation. A, of the mean, M, of the values. In other words, 
each value must fall within the interval [M(l-A), M(l+A)] around M.
Most of the other versions of BACON are based upon this theme. BAC0N.2
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finds polynomial laws by considering sequential regularities. BAC0N.3 accepts 
multiple input terms, rather than just a pair, and so is augmented with a set of 
heuristics that control the search through the terms in a systematic fashion. 
BACON.4 has heuristics that can identify intrinsic properties associated with 
nominal terms (the density of different bodies made of the same material js  an 
example of an intrinsic property). Many scientific laws exhibit symmetry, which 
B AC0N.5 exploits to improve its efficiency by assuming symmetry to dramatically 
cut down the number of combinations of terms it has to search through.
The BACON programs can find quantitative laws from numerical data relating 
together several terms, perhaps in a symmetrical equation, that may have intrinsic 
properties and contain some degree of noise. However, their abilities are limited in a 
number of ways. BACON copes with noisy data by employing the maximum- 
percentage-deviation technique. The technique has particular deficiencies. For 
example, a single erroneous value, in otherwise perfect data, may cause the 
technique to fail if the value falls outside the permitted band. Similarly, high noise 
levels would require large values of A, but this opens up the possibility that 
incorrect laws might satisfy the constant term test before the correct law is reached. 
Further problems have been noted by Walker (1987) and Langley gf.aZ.(1984) to 
do with irrelevant terms and the ordering of input terms. In science, discovering 
which terms are really relevant to a phenomenon is an important part of 
characterizing a domain. But BACON has no ability to find and eliminate such 
terms. Rather, it methodically searches though all the terms given as input to the 
same level of detail at the expense of performance and efficiency. However, even 
when the input terms are all relevant, the order in which they are presented must be 
carefully selected by the user, because the intermediate terms in BAC0N.3 on one 
level must be linearly related to the input term considered on the next level (Langley 
et.al., 1987, Chapter 3). Thus the program will fail if the data is presented in the 
"wrong" order. In effect BACON must be told which terms are independent and
-26-
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dependent variables. Fortunately, this problem has been tackled in FAHRENHEIT.
FAHRENHEIT (Koehn & Zytkow, 1986; Zytkow, 1987) employs BAC0N.3 
as a subprogram so can finds laws just like BACON. However, FAHRENHEIT 
also attempts to find the range of values over which the law is valid (in teims of the 
variables referred to by the law). For example. Black's law of specific heat 
concerns heat transfer between bodies of different mass, heat capacity and 
temperature, e.g. mixing mercury and water. However, it is limited to regions 
where no state transitions occur, such as the boiling of water into steam. For fixed 
quantities of mercury and water, only the initial temperatures of the substances 
affect the outcome of the process. So, FAHRENHEIT attempts to determine the 
region within which Black’s law remains valid by finding expressions that describe 
the boundaries of the law as it just breaks down, when the initial temperatures are 
varied. An additional feature possessed by FAHRENHEIT is the ability to rearrange 
the order in which terms are examined. As noted above,, the depth first search of 
BACON can fail to find a law if the user presents input terms in the "wrong" order, 
but FAHRENHEIT has a second level of search which proposes alternative 
combinations of terms whenever regularities are not found.
FAHRENHEIT is an advance on BACON as it not only finds a law but attempts 
to find the region within which it is valid with respect to certain dependent terms. 
Further, it has the ability to sort out the order of input terms for itself. However, the 
range of phenomena that can be modelled is very much more restricted than 
BACON, because the phenomena must have a region bounded by discontinuities. 
Although FAHRENHEIT considers the range of applicability of a law this should 
not be confused with the more usual sense in which theoretical knowledge is 
thought to be true. The description of the range of applicability simply characterizes 
another aspect of the law. Black's law is typically considered valid because it 
satisfactorily accounts for many different combinations of substances examined in
-27-
Previous Work
different experimental situations. FAHRENHEIT considers just one pair of 
substances.
22 .13  Qualitative Programs - GLAUBER, STAHL, DALTON & GELL-MANN
There are four programs that work on qualitative data in the BACON school. For 
the sake of brevity just one will be considered in detail as it is representative of the 
rest. I will consider STAHL (Langley et.al., 1987) (see Figure 2.1) in detail, 
because it forms the basis of later work on an interesting system called 
REVOLVER.
STAHL can find models of the chemical compositions of compounds in terms of 
their elements, given data consisting of ordered sets of reactions. Like GLAUBER 
and DALTON, STAHL uses a predicate attribute and value notation to represent 
chemical reactions. For example:
(reacts inputs {charcoal air) outputs (phlogiston ash a ir)) , . . . ( 2 .1)
states the reaction that is assumed to occur during the combustion of charcoal under 
the pre-oxygen phlogiston theory.
Three main heuristics are employed by STAHL to find models of the 
compositions of substances. INFER-COMPONENTS is a heuristic that posits that one 
substance is composed of two others. When a reaction synthesizes the substances B 
and C into A, or A decomposes into the B and C, INFER-COMPONENTS reasons that 
A is composed of B and C. Once A is known to be a compound, the SUBSTITUTE 
heuristic may swap B and C for A in reaction equations. REDUCE removes 
occurrences of the same substance from both sides of a single reaction equation.
STAHL invokes the three heuristics is a specific order. INFER-COMPONENTS is 
first applied alone to the input reactions. Then REDUCE followed by INFER-COMPO­
NENTS. Finally, SUBSHTUTE, REDUCE and then INFER-COMPONENTS in that order. 
The results of each path followed are analysed individually for reaction equations 
that are consistent; this is to say that their sides balance. Specific backtracking 
methods are employed to deal with inconsistencies (e.g., nothing on one side of a
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reaction equation) and circular definitions (e.g., a compound constituted by itself 
and another substance). In certain cases identification heuristics may be required to 
infer, for example, that two substances occurring in two similar equations are in fact 
the same.
GLAUBER and DALTON also work in the domain of chemistry but operate on 
different levels. GLAUBER takes specific observations about chemicals (e.g. their 
tastes and the reactions they have been involved in). It attempts to find classes of 
chemicals with similar properties and general reactions across those classes. 
DALTON considers componential models of the stmcture of substances in terms of 
constituent molecules and atoms. The descent down the scale of entities continues 
with the GELL-MANN system (Fisher & Zytkow, forthcoming), that discovers 
Quark models that explain the properties of families of subatomic particles. Grossly 
simplified, GELL-MANN proposes models based on different numbers and types 
of quarks. Those that do not satisfy the additivity law (which states that for each 
attribute, the sum of the values over component quarks must equal the particle's 
value) are eliminated.
An obvious limitation of the qualitative models in the BACON school is that they 
only use qualitative reasoning, with the exception of GELL-MANN. It seems 
highly likely that the power of GLAUBER, STAHL and DALTON could be 
substantially enhanced if quantitative techniques were to supplement the existing 
qualitative heuristics. For instance, Proust's law of definite proportions was of 
great significance in (John) Dalton's thinking and discoveries (Holten & Roller, 
1958). Heuristics based on this law may help reduce the DALTON program's 
search space considerably. The importance of modelling both quantitative and 
qualitative inferences in a complementary manner within a single system is an issue 
that recurs several times in this review.
22.1.3 The BACON School Programs As General Models O f Scientific Discovery
How realistic are the programs in the school as general models of scientific
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discovery? Even in terms of the general description of the scientific enterprise given 
by the BACON school their programs do not cover much ground. The general 
description considers phases including: (i) data gathering; (ii) finding parsimonious 
descriptions of the data; (iii) formulating explanatory theories; and (iv) testing these 
theories. Of the four phases outlined only the second, formation of parsimonious 
descriptions of data, phase is considered in detail. The data gathering heuristics do 
not model the observation of natural events or the production of phenomena in 
experimental apparatus. Furthermore, once a satisfactory law has been found most 
of the programs do not use the law to make further inferences (the one exception 
being FAHRENHEIT). Finally, the processes involved in the third and fourth 
phases, the formulation and testing of explanatory theories are not modelled at all. 
With respect to the present framework (Chapter 1), the models formulated are not 
generalized into hypotheses and the acceptability of theoretical knowledge is not 
assessed.
2.2.2. Combined Qualitative & Quantitative Inference
IDS and ABACUS are programs that fit into the data driven formation of models 
category, but they are more sophisticated than the work of the BACON school. 
Each program possesses qualitative and quantitative representations and uses 
qualitative and quantitative heuristics to finds models from instances.
22.2.1 Integrated Discovery System (IDS)
IDS is an integrated discovery system in that it integrates quantitative and 
qualitative inferences (Nordhausen and Langley, 1987)^. Like FAHRENHEIT, 
IDS works with phenomena that exhibit discontinuities when some independent 
variable is increased. For example, IDS attempts to characterize the changes that 
occur when a quantity of ice is heated, melts into water and eventually boils into 
steam. The systems begins by characterizing the phenomenon using qualitative
1 Although Langley helped develop IDS, it does not fit the BACON school mould. The program 
does not recursively search an homogenous state space using a single group of heuristics.
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schemata to record the changes between states as heat is supplied. The schemata, 
represented as frames, have three slots containing: descriptions of objects present 
and their phase (e.g. solid ice and liquid water); specifications of the quantitative 
conditions of attributes of these objects (e.g. weight greater than zero, constant 
temperature), and process descriptions of changes to variables (e.g. positive rate of 
weight increase). A new schema is induced whenever a limit point, or state 
transition, is found. The qualitative schemas are used to infer two types of law: (i) 
constancies over all objects of a given class, such as the invariant melting point of 
water across different samples; and (ii) constancies within a single qualitative 
schema, such as the conservation of mass as ice melts into water.
IDS's quantitative discovery abilities are rather limited. The rich vein of 
information available in the qualitative schema is barely exploited in the inference to 
quantitative laws. This limitation is due more to lack of development than to any 
underlying weakness of the approach. Even so, IDS does begin to demonstrate how 
the combination of the quantitative and qualitative abilities can lead to more 
powerful discovery models. For instance, an effective solution to FAHRENHEIT'S 
inability to search for quantitative laws across and between state transitions is now 
available in IDS.
2 2 2 2  ABACUS
ABACUS (Falkenhainer & Michalski, 1986) considers qualitative and 
quantitative inferences in the reverse order to IDS. The finding of equations that 
describe numerical data comes first, in a manner that superficially resembles the 
BACON programs but is more sophisticated in five respects. First, ABACUS can 
find separate equations for a set of data by searching portions of the data where the 
relation between the variables is not monotonie. Like BACON regularity-spotting 
heuristics are used: Prop"^ and Prop' are analogous to BACON's increase and 
decrease regularities, and Prop‘s and Norel indicate insufficient data is available or 
that there is no relation, respectively. Second, the qualitative relations between the
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input terms are all found at once, thus eliminating irrelevant terms at an early stage. 
Third, as an initial best guess, a single equation composed of all the relevant terms 
is proposed. The equation is based on the noted and Prop' regularities, with 
the hope that the main protracted rigorous search may be avoided. Fourth, the main 
search for equations considers products, ratios, sums and differences of terms 
(nodes) on a current level and defines new nodes on the next level by 
proportionality testing of all previous nodes. The search space is reduced by 
suspending those branches that seem farthest firom constancy. Fifth, the search 
space is further constrained by three rules concerned with certain types of 
equations, (i) Equations that do not have balanced units according to dimensional 
considerations cannot be valid. They are eliminated. The units for particular terms 
are user specified inputs, (ii) Some equations are mathematically equivalent, but 
syntactically different. Only mathematically different equations are retained, (iii) 
Terms in equations that can be tiivially cancelled are cancelled out. ABACUS'S 
equation finding abilities are both extensive and powerful.
The quantification process employs the AQ algorithm (Falkenhainer & Michalski, 
1986, 386-8) that has two main stages: the first finds sets of attributes that can 
distinguish equations from each other; the second takes the best set of attributes for 
each equation as a positive instance, and finds the maximally general description 
that does not cover any other equation. The resultant quantification is in effect the 
precondition for the application of the equation.
The abilities of ABACUS clearly surpass those of BACON. The system copes 
efficiently with irrelevant variables and does not need to be told which ones are 
independent or dependent. Multiple equations are found for discontinuous data and 
quantified in a manner that achieves the same result as FAHRENHEIT'S validity 
expressions. The units of the terms are acknowledged and play a significant role in 
the identification of valid equations. In fact, this is the first program, of all the ones
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SO far considered, that really seems to have terms that refer to observed or measured 
quantities, because of the presence of units. As we will see below, more complete 
models of discovery need to exploit this technique more fuUy. The use of units is an 
example of the correspondence between the theoretical terms in instances and the 
parameters in experimental tests - the most direct form of communication between 
the theoretical and experimental components considered by the framework.
We have now seen several computer programs that successfully make 
generalizations from data, using a wide range of different techniques. But how do 
humans perform such tasks? Do they use similar methods -  like spotting trends in 
numerical values to find equations? The empirical studies that have studied this task 
will now be considered. They provide a few answers to these questions.
2.2.3 Empirical Studies Of Generalizations From Data
We are considering how instances are generalized in order to form models. 
Computational systems that perform this task were discussed above. However, this 
is something that humans scientists are well able to do and have been doing long 
before the invention of computers. So, it is not surprising that this particular aspect 
of the human scientific discovery has been investigated empirically. In all the 
studies, the investigators typically have control over the data presented to the 
subjects.
223 .1  Equations From Numerical Data
In the two studies undertaken by Gerwin (1974) and Qin & Simon (1990) 
subjects were given two lists of related numbers (pairs of cartesian (x,y) 
coordinates). Gerwin's data was generated from equations like:
y = x.cos X  + x ^ / 2  + k.e^ , . . .  (2.2)
where k.e^ is a function that adds noise. Qin & Simon's subjects were given data 
that satisfied Kepler's third law; that is D^ /  p2 = C, where D is the distance from 
the sun, P the period of revolution and C a constant
Gerwin's subjects were presented with the data plotted on a graph and suggested
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an equation composed of functions from a given list. New data points were 
calculated from the suggested equation and plotted by the experimenter. 
Additionally, comparisons between the new and the original data points were 
plotted. The subject examined the new information and suggested further equations 
until satisfied that the correct one had been found. The analysis of the protocols 
over a number of different subjects and data sets permitted Gerwin to write a 
computer program simulating the behaviour of the subjects. Then both the computer 
program and new human subjects took part in a second series of similar 
experimental trials. Both found correct equations with an accuracy of approximately 
forty per cent, with a close match between the program and human solutions. 
However, the types and sequence of processes used by the two varied in all but the 
simplest cases.
Qin & Simon (1990) found that the subjects' behaviour can be described in terms 
of two levels of search: function spotting and parameter search. Function spotting 
refers to processes of finding the general form of the equation (e.gJ, an exponential 
rather than a sinusoidal function). Diagrams and graphs were typically used for this 
purpose. Parameter search involves finding the magnitudes of constants.
Three conclusions of relevance to computer modelling can be drawn from the 
two studies. First, BACON-like regularity-spotting heuristics model human 
scientists, in certain circumstances, when looking for trends in data and proposing 
new equations. Second, qualitative techniques (like graphs and diagrams) are used 
by humans in the interrogation of data, often as a short cut to blindly applying 
quantitative analysis techniques. Third, the underlying variability in the performance 
of human subjects is great even in the simple tasks in the experiments. Thus, there 
is little hope of successfully simulating every little step in processes that bring about 
a discovery - the discovery paths of Gerwin's program and humans varied 
substantially. This supports the view that modelling  is preferable to exact 
simulation.
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2 2 3 2  WAS0N's 2  4 6’ Experimental Paradigm
Wason's (1960) '2 4 6' task is the basis of an experimental paradigm that has 
been used to investigate how scientists propose expressions that explain data. The 
paradigm has been the subject of an extensive programme of research (see Evans, 
1989, for a review). In the basic paradigm the experimenter has a rule in minà that 
describes the structure of numerical triples (e.g. 2 4 6). The subject attempts to 
find this rule by proposing triples and being told whether they are instances of the 
rule. Classically, the rule is 'Any ascending sequence' and the subject is initially 
told that '2 4 6' is a positive example. Subjects typically posit rules like 
'Ascending with equal intervals' and only propose triples that are positive instances 
of their own rule. This is has been taken as evidence that humans exhibit 
confirmatory bias', namely the fundamental tendency to only seek information 
consistent with present beliefs. This has been used to argue against the Popperian 
falsificationist view of scientific discovery (Evans, 1989).
The main criticism to make of research under the Wason paradigm is that the 
'2 4 6' task only bears a superficial resemblance to real-life scientific discovery. 
For example, binary feedback about whether the proposed is an instance of the 
target rules is supposed to represent experimental tests. Experiments provide a rich 
source of information even when negative outcomes are obtained. Other criticisms 
along this line are that: the experiment is rigidly predefined; the mapping between 
experiments and laws is obvious; and there is no parallel of prior knowledge and the 
semantics of real situations under the Wason paradigm. As we shall see later, Klahr 
& Dunbar (1988) recognize these limitations and have been motivated to perform a 
study on a much more realistic scientific discovery context.
We can draw the following general conclusion. Apart from supporting the view 
that regularity-spotting heuristics may be a reasonable model of certain aspects of 
instance generalization, the empirical research does not provide much information
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that is useful to the computational model builder.
2.2.4 Lim itations Of Data Generalization Models & Studies
In this section, we have seen a wide range of programs and reviewed empirical 
studies that have focussed on the inference to models that parsimoniously describe 
data. However, as general models of scientific discovery they are far Jrom  
complete. The generalization of data into laws is an important part of scientific 
discovery but it is by no means all or even the most significant part. Major issues 
are left unanswered by the research. How are the data obtained in the first place? 
What happens when the data are unreliable (e.g., noisy)? Typically, these programs 
take just one set of data as input and find one law, whereas scientists usually gather 
many sets of data from different experiments and consider multiple models. 
Furthermore, models themselves also become the subject of inferential processes 
when their acceptability across different experimental situations is assessed or when 
they are generalized to form higher-level theoretical knowledge (i.e., instances). 
Also, laws may be used to help infer new theoretical knowledge.
Fortunately, there are other programs that have considered some of these issues, 
to which we will now turn.
2.3 THEORY DRIVEN MODEL AND INSTANCE GENERATION 
The programs examined in this section all possess some theoretical knowledge 
from the start. The knowledge (hypotheses or models) is used typically in 
conjunction with data to infer further theoretical knowledge. A mixed bag of 
programs are considered but they can be divided into groups according to the 
particular task to which they put their theoretical knowledge. The first group deals 
with the modification of unacceptable models into forms that more closely account 
for phenomena. The second group employs valid hypotheses that are used to 
generate models, or valid models that are used to generate instances, relating to a 
specific situation.
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2.3.1 Modification Of Given Models
The programs here all possess a model that is almost adequate and use data in 
order to modify and improve that model.
23.1 .1  BAC0N.6
This version of BACON (Langley et.al., 1986) differs from the preyious 
versions (Langley et.al., 1987) because it does not find a model from data but is 
given the correct model as its input; for example Y = aX + b. However, the 
values of the constants a and b are unknown so BAC0N.6 attempts to find the 
values that give the best fit to the data. Thus, the program searches through a space 
of possible combinations of values of the constants, where each state in the space 
differs from a previously visited state with respect to the value of just one constant. 
New constant values are calculated by incrementing (or decrementing) the value by 
a geometrically decreasing amount. The control strategy here is a beam search
version of hill climbing, with termination when an invariant set of constant values is
 ^  ^ • • •  . . .  • found.
The task that this version of BACON performs is limited, but even the manner in 
which it is performed is very inefficient. Scientists are likely to have some idea of 
which constant is most significant and therefore consider a smaller number of 
combinations. Important constants will likely emerge naturally when a wider 
context of scientific discovery is modelled.
23.1.2 STAHLp & REVOLVER
Unlike the other qualitative programs of the BACON school, STAHL’s abilities 
have been developed further. The program becomes STAHLp in Rose & Langley 
(1986) and is improved by augmenting the representation of reactions with reduced 
lists and source tags. The reduced lists store details about which substances are 
eliminated from reactions or componential models by the REDUCE heuristic. Source 
tags indicate at what stage each substance was first considered. This information 
improves the accuracy of the program in its actual generation of models and permits
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the use of an enhanced mechanism for recovering from erroneous inferences.
In Rose (1988a) STAHLp evolves into the REVOLVER system. The new 
program uses an evaluation function to assess which of the alternative models 
should be modified. The evaluation function calculates a value for each model based 
on factors such as the number of.beliefs supported and the number of substances in 
the reaction. This value measures the desirability of modifying each model using 
criteria concerned with the minimum mutilation of the data base, conservatism and 
complexity. Two further REVOLVER enhancements (Rose, 1988b) have been 
implemented. First, the program can cope with multiple models considered by 
different agents using degrees of belief supplied as inputs. The fixed belief values 
help to order the sequence in which the models are considered. Second, 
REVOLVER is given the ability to postulate new substances when certain types of 
inconsistency arise during inferencing.
In conclusion, REVOLVER possesses sophisticated theory revision abilities but 
they are mostly domain-specific. The latest version has the user input degrees of 
belief assigned to models that are somewhat like measures of acceptability. 
However, the degrees of belief are not amended during the model revision or any 
other process. In addition to REVOLVER, only ECHO (Thagard, 1989a: see 
below) has attempted to model separate agents in scientific discovery. However, 
this ability in REVOLVER is limited and can be viewed merely as a mechanism for 
partitioning and storing sets of premises that are dealt with sequentially. An 
adequate model of separate researchers working on the phenomenon would require 
intercommunication between the agents; with, for example, specific challenges and 
defenses of particular premises.
23.1.3 COPER
COPER (Kokar, 1986) takes an equation as input and uses dimensional 
considerations to determine whether it has missing or redundant arguments. Briefly,
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dimensional analysis is based on the fact that equations normally relate together 
terms standing for independent physical quantities (e.g., length, mass, time). The 
fundamental point to note is that the units on both sides of the equation must 
balance. COPER's abilities to find missing or redundant terms relies on tests for 
dimensional consistency in equations.
COPER can make various inferences about equations just by examining their 
dimensionality. The program can do this because of its knowledge of the units of 
theoretical terms. This knowledge is derived from the fact that experimental 
quantities are defined on scales of measurements using base units (e.g., the metre, 
kilogram, second). As such. Coper is another case which indicates the importance 
of theoretical inferences having access to knowledge about experiments through the 
correspondence between theoretical terms and experimental parameters.
2.3.2 G enerating Models & Instances From  Hypotheses & Models 
We have seen how theoretical knowledge can be found by the generalization of 
instances to form models. Now we will look at another way in which theoretical 
knowledge can be generated. In particular, we will consider how hypotheses or 
models can be used to generate less general models or instances. In terms of the 
present framework all the programs perform similar tasks, so for the sake of 
exposition the approach adopted by particular groups of research will be used to 
classify the systems.
2 3 2 .1  Engineering Systems
Many AI programs have been development that solve real scientific problems 
using the sheer information processing power of computers. The researchers who 
adopt this approach have no intention of modelling human capabilities, so their 
programs can be called Engineering Systems. Engineering systems employ 
established scientific knowledge to make specific discoveries in well delimited 
domains.
Just one such discovery system, MetaDendral, is considered in detail in this
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section. Other examples of engineering AI discovery programs are: PROSPECTOR 
(Duda et.al., 1979; Campbell et.al., 1982), which was designed to help geologists 
in mineral exploration and has successfully predicted ore deposits; MOLGEN 
(Friedland & Kedes, 1985), which acts as an intelligent assistant for molecular 
biologists; and PROTEAN (Hayes-Roth et.al., 1986), which derives protein 
structure from constraints.
MetaDendral's (Buchanan & Feigenbaum, 1978) task is to find rules for the 
fragmentation of molecules in mass spectrometry. The inputs are structural 
descriptions of molecules and their mass spectra. The program is composed of three 
sub-programs that are called in sequence to perform particular tasks. The first sub­
program simulates a run of a molecule through a mass spectrometer to find the 
points at which the molecules are cleaved. The second sub-program generates rules 
that describe the bond environment surrounding each break, starting with the most 
general rule that can be considered as an hypothesis. The final sub-program refines 
the rules by generalization or specialization in comparison with real mass 
spectrographs, and ranks them according to their predictive accuracy. MetaDendral 
has successfully found previously unknown rules for certain classes of molecules, 
and has been modified to perform Carbon-13 analysis of molecular structure in 
organic chemistry (Gray, 1984).
Gray et.al. (1988) consider MetaDendral as an example of Explanation-Based 
Generalization (e.g. Mitchell et.al., 1986). EBG is a technique that attempts to 
explain data (mass spectra) by forming semi-empirical laws (the fragmentation 
rules) from a domain theory (the hypothesis). The technique is established in AI but 
whether it is applicable to the general modelling of theory-led discovery is 
debatable. It is seldom the case in scientific discovery that acceptable hypotheses 
and instances are both available when no intermediate models exist. When an 
hypothesis precedes other things scientists tend to generate predictive models before 
data is gathered. Similarly, when only instances exist they tend to be generalized to
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form models before hypotheses are inferred (however see Rajomoney et.al., 
1985).
Scientific discovery has not been the only form of discovery that has been 
considered in AI. Two important discovery programs need to be mentioned that 
work in domains that are not strictly scientific. They are L en a t's  AM and 
EURISKO (Davis & Lenat, 1982; Lenat 1983; Lenat & Brown, 1984). Both are 
given as input some detailed information about their discovery domains, and Lenat 
does not intend them to be considered as direct models of human discovery abilities, 
so his programs are engineering systems. AM and EURISKO are particularly 
effective and successful designs for discovery systems. They use concepts 
represented as frames, manipulated by heuristics expressed as productions, with a 
best-first search of tasks guided by heuristics that modify "interestingness" and 
"worth" of concept slots. AM makes discoveries in pure mathematics and 
EURISKO has, for example, successfully played a war game that involves 
designing battle fleets.
23.2.2 Models O f Problem Solving
There has been much research in Cognitive Science on scientific problem solving 
which typically takes a theory-led approach in which high-level principles, such as 
Newton's laws, are applied to particular situations.
Larkin et.al. (1980) model the behaviour of expert and novice humans in the 
domain of kinematic and dynamic physics problems. Their program, implemented 
as a production system, starts with a problem and a stock of principles. (For 
example, the problem might state that a block is sliding down a ramp with a certain 
coefficient of friction and that the speed after a certain period of time is desired.) 
The set of relevant principles are applied successively until all the unknown 
variables can be eliminated (the program does not actually manipulate the 
equations). The difference between novices and experts is captured by two
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strategies. Novice behaviour is characterized by means-ends analysis in which 
principles are selected according whether they reduce the difference between the 
current problem state and the desired goal. The experts are modelled by a 
knowledge development strategy that selects principles which permit the finding 
of the value of a new variable. In this way new information is generated at^each 
stage that follows directly from the known equations. (See Bundy et.al., 1979, and 
Luger, 1980, for other programs in this domain.)
Jones & Langley (1988) take a different approach and attempt to build certain 
properties of human problem solving behaviour into their EUREKA program. Four 
properties are considered: the use of heuristic methods; being non-systematic; 
performance improvement with experience; and, being sufficiently insightful to 
respond to external stimuli. Specific techniques are used to model each property. 
For example, EUREICA models the non-systematic property by not backtracking 
whilst problem solving using means-ends analysis. Although an interesting 
approach it does rather beg the questions being investigated in scientific problem 
solving.
Clearly, scientific problem solving and scientific discovery are related. In the 
context of theory-led inferences, finding equations to solve a particular problem is 
akin to the generating of predictions from hypotheses in order to account for a 
particular experimental paradigm. Nevertheless, they differ in an important respect. 
Problem solvers assume the stock of principles to be true when they infer an 
equation to describe the motion of a block sliding down a ramp. However, in 
discovery the aim is to determine which of the principles, if any, are acceptable. 
Which strategies scientists performing discovery follow - means-end analysis or 
knowledge development - and whether the uncertainty about the truth of hypotheses 
influences the strategies, are open questions for the future.
Another area of AI that treats problem solving is Qualitative Reasoning. As the 
name implies the approach involves purely qualitative attempts to build models of
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physical devices (such as regulators) and to perform various kinds of reasoning task 
on the models. (See Cohn, 1989, for a review.)
The modelling of scientific problem solving is closely related to scientific 
discovery but they are different. Problem solving tends to start with accepted true 
theoretical knowledge, whereas such knowledge must first be uncovered in 
discovery. The application of this knowledge to particular situations in problem 
solving aims to explain or account for the situation, whereas in discovery the aim is 
also to test the validity of the knowledge.
2.5.2.5 An Architecture For Theory Driven Scientific Discovery
An alternative to the above problem solving approach is Sleeman et.aVs (1989) 
architecture for theory-driven scientific discovery based on the analysis of an 
episode of discovery. BLAGDEN is a system being developed with this 
architecture. Discovery starts with a weak theory (e.g. a Newtonian description of 
planetary motion in the solar system) that is an instance of an acceptable core theory 
(Newton's laws). The weak theory needs to be adapted to account for a new 
situation (the discovery of a new planet) by proposing informal qualitative models. 
These models identify the relevant dependent terms (such as periods of revolution) 
and help to specify law frameworks. A law framework delimits the space of 
quantitative laws. Finally, input data is used to infer the actual law. Throughout the 
procedure the core theory and background knowledge are used in the various 
inference steps.
The fact that the architecture is based on the analysis of a particular episode of 
discovery means it is likely to be a successful model. However, it also suggests that 
it is unlikely to be more generally applicable to other cases of discovery. Further, as 
in the problem solving models, the core theory is given as input and assumed to be 
correct, whereas an important part of theory-driven discovery is the demonstration 
that high-level theoretical knowledge is acceptable in the first place.
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2.32.4 Limited Experimental Design
To finish the review of programs in this section, we will briefiy consider a 
theory-led system that differs from the rest, because it has a limited ability to design 
experiments. Rajamoney et.al.'s (1985) system (with no name) has beliefs about 
processes involving fluids, such as flow and evaporation. The system niiakes 
predictions using the beliefs that apply to specific situations, in order to test their 
validity. When a prediction fails the system attempts to find out why, by examining 
the beliefs that are closest to the unexpected behaviour. This is done by designing 
experiments to differentiate between the processes. For example, by maximizing the 
surface area in contact with the air, whilst minimizing the contact area with the 
vessel, the system can distinguish between evaporation and absorption. This is 
certainly an interesting approach, but unfortunately it has not been explored in any 
depth, or applied to other domains.
2.3.3 Limitations Of The Theory-Led Discovery Systems
The obvious criticism of the theory-led discovery systems is that they do not 
model how the theoretical knowledge, supplied as input, is generated in the first 
place. More productively, we can say that an adequate model of scientific discovery 
must include processes for both data-led inference to theoretical knowledge (as 
considered in §2.2) as well as theory-led processes that apply such knowledge.
Even though we have seen, in this section, many different types of inferences 
using theory it is clear that some aspects are absent. First, the assessment of the 
acceptability of theoretical knowledge has not been modelled; the programs usually 
proceed directly to a single answer that is assumed to be coirect. Second, the role of 
experiments is absent, their only manifestation takes the form of true and accurate 
experimental results. Nor does theory-led discovery model the generation of new 
theories from unacceptable theories. BAC0N.6, REVOLVER and COPER improve 
given theories but no programs use the information about a phenomenon that is
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encapsulated in partly or totally unacceptable theories. Unacceptable theories may 
indicate that portions of the hypothesis space need not be searched as the terms to 
which they refer could be irrelevant. Similarly, partially acceptable theories may 
suggest which terms are likely to be relevant -  this is an idea underlying Sleeman's 
theory-driven discovery architecture.
Fortunately, the assessment of acceptability of theories has been considered in 
Cognitive Science.
2.4 ASSESSING HYPOTHESIS ACCEPTABILITY & ECHO
We will now consider the assessment of the acceptability of theories by a system 
that does not also model how the theories were obtained in the first place.
Thagard (1989a) proposes a Theory of Explanatory Coherence that is 
implemented in the ECHO computer program. The program assesses the 
acceptability of competing mature research programmes that have investigated the 
same set of phenomena; for example when the oxygen theory of combustion was 
becoming a real challenge to the previously dominant Phlogiston theory.
The theory, stated as seven principles, considers the coherence of explanations 
within a scientific theory as the basis for judging the acceptability of theories. 
Explanatory coherence relations between propositions are symmetrical and several 
propositions are deemed to cohere if they explain a common proposition. 
Propositions incohere when propositions are contradictory. Observations or data 
are assumed to have their own acceptability (a data priority principle) and there is 
coherence associated with analogies. The specific acceptability of a proposition is 
determined by its coherence with the system it is in and the overall coherence of a 
system is a function of the pairwise coherence of its propositions.
To maintain the holistic nature of the theory, Thagard adopts the connectionist 
paradigm to implement the theory in ECHO. Like all connectionist systems, ECHO 
possesses nodes and links; the nodes represent propositions and links the
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explanatory coherence relations. The weight or activation of links is positive for 
coherence and negative for contradiction. The nodes representing observational data 
are connected to special nodes that have a constant level of activation to instantiate 
the data priority principle. Analogies are modelled in ECHO by providing links 
between pairs of propositions that are similar, with a user set ’analogy in tac t' 
parameter that adjusts the significance of these groups. Each run of the network 
begins with an even distribution of the activation of nodes and a standard 
connectionist algorithm is used to update the activations at each cycle. ECHO halts, 
typically after many tens of cycles, when the activation levels of all the nodes have 
reached asymptotes. The degree of activation of the nodes indicates the relative 
acceptability of the propositions.
Normally ECHO is used to model the competing acceptability of the two sides of 
a scientific debate. The user analyses historical material, seeking the main concepts, 
data, arguments and explanations involved, and then encodes this in a network. The 
range of episodes is extensive, including: the oxygen phlogiston debate (Thagard, 
1989a & in press); Darwin versus creationism (Thagard, 1989a); dinosaur 
extinction (Thagard, 1988b & 1989a); the continental drift debate (Thagard, 
forthcoming); and, two examples of trial jury reasoning (Thagard, 1989a).
A host of criticisms of the theory of explanatory coherence and ECHO can be 
found in the open peer commentaries that accompany Thagard's (1989a) 
Behavioral and Brain Science article (see e.g., Cheng & Keane, 1989b). Here, 
three criticisms not previously considered will focus on the adequacy of ECHO as a 
general model of the assessment of the acceptability of theories.
First, a generally adequate theory of the assessment of acceptability should be 
applicable to all stages in scientific discovery, not just the revolutionary periods 
considered by Thagard. Consider, for example, the assessment of a theory as new 
evidence and explanations are incorporated over time. Should ECHO (i) be run 
from scratch each time a new node or link is required, or (ii) can new elements be
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added during a particular run when appropriate? Both options are problematic. The 
first may lead to the abandonment of a theory in its infancy even though it may in 
the long run be the most acceptable (e.g. the early development of oxygen theory in 
the presence of the phlogiston precursor). To prevent such occurrences, explanatory 
coherence will require something like a disbelief suspension mechanism, but this 
goes well beyond the scope and principles of the original theory. The second option 
(apparently favoured by Thagard; see Ranney & Thagard, 1988) leads to the 
problem of interpreting how the cycles of updating activation represent time or map 
onto events in a discovery episode. This will inevitably be arbitrary as the theory is 
atemporal. Thus, it can be concluded that ECHO cannot adequately model 
acceptability assessment in general without ad hoc assumptions. For this, and other 
reasons, Cheng & Keane (1989b) contend that a symbolic approach may be more 
adequate.
Second, although Thagard claims that the successful modelling of many episodes 
by ECHO demonstrates the validity of the Theory of Explanatory Coherence, it is 
by no means conclusive. The theory claims that it is not only explanatory breadth 
that measures acceptability, but that simplicity, analogies and contradictions have a 
substantial role. These properties should have a substantive role in the selection of 
the most acceptable theory by ECHO. However, this is not the casé. Table 2.1 
shows the numbers of data propositions explained by competing theories in 
episodes of discovery modelled by ECHO. The theories that ECHO finds most 
acceptable always possess the greatest number of data propositions. So explanatory 
breadth alone is sufficient to distinguish acceptable theories; ECHO could achieve 
the same result just by counting the numbers of data propositions. Furthermore, 
Thagard has analysed the relative contributions of the various aspects of 
Explanatory Coherence (Thagard, forthcoming. Table 10.2) and finds that 
explanatory breadth is by far the most important, with simplicity occasionally
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Table 2.1 Evidence Proposition Numbers In ECHO
E pisode
(reference)
Participants* Evidence Propositions 
Explained
Oxygen-Phlogiston Lavoisier - oxygen 8
(Thagard, 1989a) Phlogiston theorists 3 '
Evolution Darwin 13
(Thagard, 1989a) Creationists 4
Dinosaur debate Comet 9
(Thagard, 1988) Volcano 3
Dinosaurs revisited Terrestrial 13
(Thagard, 1989b) Comet 7
Continental Drift Wegner 20
(Thagard, forthcoming) Fixists 10
^ECHO finds the top participant in each episode the most acceptable.
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having a role, and the rest being of minor or no utility. This damaging criticism 
could be parried by ECHO successfully modelling a real episode of discovery 
where one theory is clearly more acceptable than another, even though they both 
explain the same amount of evidence.Whether such a case exists and how ECHO 
would deal with it remains to be seen. ^
Third, Explanatory Coherence assumes that empirical data have an inherent 
acceptability. However, this view is not justified, because the strength of support 
given to a theory accounting for an experimental result varies according to the 
reliability of the experiment. Scientists are wary of experimental phenomena that 
have not been reliably demonstrated and are able to judge the degree to which 
experimental evidence is acceptable, which is by no means a constant across all 
types of experiment.
In terms of the present framework ECHO only considers the theoretical side of 
scientific discovery. The data propositions are instances, and all other types of 
proposition are either niodels or hypotheses. The probleni with mapping Thagard's 
representations onto the framework is that his propositions do not distinguish any 
levels of theoretical knowledge.
In summary, Thagard has attempted to develop a theory that can account for how 
scientists judge the acceptability of theories. However, it suffers from just being an 
account of acceptability: the incremental development of theories presents a real 
problem; it is not clear that ECHO requires anything beyond the principle of 
explanatory breadth to explain its abilities; and the role of knowledge in the 
reliability of experimental data is glossed over.
In the next section we will consider systems that are much more complete. Not 
only do they assess the acceptability of theories, but they also discover that 
knowledge in the first place, and begin to consider the representation of 
experiments.
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2.5 MULTIPLE-PROCESS MODELS
The most complete models of scientific discovery so far developed are now 
considered. The programs have abilities that include: the generalization of instances 
to form models; the generation of models and instances from higher level theoretical 
knowledge; and the assessing of the acceptability of theories. The four models to be 
considered are PI (Thagard, 1988a), HDD (Reimann, 1990), SDDS (Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988) and KEKEDA (Kulkami & Simon, 1990). The first is an example 
of the Induction framework of Holland et.al. (1986) described above in §2.1.3; the 
next two were based on empirical studies of subjects performing simulated 
discovery tasks; and the fourth is a detailed simulation of a well- documented 
episode of discovery.
2.5.1 PI
PI (Thagard & Holyoak, 1985; Thagard, 1988a) stands for Process of 
Induction, which is apt as it is an example of Holland et.al.'s, (1986) Induction 
framework. The program has been used to model the formulation of primitive 
scientific concepts, such as the wave theory of sound.
Three types of scientific knowledge are posited that have frame-like 
representations: messages, laws, and concepts. Messages hold the results of 
observation and inferences. Laws are represented as if-then statements. In English, 
an example of a law is, if x is copper then x conducts electricity. Concept frames 
include information about superordinate and subordinate concepts. The frames of all 
three types have multiple slots; one of the most important of them is a slot indicating 
the frame's level of activation. When this level is above a threshold the frame comes 
under direct scrutiny.
PI runs in a cyclical manner with sets of processes repeated at each time step. 
During each cycle, PI matches the active messages produced by rules fired in the 
last cycle (or stated in the problem) with all the conditions of rules stored in active 
concept frames. The rules that can be fired are fired, according to Pi's limited form
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of parallelism, to produce new messages. An automatic mechanism spreads 
activation throughout the network to related problems, concepts, laws and 
messages. For example, concepts with rules that have been fired have their 
activation levels increased. This activation spreading draws in potentially useful 
concepts and rules from up and down the conceptual hierarchy and initiated new 
sub-goals. These new problems may be analogous to previously solved problems 
so are reactivated to help with the current task. PI monitors the currently active 
items and may trigger various forms of induction including: instance and condition- 
based generalization, abduction, and conceptual combination.
The acceptability of laws is assessed using three criteria, (i) The explanatory 
breadth or consilience of a law (L) (the number of facts explained by the law), (ii) 
Simplicity, given by:
No. facts explained by L - No. co-siblings of L
simplicity = -----------------------------------------:-------------------- . . . (2.6)
No. facts explained by L
L's co-siblings on the same level (ie. co-"hypotheses") are subtracted, because they 
are likely to be special assumptions accounting for single facts, and therefore detract 
from the explanatory range of L. (iii) The overall explanatory power of a law is 
given by the product of explanatory breadth and simplicity. These three measures 
are calculated for laws on each cycle and are used in the selection of rules to be 
fired.
2 3 .1 2  Limitations O f PI
The main criticisms of PI arise mainly from the fact that it is a model based on 
the Induction framework. The suitability of one of its fundamental tenets for 
modelling scientific discovery will be questioned. Consider the representation of 
knowledge in the form of condition-action rules. Although rules are a general way 
to represent knowledge, it is questionable whether they are the most appropriate
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form of representation for all kinds of scientific knowledge. Quantitative knowledge 
in the form of equations is a particular problem. For example, consider Newton's 
second law, often stated as F=ma. As a rule it is: if F  is a force and m is a mass 
and a is an acceleration and the magnitude of m and a are known, then the 
magnitude of F  is the product of m and a. However, F  may be known and either 
m or a unknown, so a total of three rules is required to cope with all the 
combinations of terms (or one rule with very unwieldy disjunctive tests in both its 
condition and action). It is thus far more economical to express the law in a realistic 
and directly manipulable form. This allows general rules modelling scientist's 
mathematical abilities to be employed, which rearrange and substitute values into the 
equations as required. To summarize, rules are not a straightforward form of 
representation and they require extra interpretation not needed in more natural forms 
of expression.
The next program to be considered also uses rules to represent laws and is 
limited for the same reason. '
2.5.2 HDD
2.52.1 Empirical Study O f An Optics Experiment
The basis of the Hypothesis Driven Discovery (HDD) model (Reimann, 1990) is 
the empirical findings of a study performed using a simulated, optical experiment 
environment. (Reimann's sense o f hypothesis is Ifko m odel in the current 
framework). The environment created in the program called REFRACT permits 
subjects to investigate the refraction of light rays travelling into different media (e.g. 
glass, diamond) with different shapes (e.g. plane, concaved and convexed). The 
underlying behaviour is given by Snell's law, but simplified by ignoring the sines 
of terms (ie. incidence angle /  refraction angle = a constant). Qualitative or 
quantitative predictions can be made and are graphically compared to the actual 
result. It was found that qualitative feed-back from trials is important for all 
subjects. Successful subjects differed from unsuccessful subjects in that they: (i)
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tended only to vary one independent variable at a time; (ii) they paid more attention 
to the current hypothesis during experiment design; (iii) they preferred numerical 
rather than graphical or qualitative predictions; (iv) they were more willing to make 
generalizations over several experimental results; and, (vi) they found a more 
complete set of relations between terms. These results were used to guidp the 
construction of a discovery model.
25.2.2 The Computer Model
The HDD model is a production system with three main conceptual components. 
First, the run experiment component designs an experiment, makes a prediction 
from a chosen hypothesis, and compares the prediction and experimental outcome. 
Second, the evaluate and modify hypothesis component assesses the acceptability 
of the hypothesis and attempts to improve it if the prediction failed. Third, the 
hypothesis generation component infers new hypotheses from previous 
experimental outcomes. These three components operate in a cycle.
The program possesses a representation for experiments but does not have 
heuristics for the design or performance of experiments. An experiment is defined 
by the specification of: the optical medium; the values of variables; and which 
variables are independent and dependent. The user supplies different designs on 
each cycle and the program, makes a quantitative prediction (as HDD has no 
qualitative reasoning abilities). The experimental outcome, supplied by the user, is 
compared with the prediction.
Before considering how hypotheses are evaluated and modified let us consider 
the condition-action rule representation of hypotheses in HDD. The condition 
specifies the attributes (medium, angles, distances) considered by an hypothesis, 
which are assigned symbols standing for particular variables or specific values. The 
action part is an equation of the form:
Variable^ = Variable2 (op) constant, . . .  (2.3)
where the variables may be distances or angles, the constant is a real number, and
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(op) is an arithmetic operator (i.e., *, /, + or -). This is the only form of equation 
HDD knows.
Evaluation takes the form of increasing the strength of hypotheses when the 
prediction is successful and decreasing the strength when it is not. The strength is 
used to select hypotheses for consideration or to eliminate unacceptable ones when 
their strength gets too low. The hypothesis is itself modified when the prediction 
fails by the specialization of the condition part of the rule.
The generation of new hypotheses employs BACON-like regularity spotters that 
compare the values of pairs of terms from different experiments. TrendDirectl and 
TrendJnversel are analogous to BACON's increase and decrease heuristics (see 
§2.2.1.1 above). Equations of the form given by equation (2.3) are generated for 
the appropriate trend. HDD constrains the space of hypotheses by preferring 
equations that are products or quotients and ones that have the same type of term on 
both sides of the equation (e.g. both distances).
The program successfully models the performance of the prototypical subjects in 
the REFRACT experiments, but it has some problems and limitations
2.52.3 Problems & Limitations
REFRACT is a good simulated scientific discovery environment. In particular, 
the combination of graphical qualitative information and quantitative data means that 
subjects could investigate and reason about the phenomenon in more "natural" ways 
than previous studies such as Wason's (1960) paradigm. However, only 
quantitative representations and inference were implemented in the HDD model. As 
we have already seen above, the combination of both qualitative and quantitative 
inferences is desirable in, if not essential for, powerful and efficient discovery 
systems.
HDD's representation of experiment is an advance on the programs mentioned 
earlier, but as the system possesses no abilities to design, perform or even select
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experiments, it is only a minor improvement. Furthermore, the range of equations 
considered by the program is very limited; only two variables related by simple 
arithmetic operators are considered. However, the program possesses a rich 
representation of types of theoretical knowledge. For example, every variable has 
role, type and status properties in addition to its particular value (Reimann, J990, 
87).
The pattern of discovery found in the empirical study and modelled in HDD is a 
neat sequence of processes that remains constant in every cycle. However, this 
cycle emerges from the structure of the empirical study. The fact that a prediction 
must be made before experimental feedback is received forces the subject into the 
cycle. Scientists do not normally face such a restriction as they may perform many 
experiments without making any predictions in order to explore the space of 
experimental results independently of a theory.
The next model to be considered is also based on an empirical study but is more 
flexible in permitting various different discovery paths to be followed.
2.5.3 SDDS
The Scientific Discovery as Dual space Search (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) model is 
the result of an empirical study that attempts to overcome the limitations of Wason's 
'2 4 6' experimental para^gm (see §2.23.2 above). (Klahr & Dunbar's reference 
to hypotheses has been replaced by 'proposition' in this subsection to avoid 
confusion with the term as used in the scientific discovery framework.)
25.3.1 Robot Based Empirical Study
Klahr & Dunbar (1988) performed a study on a task that is a better representation 
of a real scientific context. In two consecutive studies, human subjects investigated 
the behaviour of a computer-controlled robot, attempting to discover the function of 
a particular instruction in a LOGO-like language. The subject writes a series of 
instructions using simple commands including the "mystery" function, and 
observes the consequent movements of the robot. Propositions describing the
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function are formulated and subjects are allowed to carry out repeated tests until the 
correct operational description of the function is found.
Detailed analyses of subjects' protocols led Klahr & Dunbar (1988) to identify 
two distinct groups of subjects. One group of subjects were theorists', they had a 
"theory-led" approach which involved proposing new propositions and testing 
them. Klahr & Dunbar called this a proposition-space search. The other group of 
subjects were experim enters  and tended to be "data-driven": performing 
experiments and attempting to infer propositions from the results. Theoretically, 
they were searching in an experiment-space. Overall, they propose that scientific 
reasoning can be characterized as dual space search of the physical possibilities of 
the experimental situation and the space of conceivable propositions.
This dual-space proposal leads to two predictions: (i) it is possible to think of the 
correct proposition just by a proposition-space search, without using any 
experimental results, given the overall context of the experimental situation; (ii) 
when proposition-space search search fails, subjects will switch to experiment- 
space search. The predictions were tested by Klahr & Dunbar in a second series of 
experiments and found to have support 
2 .5 3 2  The Model And Processes Hierarchy
In a similar manner to Reimann (1990), Klahr & Dunbar (1988) have produced a 
model based on their psychological findings, although they have not implemented it 
in a running program. They have also formulated a representation that helps to 
explain the processes involved. Propositions are considered as frames with four 
slots relating to particular attributes of the mystery function. Klahr & Dunbar have 
analysed the types of inferences made by subjects in terms of transformations of 
these frames.
SDDS characterizes Scientific Discovery as a Dual Search of the proposition and 
the experiment spaces. This search comprises of three main components called, 
space proposition search, test proposition, and evaluate evidence. The search of
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Table 2.2 SDDS Processes
Process Name' SDDS Process 
Description
Framework . 
Interpretation
SEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
SPACE*
GENERATE FRAME*
EVOKE FRAME
INDUCE FRAME
° GENERATE 
OUTCOME
«GENERALIZE
OUTCOME
ASSIGN SLOT VALUES*
• USE PRIOR 
KNOWLEDGE
• USE EXP OUTCOMES*
® USE OLD 
OUTCOMES
® GENERATE 
OUTCOME
Full specification of a 
proposition using two 
processes to either 
generate a new frame or 
change slot values
Generation of a new frame 
using one of two sub­
processes.
Memory search for 
information to permit 
new frame to ho 
constructed.
Generates a new frame by 
induction out of a series 
of outcomes, using two 
subprocesses in turn.
A combination of 
processes, see below, 
that yields input to next 
processes.
Generalise over the 
outcomes in an attempt to 
produce a new frame.
For a partially instantiated 
frame, using one of two 
sub-processes required 
to make a fully specified 
frame.
Assign slot values using 
prior knowledge.
Assign slot values using 
previous or new specific 
experimental outcomes.
Examine old experimental 
outcomes to determine 
specific slot values.
See below
Make a complete model 
from scratch or modify 
an existing a model.
Make a new model.
Search stored models for 
suitable base.
Make new model from 
instance(s).
Obtain instance(s).
Generalise to model from 
instances.
Fully specify partial 
model.
Use Background know­
ledge to specify model.
Use existing or new 
instances to specify 
model.
Try old instances to 
specify model
TEST PROPOSITION
ESPACE MOVE* 
MAKE PREDICTION
A series of three processes 
to formulate an 
experiment, make a 
prediction and runs the 
experiment.
See below.
Take current proposition 
and experiment to make a 
prediction centred on the 
focal values.
Test model by generating 
instances and comparing 
them with expt. tests.
Generate instance from 
model and specified 
expt. setup.
continued.
Table 2.2 SDDS Processes Continued
Process Name^ SDDS Process 
D escription
Fram ew ork
In terpretation
• R U N
• OBSERVE
• MATCH
} See below 
jSee below 
Note discrepancies 
between predicted and 
observed behaviours.
Compares instance and 
experimental test.
EVALUATE EVIDENCE
• REVIEW OUTCOMES 
• DECIDE
Determines whether the 
cumulative experimental 
evidence is sufficient for 
acceptance or rejection of 
the current proposition.
Consider previous 
experimental outcomes.
Choose whether to accept, 
reject proposition or 
continue testing.
Are there enough instances 
supporting the present 
model?
Look at previous instances
Continue, accept, or reject 
model on adequacy 
' terms.
DEEPER NESTED PROCESSES^
GENERATE OUTCOME 
• ESPACE MOVE*
Generates an experimental 
outcome using three 
processes.
See below.
Obtain experimental test or 
instance.
RUN
OBSERVE • •
Performs the experiment. 
Note observed behaviours.
Obtain an expt. test output 
parameter values.
Note relation between 
input-m and output of 
expt. test.
ESPACE MOVE
• FOCUS
• CHOOSE & SET
Two processes for 
designing experiments.
Concentrates on the most 
"important" slot of the 
current frame.
Chooses an "important" 
slot & sets its value, and 
fixes the rest of the slots.
Full specification of expt. 
setup.
Choose input-m and output 
parameters.
Specify fixed input-c 
parameters.
Notes and Kev
Adapted from Klahr and Dunbar (1988) 
t  - fridentation of name indicates the level of nesting in SDDS.
^ - Indentation indicates depth relative to the first process in section.
• - 1st level of nesting • - 2nd level of nesting ° - 3rd level of nesting
* Process includes a conditional test for which subprocess to execute.
Previous Work
the proposition space involves the generation of new frames or the modification of 
existing ones. To test a proposition an experiment is designed, a prediction made, 
the experiment performed, and the prediction and observation compared. The 
evaluation of evidence reviews the present and previous outcomes of experiments 
and decides if an adequate description of the mystery function has been found. 
Fuller descriptions of these processes, and their sub-processes, are given in the 
second column of Table 2.2 (the third column is referred to later in the thesis). 
Furthermore, Figure 2.2 shows all the processes arranged in the hierarchy proposed 
by Klahr & Dunbar, with the groups of processes that are repeated at more than one 
location deliberately highlighted. One set relates to the design of experiments 
(ESPACE MOVE). It occurs within both the proposition space search and the test 
proposition branches of the hierarchy. This clearly demonstrates that theory and 
experiment interact to a large extent.
■25.3.3 Umitations O f The Model
The experimental context of this work is the most complete of any empirical 
study to date. Since the simulated discovery task was less rigidly defined in 
Reimann's (1990) REFRACT environment, Klahr and Dunbar found that different 
discovery paths may be followed depending on the state of the investigation and the 
preferences of the subject.
However, like Reimann’s study and model, there has been no investigation of 
high-level theoretical knowledge that is applicable across several different 
experimental situations (of the sort called hypotheses in the present framework). 
Such universal laws are an important part of science. To rectify this, Klahr and 
Dunbar’s robot experiments would need to investigate several different mystery 
functions. Descriptions for a partial set of the functions would be found (models) 
and then a general account (an hypothesis) inferred. This account would then be 
tested by making predictions with the remaining functions.
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The model is also limited in the way its assesses theoretical acceptability and the 
reliability of the experiments. SDDS has a location for the evaluation of evidence in 
its process hierarchy but does not specify what form the assessment of acceptability 
might take, other than that previous outcomes are reviewed. The robot experimental 
environment was perfect in the sense that it did not suffer from noise or erroneous 
effects. Gerwin (1974) included noise in his data which meant human subjects and 
his computer program often failed to find the exact equation. It would be interesting 
to see the effect of noise and other adverse influences in future work on SDDS.
2.5.4 KEKEDA
Kulkami & Simon (1988) have simulated Hans Krebs' discovery of the Urea 
cycle in biochemistry, using their KEKEDA system. This is, perhaps, the most 
detailed and best model of an episode of scientific discovery to date. The strength of 
the model comes from the historical account of the discovery at their disposal. This 
included a detailed examination of laboratory notebooks and retrospective 
interviews with participants in the discovery. (Again, the use of 'hypothesis' by 
Kulkami & Simon is replaced by 'proposition' in this subsection).
25.4.1 Representations
KEKEDA not only makes theoretical inferences, but also assesses the 
acceptability of the theoretical knowledge and models experiments to a degree. Thus 
it has representations for theoretical and experimental knowledge and employs 
measures of acceptability.
KEKEDA works in the domain of biochemistry, and has representations for 
processes, substances, propositions (ie. "hypotheses"), experiments, and 
supplementary facts. These representations are classes of attribute-value pairs and 
contain a rich variety of information. For example, processes are chemical reactions 
represented by an input, an output, a likely locus of the reaction, and the class to 
which it belongs. Experiments are also represented in the same manner. An 
experiment is defined by attributes for: the input; the input's initial values; the
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condition and location of the experiment; and indicators of what is to be measured.
Propositions have associated measures of confidence along five dimensions that 
include: number of successful experiments verifying the hypothesis; number of 
experiments failing to do so; amount of failed effort in attempts to find positive 
instances; implied but inconclusive success; and implied but not certain failure. 
They not only state how acceptable the propositions are, but help to guide 
KEKEDA in its discoveries. For example, the current proposition is abandoned 
when the measure of failed effort, of attempts to find positive instances of the 
proposition, passes a certain threshold. This happens even though there is 
insufficient evidence to show that the proposition is unacceptable.
25.4.2 Heuristics And Simulation
KEKEDA is a production system. Sixty four heuristics, productions, are 
employed and grouped into nine classes according to the type of task performed. 
The classes are: problem choosers, problem generators, decision makers, 
experiment proposers, expectation setters, proposition generators, proposition 
modifiers, confidence modifiers, and proposition-strategy choosers. There are 
roughly equal numbers of domain specific and domain independent heuristics.
KEKEDA simulates discovery of the urea cycle in some detail, starting with the 
problem of urea synthesis and working through to the full specification of the cycle, 
including the pursuit of unproductive paths along the way. During the discovery 
particular patterns of heuristics repeatedly fire in sequence. For example, when 
testing the alternative combinations of substances in a particular class of reaction. 
The program designs experiments and makes predictions, but the user supplies 
KEKEDA with the results of the appropriate experimental tests when requested.
25.4.3 Criticisms o f KEKEDA
The obvious limitations of KEKEDA are that it does not model the most general 
levels of theory and experiment - hypotheses and experimental paradigms in the 
framework. However, we should remember that there was no intention on the part
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of Krebs in the real discovery to find a universal law of chemistry, but only to 
uncover the secrets of a particular biochemical processes.
KEKEDA does, however, possess the most sophisticated means, of any of the 
systems, to assess the acceptability of propositions (excepting ECHO). The 
measures that directly indicate the acceptability of a proposition do so by noting the 
extent to which the proposition successfully predicts the behaviour of the 
phenomena. This is a further example of the explanatory breadth criterion. Note 
also that KEKEDA needs to record the absolute number of both successes and 
failures, unlike Reimann's (1990) HDD program where a single strength value is 
used. This extra information is important for KEKEDA as it helps to guide the 
choice of strategies.
The detail and thus completeness of the simulation of the discovery of the Urea 
cycle is much greater than the level attained in any of the previous models of 
discovery. This is not surprising as there is an order of magnitude difference in 
numbers of heuristics employed. There are two implications to be drawn from this. 
First, it seems that realistic models of episodes of scientific discovery are more 
likely to be achieved by sets of domain-specific heuristics rather than a single, all 
encompassing, technique. Second, the modelling of scientific discovery in 
computer programs will require the investigation of several different domains in 
detail followed by the generalization of patterns common to each in order to 
understand the underlying character. A step towards this will be to develop 
computer models that possess a richness of heuristics and representations 
comparable to KEKEDA, but implemented in a system with an explicit organization 
of tasks and processes like SDDS. As we will see the STERN model of scientific 
discovery attempts such an integration.
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2.5.5 Summary Of Multiple-Process Models
In this section models that incorporate both theory and experiment led strategies 
have been examined. They represent and model experiments to varying degrees and 
employ a range of measures and procedures to assess the acceptability of theoretical 
knowledge. In fact, its does not seem just to be coincidental that the more 
experimental knowledge is acknowledged the more realistic the methods for the 
assessment of the acceptability of theories become. In terms of the scientific 
discovery framework this is explained by the proposal that the acceptability of 
models is assessed as a function of the success of experimental tests matching with 
(predictive) instances. The problem of the acceptability of higher levels of 
theoretical knowledge, framework hypotheses, has not been addressed in previous 
work as they simply have not modelled that type of theory.
2.6 IMMEDIATE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The review carried out in this chapter reveals a number of directions in which the 
development of computational models may profitably progress. These include:
• The modelling of the highest level of theoretical knowledge to account for phenomena 
across several different experimental situations (including the processes that generate 
them and use them to make inferences).
• The realistic modelling of all the types of experimental knowledge, and the processes 
that manipulate the knowledge, in as much detail as that used to model theories.
• The assessment of the acceptability theoretical knowledge, particularly in terms of the 
breadth or scope of experimental evidence for which it can account.
• The investigation of the different types of communications that occur between 
theoretical and experimental components; in particular, modelling the correspondences 
between theoretical terms and experimental parameters.
• The development of systems with a range and richness of representations and heuristics 
equivalent to KEKEDA’s (Kulkami & Simon, 1988), but organized by an over-arching
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scheme like the process hierarchy of SDDS (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). This will require 
the explicit separation of general and domain specific knowledge and rules.
• The initial examination of processes to incorporate experiment reliability measures into 
the assessment of theory.
The development of future models must also pay attention to the lessons leamt in 
previous work. This in effect places a number of constraints, or guidelines, on the 
development of new discovery systems, these include:
• Representing domain specific knowledge using formalisms that are natural and realistic, 
to avoid problems of vagueness and ambiguous interpretation.
• Acknowledging the importance of both qualitative and quantitative knowledge 
representations and inferences in discovery.
• The use of BACON-like regularity spotters as an effective way to find relations between 
terms and quantitative descriptions of data.
• The formation of a close integration between the processes that generate new knowledge 
and those that assess the acceptability of that knowledge.
The STERN discovery system will take up the suggestions for future 
development, whilst trying to satisfy the set of constraints. The description of the 
system begins in Chapter 4, while the intervening chapter considers the episode of 
discoveiy modelled by STERN.
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Chapter 3
Galileo And Natural Accelerated Motion
3.1 WHY GALILEO'S DISCOVERIES?
In this Chapter an account of Galileo's investigation of the motion of terrestrial 
bodies moving under the effect of gravity will be related in some detail. The 
STERN discovery system models this episode of scientific discovery.
Several characteristics of Galileo's discoveries make the episode a good 
candidate for modelling. First, experimentation plays an important role in the 
episode; several different experimental paradigms are employed and even new 
experimental paradigms are invented. Second, it is a domain that requires a rich 
interplay of qualitative and quantitative formalisms. Third, since the discovery of 
the law of free fall has been superficially modelled by BACON the treatment of the 
episode within the present framework emphasizes the advances that can be made. 
Fourth, dynamics is a well-established area with adequate laws that account for 
phenomena with known levels of experimental noise and accuracy. Thus the user 
will not need to hand calculate experimental outcomes.
The experiments that Galileo used will be described first, followed by a 
consideration of the way theoretical knowledge and inferences were expressed at the 
time. Finally, the chronology of discovery events is outlined.
3.2 EXPERIMENTS
The central role of experiments in the discoveries of Galileo should not be 
underestimated. Whereas, previous thinkers, like Aristotle, simply relied on mere 
observation in their qualitative attempts to characterize motion, Galileo performed 
experiments on the phenomenon. He manufactured experimental apparatus in which
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the motions of bodies could be carefully manipulated and their consequent 
behaviour accurately measured. This allowed him to form quantitative laws and to 
test them rigorously. For this reason, Galileo is often be considered to be the first 
scientist in the modem sense of the term.
The most important classes of motion experiments used by Galileo include 
(Galileo, 1838):
(i) swinging pendulums consisting of small weights attached to the end of long 
suspended chords set into oscillatory motion (MacLachlan, 1976); and
(ii) inclined planes, or ramps, made from long straight wooden batons down which 
spherical metallic balls are rolled (Settle, 1961).
Figures 3.1a and b show these two experiments schematically. Although the 
possibility of performing accurate experiments using such equipment has been 
doubted (Koyre, 1968), actual reconstructions have shown such claims to be 
ungrounded (e.g.. Settle, 1961).
The empirical side of Galileo's work can be characterized easily by the 
experimental component of the framework. The simple pendulums and inclined 
planes are different classes of experiment or experimental paradigms. The 
manufacture of an inclined plane gives an experimental setup that has many kinds 
of parameters (e.g. including: the distance down the plane, its height, the size, 
weight and volume of the ball). Some of the parameters for each experimental 
paradigm are shown in Figures 3.1a and b. In the inclined plane paradigm distances 
can be determined from markings made on the side of the plane. However, the 
measurement of time was more difficult and required Galileo to use a water clock 
(and sometimes his own pulse!). Thus certain parameters are easier to control or 
measure than others, which to a large extent determines the selection of parameters 
that occupy the particular roles in an experimental test. For example, when using the 
inclined plane to investigate the relationship between distance and time in an
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experimental test, the distance is simpler to manipulate as the input-m parameter 
because a stopping block can be placed on the plane next to specific marks, so 
forcing time to be the output parameter.
Galileo's skill as an experimental scientist is shown by his invention of new 
experimental paradigms. The basic technique he employed was to combine known 
experiments using the output of one to feed into another. For example. Figure 3.2 
shows the combined projectile and inclined plane experiment (Drake & MacLachlan, 
1975; Drake, 1975). In this experiment a ball descends an inclined plane, PQ, and 
is launched into the air with an imposed initial horizontal motion by the lip at Q, and 
freely describes a path as a projectile until it lands at R. The first half (inclined 
plane) of such combined experiments will be called the initial part of the 
experiment, and the second half (projectile) called the terminal part. There are two 
ways (which I call modes) in which combined experimental setups can be used in 
tests, see Figure 3.3 which shows the two parts of combined experiments as black 
boxes. The initial mode (a) employs a parameter from the initial part to be the 
overall input-m and measures a terminal parameter as the output; for example the 
height of the inclined plane as the input-m and horizontal projectile length as the 
output. The terminal mode (b) focuses just on the terminal part of the combination, 
both overall input-m and output being parameters from that part, with the initial part 
output acting as a fixed terminal input parameter; for example projectile height and 
length, with fixed inclined plane height. As we will see Galileo carried out 
investigations on combined experiments in both the initial and terminal modes.
We have already seen how the relative ease with which parameters can be 
manipulated or observed influences the selection of input-m and output parameters 
during the design of an experimental test. However, this is not the only form of 
domain specific knowledge that is associated with the Galilean experiments. The 
relative ease of manufacture of experimental setups from particular paradigms plays 
a role in the selection of the setups. A pendulum paradigm is very much simpler to
-64-
%i i
s
13c
B
iü(U
E
I
13
(U
A
I
S
oOX
M
<u
Qj
2çu
■oc<
0>
i
•c<uc
"v>s
%.s
I
u
o£
H
M
PÎ
S,
E
(a) initial model
INPUT-Ct
INPUT-Ci
INPUT-Mi
OUTPUTt
E  terminal
E  initial OUTPUTi
INPUT-Mt
(b) terminal model
INPUT-Ci
INPUT-Mi
INPUT-Ct
r
OUTPUTt
E  terminalE  initial
OUTPUTi
INPUT-Mt
(c) overview
INPUT-Ct+i
INPUT-M
OUTPUT
Figure 3.3 Combined Black Box Experiments
Galileo
construct than an inclined plane.
The design of experiments does not just rely on knowledge that is specific to 
experiments. Background knowledge also has an important role to play. When 
choosing the parameters in a given experimental setup to be the input-m and output 
it is essential to ensure that the parameters are not trivially related. For example, 
when the inclination of an inclined plane is fixed, the distance, height and length 
will vary in proportion to each other just because of the geometry of the setup. In a 
pendulum with a fixed angle the size, height and length are also related together in a 
similar way. Experiments with such parameters would produce irrelevant or even 
misleading results. However, simple geometrical knowledge about triangles and 
circular arcs will tell the experimenter that these parameters are related together in a 
manner that is completely independent of the phenomenon in the black box. Galileo 
possessed and used his knowledge of geometry and also knew of relationships 
between the diameter, volume, and weight of spherical bodies.
The reader may be wondering why there has been no mention Galileo's most 
famous experiment that involved dropping two balls of unequal weight from the 
Leaning Tower of Pisa. The case has been omitted because there is no historical 
evidence to show that any such experiment was ever performed. The origins of this 
myth seem to be in a thought experiment that Galileo conceived as an illustration of 
his actual empirical findings.
3.2 TH EORIES AND INFERENCES
On the theoretical side of the investigation, Galileo initially believed that the 
natural motion of bodies was adequately described by an existing theory (set of so- 
called laws) that originated from Aristotle. Two important laws were the 
instantaneous acceleration law and the effective weight law. The instantaneous 
acceleration law states that acceleration lasts only for a very brief period at the start 
of the motion, followed by more or less constant velocity motion. The velocity
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attained by a body is in proportion to its effective weight according to the second 
law. Effective weight meaning either weight or density, in modem terms. It is 
interesting to note that the first is an example of a qualitative law typically expressed 
propositionally, while the second is a quantitative law that would have been 
expressed as an equation between ratios of terms, e.g.:
w*i/w*2 = V iA^ 2» . . . ( 3 . 1 )
where w* is effective weight, V is speed and the subscripts refer to different bodies 
or situations. Compared with modem equations in physics, the ratio expressions 
make manipulations more complicated and limits the form of the equations that can 
be stated, but avoids the need to consider constants of proportionality. Equation 
(3.1) is easily categorized as a state transformation function in the present 
framework.
Galileo carried out several types of theoretical inference. This included the 
simple manipulation and substitution of terms in equations like (3.1). However, he 
also employed a geometrical-pictorial method to generate models that is unusual 
compared to modem conventions (e.g. Drake, 1973a, 1973b; Humphreys, 1967). 
For example, consider how Galileo inferred the speed of bodies descending an 
inclined plane from the effective weight law (see, Humphreys, 1967). From the 
picture in Figure 3.4 he represented the inclined plane by the line gh, which is a 
tangent to a circle with centre a. Line e/indicates the path of a body falling freely 
due to its unmodified effective weight. Now, as the effective weight along gh is in 
proportion as ap is to ad, then the ratio of the speeds of gh and e /is  apiad. 
That is, for the same height, the greater the angle of the inclined plane, the greater 
the speed. This geometric-pictorial method is not particularly rigorous, nor easy to 
use, and only has sufficient expressive power to cope with the simple laws that 
Galileo considered. It is not surprising that Newton needed to invent infinitesimal 
calculus before being able to fully develop, state and apply his own theories of
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motion.
3.3 CHRONOLOGY OF DISCOVERY
Galileo’s discoveries took place between 1590 and the early sixteen-hundreds 
(see Drake, 1975). From the outset he was interested in all types of bodily motions, 
but focussed his effort on the smaller and better delimited problem of naturally 
accelerated terrestrial motion. In modem terms this is motion influenced by the 
earth's gravitational field. All together his use of both theory and experiments make 
up the research programme component of the framework.
3.3.1 Aristotelian Laws Disconfirmed
Galileo started his investigations by adopting the Aristotelian laws and attempted 
to test their validity by performing experiments. By careful observation in 
experiments using long slow swinging pendulums, Galileo saw that the speed of 
the pendulum bob increased throughout the swing, from its release to the lowest 
point of the arc (Drake, 1975). This was a direct disconfirmation of the 
instantaneous acceleration law. The test of the effective weight law was more 
involved (Humphreys, 1967). Using his characteristic style of geometric inference, 
Galileo made the prediction from the law that the speed of the balls rolling down 
inclined planes would be inversely proportional to the length of the plane. 
However, actual inclined plane experiments showed that the speeds were 
independent of the length of the plane. By checking these findings across the 
available experimental paradigms, Galileo obtained sufficient confidence to abandon 
the Aristotelian views of motion.
3.3.2 Finding Laws
During the disconfirmation of the Aristotelian laws, Galileo would have 
gathered many experimental results that were not specifically used in the 
disconfirmation process. Further, once the laws had been abandoned Galileo 
continued to explore the phenomenon using the various experimental setups that had
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been constructed. Thus qualitative and quantitative characterizations of the nature of 
the phenomenon were formed by generalizing the gathered experimental results that 
applied to specific experimental situations. Individually or in groups, some of these 
models were further generalized to form hypotheses.
Naturally, these hypotheses were then tested by comparison with experimental 
results in the manner that the effective weight and instantaneous acceleration laws 
had been considered.
3.3.3 Proposing New Hypotheses
Galileo had thus built up a wealth of information about the phenomenon and 
was in a position to generate quantitative hypotheses, including the law of free fall. 
In the inference to the law of firee fall Galileo first made the assumption, based on 
existing knowledge, that distance increases with the natural numbers (1,2,3,...) as 
the speed increases with the odd natural, numbers (1,3,5,...). Then by a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative manipulations, using the geometric-pictorial form of 
reasonings he found (or ratlier stumbled upon) a simple relation between distance 
and speed (Drake, 1973a, 1973b). The relationship stating that the velocity squared 
is proportional to the distance travelled (or distance travelled is proportional to the 
square of the time), ie:
Vi2A^2^ = di/d2. . . . ( 3 . 2 )
where V  and d are speed and distance, respectively, and the subscripts relate to 
different distances on the inclined plane. Other hypotheses were also considered, 
such as, that velocity was linearly related to the distance travelled. To find which 
new hypotheses were correct further experiments needed to be performed.
3.3.4 Inventing Experiments To Test New Hypotheses
To experimentally test the law of free fall Galileo had to invent a new 
experiment, because of a problem concerning the speed term. Galileo wished to 
eliminate the term from the free fall equation and replace it with other terms that 
could be directly measured in experiments. He knew that speed was defined by the
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ratio of distance over time but only when the speed was constant, i.e. no 
acceleration. So distance and time terms could replace the speed term if the actual 
speed in the experiment was constant. Previously, when attempting to confirm the 
Aristotelian laws, Galileo thought the instant acceleration law, which stated that 
velocity was constant for most of the time, was true and was thus happy to make 
the substitution. However, by now it had been found that gradual acceleration 
occurs in both the inclined plané and pendulum motions. Galileo’s solution to this 
problem was ingenious. He developed a new combined experimental paradigm by 
using the inclined plane as a launcher for projectiles (Figure 3.2). Galileo knew that 
the horizontal velocity of a projectile was constant and he had the law of free fall 
describing the speed of the ball at the end of the ramp. Thus considering the 
combined experiment in the initial mode, he was able to substitute out the speed 
from both equations and obtain a relation between the height of the inclined plane 
and the horizontal distance travelled as a projectile. As both parameters were 
measurable quantities in the experiment Galileo was able to perform experiments 
that confirmed the law of free fall (Naylor, 1974).
Whilst performing those experiments Galileo was able to closely observe the 
flight of a projectile for the first time, and thus became interested in the shape of the 
path described in this motion. By applying the newly-confirmed law of free fall to 
projectile motion he was able to make predictions about its exact trajectory. These 
predictions were confirmed by further experiments using the original setup in the 
terminal mode. This not only explained the shape of the path but also increased the 
acceptability of the law of free fall (Naylor, 1975; Drake & MacLachlan, 1975; 
Naylor, 1976; Hill, 1988). The shape described by a projectile is parabolic, the 
horizontal length, L, increases with the square of the vertical height, H; ie
H i2/H22 = L i/L2, . . . ( 3 . 2 )
where the subscripts refer to different points on the path.
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3.3.5 Switching Research Programs
Galileo's work on dynamics stopped around this time his attention being 
diverted when he leamt of the invention of the telescope. Galileo used the new 
instrument to make other discoveries for which he is also justly famous. In the 
Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences Galileo (1838, 1954) gives a full 
account of his dynamical theories, although little is said about the way in which the 
law of free fall was really discovered. It is well known that Newton took up, more 
or less, where Galileo left off and developed laws of motion that superseded the law 
of free fall. However, it is not so widely acknowledged that Newton also inherited 
Galileo’s experimental legacy, and performed experiments that were adaptations of 
Galilean paradigms.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS
The Galilean episode of discover}^ will be modelled by the STERN discovery 
system, so it seems appropriate to make a few relevant observations.
• Qualitative and quantitative theoretical knowledge had complementary roles in the 
episode.
• Galileo did not consider theories that had been generalized from experimental 
results to be inherently true, but tested them against other experimental paradigms 
before accepting them.
• In the generation of predictive models, attention was paid to the particular 
experimental paradigm that was being modelled and the terms specified in models 
corresponded to measurable and observable parameters of an experimental setup.
• Several different experimental paradigms were used by Galileo and he had 
pragmatic knowledge concerning each one: for example the relative ease with 
which experimental setups could be manufactured, and the ease with which 
particular parameters could be observed.
• Four general discovery processes can be identified: (i) the confirmation of existing
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hypotheses (§3.3.1 & §3.3.2); (ii) the generalization to new hypotheses (§3.3.2); 
(iii) the formation of new hypotheses from existing ones (§3.3.3); and (iv) the 
invention of new experiments (§3.3.4) permitting further hypotheses to be tested.
• Background knowledge played a significant part in the inferences, in particular it 
helped to identify parameters that were trivially related through the geometiy of 
specific experiments and it was used to make predictions from hypotheses.
It is interesting to note that many of these points overlap with the requirements 
and proposals for computational discovery systems outlined in the conclusions to 
Chapter 2 on previous work.
We have seen how Galileo made important scientific discoveries. In the 
remaining chapters of this thesis we will also see how the STERN discovery system 
also successfully models the discovery of the same models and hypotheses using a 
range of experimental paradigms.
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Chapter 4
STERN: Scientific Theorist And Experimental 
Researcher
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the remainder of this thesis we apply the framework (described in Chapter 1) 
to Galileo's discoveries on the motion of naturally accelerated bodies (see Chapter 
3). The Jesuit of this work is the STERN (N is the version number, currently 0) 
computer program which is described in the remaining chapters. STERN attempts 
to overcome many of the limitations of previous computational models of scientific 
discovery (reviewed in Chapter 2).
STERN has several notable abilities, which can be summarized as follows:
• it considers aU the types of theoretical and experimental knowledge posited by the 
framework, including hypotheses and experimental paradigms, using frame like 
representations in a well-ordered hierarchical structure.
• it possesses a wide variety of processes and heuristics that can apply existing 
knowledge, or infer new knowledge.
• it distinguishes explicitly between domain-specific and domain-independent 
classes of processes, which are further organized in groups in a task hierarchy.
• it implements processes as condition-action rules in a production system 
architecture.
• it instantiates of multiple types of information transfer between theory and 
experiment, including the correspondence between theoretical terms and 
experimental parameters.
• it employs quantitative and qualitative representations and has the ability to make
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quantitative and qualitative inferences alone or in combination.
• it assesses the acceptability of theoretical knowledge by an adequacy function 
based on the relative success of hypotheses, models and instances.
• it considers methods to deal with noise in experimental results.
Although STERN is based on the framework, the range of different scientific 
domains it can model is smaller than that covered by the framework itself. In its 
present form, STERN can only cope with episodes of discovery that have similar 
types of hypotheses and models to those found in the Galilean case (i.e. mainly 
quantitative). Even so, this means that STERN is able to encompass a significant 
number of important scientific disciplines. The application of the framework to 
other scientific domains will provide interesting future research.
This chapter is the first of five describing STERN and the way it models the 
Galilean episode. The following chapters, 5 to 8, consider the main types of 
processes that STERN uses at different times when making its discoveries. The 
present chapter focuses upon basic features of the program and gives an overview 
of its performance. The following sections consider: (§4.2) an overview of the 
discoveries made and the path followed whilst making them; (§4.3) the general 
instantiation and representation of the components of the framework for scientific 
discovery; (§4.4) the representations needed to model the knowledge specific to the 
Galilean domain, including pertinent background knowledge; (§4.5) the nature of 
STERN'S heuristics, their organization as a hierarchy, and their implementation in a 
production system; (§4.6) the subprogram that simulates real experiments; and 
(§4.7) STERN'S top level of control, that chooses different discovery strategies.
The program is implemented in Common LISP (CL) and runs on an Apple 
Macintosh H.
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4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF STERN'S DISCOVERIES
STERN models Galileo's discoveries in the domain of naturally accelerated 
motion. This involves the interaction of many types of theoretical and experimental 
knowledge over a great many cycles of the program. This section presents an 
overview of STERN's performance that will help to set into context the much iriore 
detailed considerations to follow in this and later chapters. We will start with inputs 
and outputs of the program.
4.2.1 Inputs & Outputs
STERN is given the three hypotheses and six experimental paradigms. The laws 
are the instantaneous acceleration law and two interpretations of the effective weight 
law (section I, Table 4.1^). T_V, T_D, T_DEN and T_W* are theoretical terms 
standing for speed, distance, density, and effective weight. As we will see below, 
STERN represents qualitative relations using qualforms; the instantaneous 
acceleration law is a typical example. The acceptability of this hypothesis is set to a 
moderate value to reflect the fact that Galileo initially thought it to be true. STERN 
is told that the two versions of the effective weight law have not been examined 
before to acknowledge that Galileo was the first researcher to investigate them 
quantitatively. Galileo's most important experimental paradigms were the pendulum 
and the inclined plane, so STERN is given representations of them both and told 
they have been manufactured. STERN is also given knowledge about other 
experimental paradigms; for instance, projectile experiments. These paradigms are 
not yet available for use but just known about conceptually by STERN.
Two sets of background knowledge are provided to instantiate a knowledge of 
geometry and relations for spherical bodies.
What does STERN discover? (i) It finds that the three Aristotelian laws are 
unacceptable, (ii) STERN obtains a thorough qualitative understanding of the
Ifhe meaning of all the different entries of this table will become clearer as we progress through 
this chapter.
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Table 4.1 State of STERN's Hypotheses After 1600 Cycles
Section Equation or Qualform Adequacyt Tractabilityt Grouping
(=T_VT_DEN) 2 0.322 2 2
I (=T_VT_W*) 2 0.000 2 2
(INSTANTANEOUS T_V T_D) 31 33
(INCREASE T_TIME T_H) 2 2 2 2
(FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_H) 22 2 2
(INCREASE T_TIME T_L) 2 2 2 2
(FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_L) 2 2 2 2
(STEADY T_TIME T_W) 2 2 2 2
II (STEADY T_TIME T_VOL) 2 2 2 2
(INCREASE T_YT_H) 2 2 2 2
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_H) 2 2 2 2
(INCREASE T_VT_L) 2 2 2 2
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_L) 2 2 2 2
(STEADYT_VT_W) 2 2 2 2
(STEADY T_V T_VOL) 2 2 2 2
(= T_S (* T_TIME T_TIME)) 1 1 31
m (= T_D (* T_TIME T_TIME)) 21 2 2
(= T_H (♦ T_TIME T_TIME)) 21 2 2
(= T_L (* T_TIME T_TIME)) 21 2 2
(=T_V(EXPTT_Hl/2)) 2 1.862 4 2 GROUP3541
(=T_V(EXPTT_Hl/3)) • 1 0 2 0 GROUP3541
(=T_V(EXPTT_H2)) 10 2 0 GROUP3541 .
IV (=T_V(EXPTT_H2/3)) 10 2 0 GROUP3541
(=T_V(EXPTT_H3)) 10 2 0 GROUP3541
(=T_V(EXPTT_H3/2)) 10 2 0 GROUP3541
(=T_VT_H) 10 2 0 GROUP3541
(=T_V(EXPTT_Ll/2)) 2 0.000 4 2 GROUP3542
(=T_V(EXPTT_Ll/3)) 2 0.000 4 2 GROUP3542
(=T_V(EXPTT_L2)) 2 0.000 4 2 GROUP3542
V (=T_V(EXPTT_L2/3)) 2 0.000 4 2 GROUP3542
(=T_V(EXPTT_L3)) 2 0.000 4 2 GROUP3542
(=T_V(EXPTT_L3/2)) 2 0.000 4 2 GROUP3542
(=T_VT_L) 2 0.000 4 2 GROUP3542
t  - 1st and 2nd number are the fillers of the number and degree slots of the measure frame 
respectively.
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domain; finding which terms are relevant to the characterization of the phenomena 
(e.g., the weight of bodies is irrelevant but height is significant), (iii) Some 
quantitative models (not hypotheses) are also discovered; for example the law 
governing the period of swing of pendulums, (iv) STERN discovers that the law of 
free fall is the only acceptable quantitative hypothesis from amongst many 
proposed, (v) New experimental paradigms are constructed; for example the 
combined inclined plane and projectile experiment.
Let us consider in a little more detaü how STERN made all these discoveries.
4.2.2 Discovery Path
Figure 4.1 shows, at a very coarse grained level of detail, the various stages that 
STERN progresses through when modelling the Galilean episode of discovery. 
STERN chooses to perform confirmation of known hypotheses four times during 
the whole mn of the program. Confirmation first occurs when the three Aristotelian 
laws are given as input and then later after STERN has (i) generalized experimental 
results into hypotheses, (ii) generated new hypotheses from old, and (iii) 
considered new experiments.
STERN attempts to confirm the Aristotelian laws by considering each with 
respect to the pendulum and inclined plane experimental paradigms in turn. For each 
hypothesis and paradigm pair, STERN attempts to account for the phenomenon in 
the paradigm by generating models from the hypothesis. STERN disconfirms the 
instantaneous acceleration law by discovering that the predictions made from the 
law, when applied to the two paradigms, simply do not hold (i.e. the motion is 
gradual acceleration). During the disconfirmation of the effective weight laws 
STERN generates models with equations from the equations of the two laws. This 
involves the use of the background knowledge of geometry and spherical body 
relations to replace the wholly theoretical terms (such as speed and ejfective 
weight) with measurable terms (like distance, time and weight). STERN makes
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STERN
predictive instances from the models and compares them with the results of 
experiments that it designs and performs. To compare the instance and experimental 
test STERN uses a method that both assesses how closely they match and takes into 
account any noise that exists in the experimental data. Even so, few of the instances 
are found to compare well with the experimental results. Thus the models are not 
acceptable; and in turn, STERN finds the hypotheses are not acceptable either. This 
is correct because the effective weight and density terms, referred to by the laws, 
do not influence the rate of acceleration in naturally accelerated motion.
STERN then decides to obtain further experimental results that can be 
generalized into hypotheses via instances and models. STERN designs all the 
possible experiments that can be performed using the pendulum and inclined plane 
experimental paradigms. Background knowledge is used to eliminate all those 
experiments that would yield trivial results; such as, increasing the length of a 
pendulum increases the distance that the bob travels. STERN performs all these 
sensible experiments and interprets the results. Many quantitative and qualitative 
instances are found. These instances are then generalized to form models. In 
particular, the generalization to quantitative models involves finding equations from 
the lists of independent and dependent values (of the instance), whilst taking into 
account the presence of noise in the data. It is at this point that STERN discovers 
the law governing the period of swing of pendulums in terms of cord length {size). 
This is arguably a "genuine" discovery (rather than a modelled rediscovery), 
because it is a true law found by STERN, but the programmer had not specifically 
intended that STERN would find this law. It was only with hindsight that the law 
was seen to be a reasonable possibility given STERN's input. Other quantitative 
hypotheses were also found (HI, Table 4.1). The many qualitative hypotheses 
found by STERN at this stage provide STERN with a much deeper understanding 
of the nature of the phenomenon (II, Table 4.1). For example, the qualitative 
hypotheses indicate that the weight of a body does not affect its acceleration and that
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the acceleration is a gradual process in which the height of the body is significant.
Like Galileo, STERN does not simple believe new hypotheses to be true by 
virtue of being generalized from experimental results. STERN attempts to confirm 
them to make sure. But, only the quantitative hypotheses are considered as the 
qualitative ones were generalized from both experimental paradigms. However, 
none of the quantitative hypotheses are found to be any more acceptable. 
Furthermore, the law of the period of swing of pendulums is found to be just a 
model (i.e. only account for one experimental paradigm), because the inclined plane 
does not have a parameter that is equivalent to the size term of the pendulum 
paradigm
The range of hypotheses that STERN now possesses is extensive and covers 
the whole spectrum of acceptability (I, II & III, Table 4.1). STERN considers the 
generation of new hypotheses from its established stock. The qualitative hypotheses 
indicate which terms are significant and the general form that equations might take. 
The unacceptable quantitative hypotheses rule out certain terms and forms of 
equations. Thus, STERN is able to infer new hypotheses and successfully 
generates two groups of new hypotheses (IV & V, Table 4.1). The hypotheses have 
exponential equations that focus on the relation between speed (T_V) and height 
(T_H), and speed and length (T_L). The first equation of section TV in Table 4.1 is 
the correct law of free fall, but STERN does not know this yet.
Once again there are new hypotheses. STERN applies the confirmation strategy 
again, but none of the new untested hypotheses can be used to account for the 
inclined plane and pendulum experimental paradigms. The new hypotheses have 
speed terms that cannot be eliminated because the definition of speed can no longer 
be used to substitute out the speed term. The definition can only be applied when 
the speed is constant, but STERN has already established that in both experimental 
paradigms it is not constant. Thus the measures of tractability of both groups of 
hypotheses are simply amended.
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Since there are hypotheses to be tested but no suitable experimental paradigms, 
STERN chooses to consider new experimental paradigms. Like Galileo, the 
approach adopted is one of combining known paradigms together. Six combined 
experiments are made including the inclined plane and projectile paradigm (see 
Figure 3.2). To avoid having too many experimental paradigms to consider at any 
time, STERN limits the paradigms that are considered by calculating a pragmatic 
limit, in terms of the product of number of experimental setups and ease with which 
setups can be manufactured. Once all the paradigms above a given level of this 
pragmatic quantity have been exhausted, the value can be reduced until one (or 
more) other paradigm comes into play (as if it had actually been constructed). Now, 
in the present case with the new combined experiments, it is the inclined plane and 
projectile experiment that is selected for use by STERN.
For the last time STERN calls upon its confirmation strategy. STERN just 
happens to consider the law of free fall first. STERN applies the hypothesis to the 
combined experiment and successfully generates models for the experiment in both 
the initial and the terminal models. Further, these models are found to be acceptable 
by the comparison of their instances and experimental tests. In turn the hypothesis 
is considered acceptable; STERN can now be considered to have discovered the law 
of free fall. However, as the free fall hypothesis is acceptable, the rest in the same 
group (TV, Table 4.1) are, therefore, unacceptable. STERN sets their measures of 
acceptability to indicate this fact so that they will be ignored in the future. STERN 
now turns its attention to all members of the other set of hypotheses (V, Table 4.1). 
They are all found to be unacceptable.
The modelling stops after 1600 cycles of the program. A great number of 
hypotheses have been considered (Table 4.1). The Aristotelian laws have been 
disconfirmed; a range of qualitative hypotheses induced; a "genuine" discovery 
made by finding the law governing the motion of a pendulum as a model; and the
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law of free fall shown to be the only adequate quantitative law amongst the many 
produced. Throughout the episode experimental paradigms and setups have been 
selected for use, and experimental tests designed and performed, both to confirm 
theories and as a means to formulate new theories. (Appendix I is a condensed trace 
of STERN's output.)
4.2.3 Comparison With The Real Episode
As the overview demonstrates, STERN has successfully modelled the Galilean 
episode of discovery. The order of the stages in STERN's discovery match the 
phases of Galileo's described in Chapter 3. The disconfirmation of the Aristotelian 
laws occurs in both, followed by the performance of experiments to obtain 
generalizable results that are tested against existing experiments. STERN and 
Galileo both used the knowledge gained from their previous explorations of the 
domain to infer new hypotheses. This in turn requires the invention of new 
experiments, including the combined inclined plane and projectile experiment, 
undertaken by both. Finally, the correct law of free fall is found, by both, by testing 
the most recently generated hypotheses using the combined experiment. Thus at this 
level of description there is a good match between the route STERN took and the 
Galilean path to make the same discoveries.
We have seen the many discoveries that STERN has successfully made. It is 
now time to consider the details of how STERN did this. We will begin by 
considering how STERN represents scientific knowledge in general, using frames 
to instantiate all the levels of knowledge in the present framework (see Chapter 1).
4.3 INSTANTIATION OF FRAMEWORK COMPONENTS
The framework specifies the minimum set of components required for 
modelling scientific discovery. The structure of knowledge in STERN follows the 
framework closely. In general, all types of experimental and theoretical knowledge 
in STERN are implemented in frame like representations (d la Minsky, 1975).
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4.3.1 Research Programs
In the framework, the research programme component plays only a very minor 
part at present, in bringing together theory and experiments to work on a particular 
domain. In the future investigations of cooperative and competitive programmes I 
expect the notion to become more significant A prototype of STERN had a separate 
frame to represent research programmes with slots for theory and experiment, but 
as the Galilean episode concerns just a single scientist working more or less in 
isolation, it merely added an extra layer of representation that had no substantive 
role. Thus the current version of STERN has theory and experiment as its topmost 
level of knowledge.
As we saw earlier in Figure 1.3, the different levels of theory and 
experimentation can be viewed as a hierarchy. In STERN each level is represented 
by a frame and the hierarchy is reproduced by providing slots in each frame for 
items on the next lowest level in the hierarchy. For example, the model frame has 
an instance slot is filled by the instance frames associated with that model. 
The various representations will be considered in turn.
4.3.2 Theory
There are three types of theoretical knowledge in the framework - hypotheses, 
models and instances. However, we will first consider the theory frame that 
instantiates the theoretical side of a research programme.
4.3.2.1 Theory
In STERN theoretical knowledge comes in two forms, declarative and 
procedural. In other words, what is known and how (domain-specific) inferences 
are made. Of the ten slots in the theory frame (see Table 4.2) three slots contain 
declarative knowledge, and the remaining seven procedural knowledge.
The first three slots contain knowledge covering the whole the domain. The 
hypos slot is filled by a list of hypotheses. The tvars slot lists all the symbols 
standing for theoretical terms in the domain. The terms are themselves T! frames
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Table 4.2 Theory Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
hypos
bgknow_relate
tvars
generate_hypos
generate_models
generate_instances
generalise_models
generalise_instances
interpret_expttests
instance_vs_expttest
list of hypothesis frames
relations for theoretical 
interpretation of background 
knowledge 
list of all theoretical terms
rules to infer new hypothesis form 
existing ones 
model generation rules 
instance generation rules 
model generalisation rules 
instance generalisation rules 
rules to interpret experimental test 
results
rules to compare instances and 
experimental test results_______
Aristotelian/Gahlean 
hypotheses 
entry frames for 
geometric^d 
bodily knowledge 
symbols standing for 
term frames 
New Hypotheses
Generate models 
Generate instances 
Generalize models 
Generalize instances 
Interpret
Compare
Table 4.3 Hypothesis Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
equation quantitative domain specific an equation
formalism
qualform qualitative domain specific a qualform
formalism
adequacy hypothesis acceptability measure frame
tractability hypothesis tractability measure frame
models models accounted for by hypo. list of models frames
partial_forms unsuccessfully generated models term* frame
exptnames names of experimental paradigms various experimental
that have been considered paradigms
group group membership identifier a symbol common
STERN
(see §4.3.4.2). The bgknow_related slot stores a special list that permits sets of 
theoretical terms to be mapped onto background knowledge (see §4.4.2 below).
The names of classes of domain-specific rules that can manipulate particular 
types of theoretical knowledge fill the other seven slots. For example, the 
generate Jiypos  slot contains the class name of the rules that infer new hypotheses 
from existing ones (i.e. new hypotheses in the current versions of STERN). (In 
§4.5 below the tasks performed by each of the classes of rules are briefly described 
and discussed in detail in Chapters 5 to 8). The contents of these slots are accessed 
by STERN’s domain-independent heuristics when domain-specific inferences are 
required.
4.32.2 Hypotheses
Hypotheses are the most general or abstract type of knowledge that actually 
accounts for a set of phenomena. They are represented by frames with eight slots 
(see Table 4.3). The equation and qualform slots store quantitative and qualitative 
formalisms respectively. Models are often partial instantiations of a particular 
hypothesis so are contained as a list in the models slot. The names of the 
experimental paradigms that the hypothesis has attempted to account for are stored 
in the exptnames slot. The ease with which a hypothesis can be applied (e.g., used 
to generate models) is contained in the tractability slot and the acceptability of the 
hypothesis contained in the adequacy slot. Both tractability and acceptability 
quantities are values calculated by particular discovery processes and represented as 
measure frames (see §4.3.2.5). When attempts to generate models fail, the results 
are store in the partial Jorm s slot as a list of fewi* frames, and may be recalled for 
later use. Hypotheses that are related together for some reason (e.g., all generated at 
the same time in one processes) have a common symbol stored in ih&ir group slots.
4.3.2.3 Models
A model frame is similar to the hypothesis frame in several ways (Table 4.4). It
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Tahle 4.4 Model Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Finer in STERN
equation quantitative domain specific 
formalism
an equation
qualform quantitative domain specific a qualform
formalism
exptsetups names of experimental setups 
associated with the model
the list of names
adequacy model acceptability measure frame
tractability model tractability measure frame.
instances instances derivable from model instance frames list
exptparadigm name of experimental paradigm 
modelled
name
expttype , indication of special types of symbol specifying
experiment terminal, initial, nil
not_tested experiment setup names not 
accounted for by model
the names
STERN
has equivalent equation, qualform, adequacy and tractability slots, and the 
instances and exptsetups slots are like the hypothesis model and exptnames 
slots. Models are not as general as hypotheses and account for the manifestation of 
the phenomenon in one situation, thus each frame has an exptparadigm slot for the 
experimental paradigm (situation) that it covers. As we saw in Chapter 3, comWned 
experiments can be used in one of two different modes which the model notes by an 
appropriate symbol in the expttype slot. When STERN cannot use a model to 
account for a particular experimental setup, or when no experiments can be 
performed, the name of the experimental setup is stored in the model's notjested  
slot for future reference.
43.2.4 Instances
Instances are typically the predictions made from models or the interpreted 
results of experiments. The instance frame has seven slots that contain specific 
theoretical terms, their values and associated information (Table 4.5). The dep and 
indep slots contain the dependent ("measured") and independent ("manipulated") 
terms respectively; and the depvals and the indepvals slots store list of their 
values. The other je rm s  slot contains the terms with fixed values as a list. Not all 
instances are quantitative, qualitative instances use a qualform  slot to store 
qualitative formalisms. The degree slot contains a number (in the range [0 1]) that 
indicates the acceptability of the instances.
4 .3 2 5  Acceptability And Tractability
The framework does not specify what form the assessment of the acceptability 
should take and previous work has shown explanatory breadth to be a primary 
criterion. Thus, in STERN a simple adequacy function calculates acceptability in 
terms the range of experimental results successfully accounted for. Experimental 
test results are compared with instances and the degree of acceptability of the 
instance is calculated by particular functions (in the compare and interpret classes 
of rules, in Chapters 5 and 6). The acceptability of a model is given by the quotient
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Table 4.5 Instance Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Finer in STERN
dep
depvals
indep
indepvals
qualform
degree
other_terms
dependent term 
dependent term's values 
independent term 
independent term's values 
qualitative observation 
acceptability of instance 
other fixed value terms
a term (T! frame) 
list of values 
a term (T! frame) 
list of values, 
a qualform 
0 < real number < 1 
list of terms (T!s)
STERN
of (i) the sum of instance acceptability values (i.e., the value in the degree slot of 
the measure frame contained in the adequacy slot of each instance) and (ii) the total 
number of instances that are accounted for by the model that have been 
experimentally tested. Hypothesis acceptability is in turn assessed in a similar 
manner, but with respect to models; specifically, the acceptability is the quotient of 
(i) the sum of model acceptability values and (ii) the total number of models that are 
accounted for by the hypothesis. The adequacy of hypotheses and models can thus 
be summarized by the equation:
Z k  acceptability
Acceptability of K= , . . . ( 4 . 1 )
Number of ks
where K is a hypothesis (or a model) that accounts for one or more models (or 
instances), k, respectively. All acceptability values range between 0 and 1.
STERN also calculates the tractability of hypotheses and models by recording 
the success with which models or instances have been generated. Tractability is 
defined in terms of the number of models (or instances) successfully accounted for 
by a hypothesis (model) compared to the number of attempts made to form models 
(instances). This measure plays no part in the calculation of the acceptability of 
theoretical knowledge but helps to determine the route taken in the discovery path.
The quantities that represent tractability and acceptability are represented as 
measure frames (Table 4.6). Measure frames have two slots; a number slot filled 
by the number of knowledge items or inference attempts, and a degree slot that 
contains the sum of the particular values calculated by STERN. The assessment of 
both acceptability and tractability occurs incrementally, with the quantity being 
amended each time a new model (or instance) is considered by STERN. Thus, the 
values in the degree and number slots related directly to the numerator and 
denominator of Equation 4.1, respectively.
The use of tractability and acceptability functions makes STERN similar to, but
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Table 4.6 Measure Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
number
degree
number of items or events
sum of acceptability or tractability
values
non negative integer 
0 < real number
STERN
also different from, ECHO (Thagard, 1989a). STERN is similar to ECHO in its use 
of explanatory breadth, but differs in its incremental assessment. There is a fairly 
close similarity between KEKEDA’s (Kulkami & Simon, 1988) five measures of 
confidence and STERN. Both assess acceptability in terms of the relative support 
by experimental evidence and use pragmatic measures of the effort expended to find 
the evidence. Unlike PI (Thagard, 1988a) STERN does not use a measure of 
simplicity in its acceptability function.
It is our assumption that this treatment of acceptability and tractability is 
sufficient for successful scientific discovery. This can be viewed as something 
which will be tested by applying STERN to the Galilean case.
4.3.3 Experim ents
One of the main differences between STERN and previous discovery systems is 
the extent to which experiment has been modelled. STERN has representations for 
each of the framework levels of experimental knowledge.
4.3.3.1 Experiment
Like the theory frame, the experiment frame also has slots containing declarative 
and procedural knowledge, but they are fewer in number (see Table 4.7). The 
exptparadigms slot contains the domain's experimental paradigms. The other two 
slots contain the names of the sets of rules that perform experiments (§4.6) or 
invent new experiments (see Chapter 8).
4.3.32 Experimental Paradigms
Experimental paradigms have nine slots divided into two groups depending 
upon whether they are generally applicable to all experiments or specific to 
combined experiments. Consider the former group first (Table 4.8). The generally 
applicable slots include: (i) a name slot that holds the name of the paradigm (e.g., 
'incplane' and 'pendulum' for the inclined plane experiment); (ii) a parameters slot 
for the experimental parameters, represented as a list of E! frames (see §4.3.4); 
and (iii) an exptsetups slot containing experimental setups. The ease with which
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Table 4.7 Experiment Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Finer in STERN
exptparadigms
new_exptpardigms
perform_expttest
experimental paradigms
rules for the invention of new 
experimental paradigms 
rules to design and perform 
experiments
list of various expt 
paradigms frames 
New paradigms
Experimenter
Table 4.8 Experimental Paradigm Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
name experimental paradigm name the name
parameters experiment parameters a list of E! frames
exptsetups experimental setups list of setups frames
manf_ease measure of ease of manufacture 0 < real number < 1
bgknow_relate relations for the interpretation of geometry & bodily
background knowledge entry frames
initparams parameters of initial part of 
combined experiment
a list of El frames •
initials initial expts. setups in combined experimental setups
experiments frames
terminals terminal experimental setups in the experimental
combined experiments setups frames
bg_rel_initial relations for interpretation of back 
ground knowledge, for initial 
experiments
the relations
STERN
setups can be manufactured is specified as a number in the manf_ease slot (in the 
range [0 1]). The relation between sets of parameters and background knowledge is 
given by the special lists in the bgknowjrelate slot (see §4.4.2).
The remaining four slots are only used when a combined experiment is invented 
and performed. There are slots for experimental setups that can act as the initiA and 
terminal parts of the combined experiments, initials and terminals. The parameters 
for the initial part are stored in the initparams and their particular relations to the 
background knowledge are stored in the bg_rel_initial slot. The two equivalent 
slots for the terminal parts are the "normal" parameters and bgknow_relate ones. 
Combined experiments are named by the conjunctions of two ordinary names, for 
example 'incplane+projectile'.
4.3.3.3 Experimental Setups
The frame for experimental setups has four slots (see Table 4.9). The name slot 
holds labels such as 'down_incplane' and ’up_incplane* which are two of the 
setups for the inclined plane experimental paradigm. Parameters that are specific just 
to one setup are stored as a list of E! frames in the parameters slot. Experimental 
tests are contained as a list in the expttest slot and the combine slot contains the 
names of other setups that can act as initial parts if the present setup is the terminal 
part in a combined experiment
4.3.3.4 Experimental Test Representation
The experimental tests frame has six slots that are equivalent to one in the 
instance frame on the theoretical side (Table 4.10). The input-m, output and 
input-c slots contain the manipulated input, measured output and the fixed input 
parameters, respectively, the last one being a list. The lists of values of the 
manipulated input and the measured output parameters are contained in the 
input-m _vals  and the output_vals slots, respectively. The remaining slot, 
term inal, indicates the mode in which a combined experiment is used.
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Table 4.9 Experimental Setup Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
name
parameters
expttests
combine
experimental setup name 
parameters specific to setup 
experimental tests 
possible initial experimental setups 
for this setup
the name 
a list of E! fi-ames 
expttest frames list 
list of setup frames
Table 4.10 Experimental Test Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
input-c
input-m
input-m_vals
output
output_vals
terminal*
fixed input parameters 
manipulated input (independent) 
parameter 
manipulated input parameter values 
measure or observed output 
(independent) parameter values 
measure or observed output 
parameter values 
special experiment type indicator
list of E! frames 
anE! frame
list of values 
anE! frame
list of values
symbol to specify 
terminal expt.
STERN
4.3.4 Com m unication, Term s & Param eters
The last component of the framework deals with communication between the 
theory and experiment components. STERN models many types of communication 
between theory and experiment that typically involves the interrogation of fillers in 
particular slots in experimentation frames by theoretical inference processes, or vice 
versa. However, the correspondence between theoretical terms and experimental 
parameters requires specific representations.
43.4.1 Correspondence By Kinds and Qualkinds
The correspondence of specific theoretical terms and particular experimental 
parameters is a requirement by the framework, thus some means of mapping 
between them is required. To map between a term and its corresponding parameter, 
or visa versa, both are given an identical symbol. The symbol is called the kind of 
the term or the parameter in STERN. Distance and time are two examples of kinds 
needed to model the Galilean episode. However, previous work and the Galilean 
episode both demonstrate the importance of qualitative representations and 
inferences in discovery systems. Hence qualkinds are used for correspondence 
between terms and parameters that are merely observed but not measurable. For, 
example, the speed of an object can be qualitatively assessed even though it cannot 
be directly measured; velocity is quaMnd of the speed term. Terms and parameters 
are in fact represented as frames with slots for the kind or qualkind.
Kinds and qualkinds in STERN are comparable to the units that exist in 
ABACUS (Falkenhainer & Michalski, 1986) and COPER (Kokar, 1986), although 
they have different roles in the different programs.
4.3.42 T! term and E! parameter frames
These are some of the most basic representations in STERN. However, STERN 
requires representations of terms and parameters with more structure than most 
previous discovery systems. The terms and parameters frames, called T! and E!,
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have five and six slots, respectively (see Tables 4.11 and 4.12). Both have kind 
and qualkind correspondence symbols. STERN knows that a term and a parameter 
correctly match when contents of either the kind or qualkind slots are identical.
The T! frame has three other slots. The val slot contains the numerical value of 
the term when it is a directly measurable. Some quantitative terms can be defined as 
some function of other measurable terms, for example speed in terms of distance 
and time. The equation slot stores such definitions and the necjqualforms slot 
contains qualforms (see §4.4.2 below) that specify the necessary conditions that 
must apply if the speed term is to be substituted for the distance and time terms 
(e.g., speed must be constant).. .
The E! parameter frame also has a val slot for its magnitude, but in addition has 
maxval and minval slots defining the permitted ranges of the values given by the 
physical dimensions of the experimental setup. The ease slot contains a value (in 
the range [01]) that indicates the ease with which the parameter can be manipulated 
or observed within the experimental setup.
The extensive range of frames used to implement the components of the 
scientific framework in a general domain-independent manner have been described. 
To model a particular episode of discovery STERN needs domain specific 
knowledge, that is, the representations to fill the slots of the many frames just 
considered.
4.4 DOMAIN SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE
We have considered knowledge representations that are supposed to be general 
to all episodes of scientific discovery. However, the character o f scientific 
knowledge varies greatly from domain to domain. We now consider the 
representations that STERN possesses with which to model the Galilean domain.
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Tahle 4.11 T! Theoretical Term Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description FiUer in STERN
kind
qualkind
equation
nec_qualforms
val
quantitative kind of the term 
qualitative qualkind of the term 
equation defining the term using 
other terms 
necessary qualitative restrictions on 
substitutions using the equation 
value of the term
eg. length, time 
eg. speed, density 
an equation
list of appropriate 
qualforms 
a real number
Table 4.12 E! Experimental Parameter Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
kind quantitative kind of the parameter eg. length, time
qualkind qualitative qualkind of the parameter eg. speed, density .
ease a measure of the ease of 0 < real number < 1
manipulation and observation
maxval maximum value . . real number
minval minimum value real number
val current value real number
STERN
4.4.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Knowledge Representation
Galileo used a peculiar form of geometric-pictorial reasoning which would 
require a research project of its own to fully understand and model. Here, a more 
conventional approach has been adopted for both quantitative and qualitative 
representations.
First the quantitative representations are equations in theoretical terms. They 
terms may be related by simple arithmetic operators (i.e., products, quotients, 
summation, subtraction) and exponentials functions.The indices of the exponentials 
are small rational numbers - fractions with numerator and denominator as integers 
below a user specified limit, typically 3. Galileo expressed equations as ratios of 
terms, but here the equations that will be encountered will, for example, look like:
(= (*A B )(/C D )). ...(4.2a)
In conventional mathematical notation is written as:
A .B  = C / D .  . ...(4.2b)
The equality sign is not however to be read conventionally but means 
proportionality, thus making (4.2a) equivalent to the Galilean expressions using 
ratios of terms.
The second form of domain specific knowledge are qualitative relations that 
Galileo expressed propositionally. Here, such relations are stated in the form of 
Qualitative Formalisms, called qualforms. They employ a predicate argument like 
notation; for example:
(increase A B), ...(4.3a),
and (decrease C D), ...(4.3b).
where A, B, C and D are theoretical terms. The two qualforms assert, respectively, 
that "A increases as B increases" and "C decreases whilst D increases". Table 4.13 
lists all the qualforms used in STERN. Although qualforms bear a resemblance 
previous approaches to qualitative reasoning, such as IDS (Nordhausen & Langley,
Table 4.13 Qualforms and their interpretations
Qualform Variation of A as B increases uniformly
(INCREASE A B) 
(DECREASE A B) 
(STEADY A B)
(LINEAR A B) 
(INSTANTANEOUS A B) 
(REPEAT+AB)
(REPEAT-A B)
(INDEPENDENT A B)
A increase 
A decreases 
A is constant
A uniform rate of increases from zero 
A is constant after brief initial rapid increase 
A rises to a maximum and returns to its 
starting value 
A falls to a minimum and returns to its 
starting value 
None of the above.
■ .v^j.wuLarifwrrrrr................... ..................
(FROM ZERO A B) 1st A and B values at origin
Table 4.14 B a c k p r n n n d  Knowledge ENTRY Frame Slots and Fillers
Slot name Description Filler in STERN
variable
fixed
equation
qualform
limits
3 variables in any order 
the variable held constant 
quantitative relation between 
aU 3 variables 
qualitative relation between 
the 2 unfixed variables if 
no equation 
pairs of boundary values or 
substitutible variables
eg. arc_x, arc_l, arc_@ 
eg. arc_(2) 
eg. '
(= arc_x (* arc_l arc_(2))) 
eg.
(increase arc_x arc_l ) 
eg. '((0 0)(pi/2arc_d))
STERN
1987) the role they play in STERN is quite different. Qualforms are also similar to 
BACON like regularity spotters (Langley et.al, 1987; Falkenhainer & Michalski, 
1986; Reimann, 1990) but qualforms explicitly state the relation noted in a 
manipulable form and cover a much wider range of relations. Qualforms are central 
to STERN's integrated quantitative and qualitative discovery abilities.
4.4.2 Background Knowledge
4.42.1 Entry Frames To Store Relations
An example of background knowledge in the Galilean domain is the 
understanding of geometry that underlies the geometric-pictorial form of reasoning. 
In various different types of inference STERN also employs a repository of 
background geometrical knowledge that summarizes basic trigonometrical relations. 
Figure 4.2 shows the geometric relations. To store this and all other types of 
background knowledge, STERN uses a list of entry frames, headed by a symbol 
(eg. arc) that names the list. Each frame has five slots that defines the relation 
between certain variables (Table 4.14). The variables s\ol contains a list of three 
variables that are interrelated by the equation or qualform stored in slots with those 
names, where the variable named in iht fixed slot is held constant. The ranges over 
which the other two variables can vary are specified in the limits slot. Two of 
STERN's eleven geometric, or arc, entry frames are included in Figure 4.2. 
STERN also possesses background knowledge for bodily relations of spherical 
objects.
4.4.2.2 Background Knowledge Mapping Relations
To be able to use background knowledge in the form just described the theory 
and the experimental paradigm frames have bgknow_relate (and bg_rel_initial) 
slots. These slots contain lists that define the relation between the theoretical or 
experimental knowledge and background knowledge entry frames. The lists map 
terms onto the background knowledge variables. Each list starts with the name of a 
set of background knowledge (e.g. arc) and is followed by pairs of terms and
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Relation between the variables
arc b
arc
arc 1
arc @
arc X
arc carc a
Two example definitions of entry frames
(I 1st 
'arc
(make-entry : van IobI es ' (orc_x orc_l orc_e)
;fixed ' orc_jB
; equal ion ' ( “ arc_x (* arc_l arc_^))) 
(make-entry ; variables ' (arc_c arc_i arc_s)
; fixed 'arc_i
: qua i form ' (decrease arc_j0 arc_c) 
i i i mi t s  ' ( (0 orc_i) (*pi/2* 0) ) )
)
Figure 4.2 Geometric Background Knowledge
STERN
background variables. STERN uses the lists to transform theoretical terms into 
background variables. The variables are then used to find suitable entry frames and 
the information in the frames is used to make inferences. For example, a qualform 
from the entry frame may be transformed into an equation using the specified limits. 
The equation is then transformed back into theoretical terms using the mapping lists 
in reverse.
Two examples of the way background knowledge is used in STERN are: (i) the 
elimination of non-measurable terms by substitution and (ii) the identification of 
terms or parameters that are trivially related due to the physical geometry of an 
experimental setup rather than via the phenomenon.
4.4.3 Summary
We have considered all of STERN's knowledge representations. A clear 
distinction has been made between the general representations to implement the 
present framework and domain-specific representations to model the Galilean 
domain. The framework representations have been designed so that it should be 
possible, in principle, to use an alternative collection of domain specific 
representations without altering the general frames. This distinction based on 
knowledge specificity has been maintained in the design of STERN's processes and 
rules. We will now consider STERN's processes and rules.
4.5 DISCOVERY PROCESSES AND RULES
We have seen STERN's many different knowledge representations. Here, we 
will consider the processes used by STERN to manipulate this knowledge in order 
to make discoveries. We will see how the the framework has been used to define 
specific classes of processes to perform particular tasks and how STERN 
instantiates the processes as rules. A production system-like architecture is used for 
overall programmatic control.
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4.5.1 Knowledge States And Condition-Action Rules
We have seen how the framework provides a principled organization of 
theoretical and experimental knowledge in STERN. The framework has also been 
used to organize STERN's discovery processes.
The framework posits that three types of theoretical knowledge and three levels 
of experimentation are present in a research programme. Each has associated 
information (e.g., measures of acceptability) and may be under active consideration 
at a particular time or simply held in long-term memory. Thus it is possible to 
identify different states of a research programme in terms of: (i) the presence or 
absence of particular items of knowledge; (ii) whether those items are active; and 
(iii) the magnitudes of the various types of information related to each item. This 
state based characterization of research programmes is used in two different ways in 
the specification of rules in STERN.
First, the states of a research programme are used to express STERN's general 
domain-independent discovery processes as well defined condition-action rules. A 
particular state defines the condition and the action specifies some definite change to 
be made to the state. For example, a condition may find that there is an active 
acceptable hypothesis, but that the hypothesis does not account for a given 
experimental setup (i.e., the hypothesis does not possess any relevant models). The 
action of the rule would then use the hypothesis to generate models for the 
experimental setup.
Second, tasks are defined in STERN in terms of particular states and general 
changes to those states, rather like rules. However, tasks differ from rules in that 
they are comprised of many rules. For example, the testing of a model employs 
several rules including those to: generate predictive instances; to design and perform 
experiments for each instance; and to compare each experimental result with an 
instance. Tasks may engage sub-tasks to carry out specific procedures; generating
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predictive instances is a sub-task of the above model testing example. We will see 
below, all of STERN’s rules are classified into groups in a well defined task 
hierarchy. Tasks in STERN are similar to partitioned or packaged  rules in 
previous discovery programs (e.g., BACON, Langely et.al.^ 1987; KEKEDA, 
Kulkami & Simon, 1988). However, the state based approach used here is more 
principled. The context of each group of rules in STERN within the overall 
discovery process is transparent. Furthermore, the grouping of rules according to a 
particular task means that STERN possesses a property that is very desirable in 
discovery systems; namely, the unambiguous separation of domain-specific and 
domain-independent processes. In STERN the classes of rules that are applicable to 
a wide variety of episodes of discovery are clearly distinguished from those that 
apply only to the Galilean domain. Contrast this with KEKEDA (Kulkami & 
Simon, 1988) in which domain-specific and domain-independent heuristics are
found in every group of rules.
To summarize, the framework provides a principled method by which to define 
rules and to organize them into groups within a clearly defined hierarchy of tasks. 
We now consider the groups of rules in themselves and the tasks they perform.
4.5.2 STERN'S Classes Of Rules
STERN has 64 rules. They are grouped into 16 classes that perform specific 
tasks. There are domain-independent and domain specific sets of tasks (see Tables 
4.15 & 4.16, and Figure 4.3).
The domain-independent mles are built into STERN. They control the way 
STERN makes discoveries; guiding it down different paths as the process evolves. 
These rules typically refer to frames that instantiate the components of the 
framework without changing the contents of the slots.
The domain specific rules, on the other hand, tell STERN how to perform 
particular inferences on the Galilean knowledge representation; such as equations 
and qualforms. The groups comprise the procedural knowledge for the Galilean
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Table 4.15 General Domain Independent Classes Of Rules
Name
(STERN reference)
Description
Strategy chooser 
(RULES_0)
Top level control and strategy chooser
Hypothesis testing 
(RULES.l)
Model testing 
(RULES_2) 
Instance testing 
(RULES_9)
Hypothesis testing by experimental paradigm selection and 
model generation 
Model testing by experimental setup selection and instance 
generation.
Instance testing by experimental test design, perfoiming 
the tests, and results comparison.
Models into hypotheses 
(RULES_3)
Instances into models 
(RULES_7)
Tests into instances 
(RULES_11)
Selection of experimental paradigms to obtain models to be 
generalised into hypotheses.
Selection of experimental setups to obtain instances to 
generalise in to models.
Design and performance of experimental tests, to permit 
the interpretation of experimental results into instances.
Table 4.16 Domain Specific Classes Of Rules
Name
(STERN reference)
Description Location in STERN 
(frame: slot)
Generate models
(RULES_5)
Generate instances
(RULES_8)
Compare
(RULES_12)
Qualitative and quantitative model generation 
from hypotheses & experimental paradigms 
Qualitative & quantitative instance generation 
from models & experimental setups 
Comparison of qualitative and quantitative 
instances and experimental tests.
Theory:
Generate_models
Theory:
Generate_instances
Theory:
Instance_vs_expttest
Generalize models
(RULES_10)
GeneraHzeinstanoes
(RULES_4)
Interpret
(RULES_6)
Generalization of qualitative and quantitative 
models into hypotheses.
Generalization of qualitative and quantitative 
instances into models.
Interpretation of experimental test results into 
instances.
Theory:
Generalise_models
Theory:
Generalisejnstances
Theory:
Interpret_expttests
New paradigms 
(RULES_13)
Invention of new combined experimental 
paradigms.
Experiment:
New_exptpardigms
New hypotheses 
(RULES_14)
The generation of new qualitative and 
quantitative heuristics form existing ones.
Theory:
Generate_hypos
Experimenter
(EXPT_RULES)
(i) Design of experimental tests given a setup 
and an instance.
(ii) Experiment simulator.
Experiment:
Perform_expttest
Ih
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STERN
research programme. STERN knows which group to invoke by referring to slots in 
the theory and experiment frames (see Table 4.16). For example, when new 
hypotheses need to be generated from old, the rules named in the generatejiypos 
slot of the theory frame are retrieved (i.e., the new hypotheses class). STERN is 
run by invoking the strategy chooser (RULES_0^) class of rules. These rules 
govern STERN's overall performance by selecting one of four very different high- 
level tasks. These tasks are the four general discovery processes that were identified 
in the Galilean episode (see Chapter 3): (i) the confirmation of existing of 
hypotheses - hypothesis testing (RULES_1); (ii) the generalization from 
experimental results into new hypotheses - models into hypotheses (RULES_3); 
(iii) the formation of new hypotheses from existing ones - new paradigms 
(RULES_13); and (iv) the invention of new experiments - new hypotheses 
(RULES_14).
In STERN, confirming a hypotheses depends on the fact that the acceptability of 
hypotheses is a function of the acceptability of models, and that in turn, thé 
acceptability of models is a function of the acceptability of instances. The process 
starts with the hypothesis testing class of rules (see Figure 4.3). These rules 
generate models to account for a particular experimental paradigm and assesses the 
acceptability of the hypotheses with respect to each model. Models are formed by 
the domain specific generate models rules. Each model is individually investigated 
by the model testing rules. Testing a model has a similar pattern to assessing a 
hypothesis; specifically, instances are generated with respect to an experimental 
setup and the acceptability of the models is assessed according to the success of the 
instances. Instances are formed by generate instances. Individual instances are 
examined by instance testing. Testing an instance involves the design and 
performance of an experimental test, by the experimenter rules, and the comparison
^Each class of rules has a reference name (e.g., RULES_0) so that the class of an individual rule 
can be simply identified by its R xJ prefix, where x  is the reference number of the class (e.g., 
RO_START_CONFIRM).
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of the result with the instance, by the compare rules. We will see in detail how 
STERN performs confirmation in Chapter 5.
STERN forms hypotheses from experimental results by generalizing models. 
Models are obtained by generalizing instances, and instances are interpreted 
experimental test results. Models into hypotheses has the job of finding the models 
(Figure 4.3), using instances into models. The models are generalized to form 
hypotheses by generalize models. Models are obtained by instances into models 
that finds instances, using tests into instances, and forms them into models, using 
generalize instances. In turn, instances are found by performing experiments, 
experimenter, and interpreting the test results in to instances, interpret. We will 
see in detail how STERN obtains hypotheses in Chapter 6.
The generation of new hypotheses from old only involves one set of rules, new 
hypotheses (RULES_14). STERN only examines the one type of theoretical 
knowledge when carrying put this task and thus does not need multiple sub-tasks. 
The generation of new hypotheses from old is considered in more detail in 
Chapter 7.
Inventing new experimental paradigms also requires just one set of rules, new 
paradigms (RULES_13). Again, since only one type of experimental knowledge is 
considered, the need for additional classes of rules is obviated. The invention of 
new experimental paradigms is considered in more detail in Chapter 8.
Although the organization of rules given in Figure 4.3 follows from the 
framework it is not the only possibility. Thus the hierarchy of rules that STERN 
employs can be considered as a "hypothesis'* that will be assessed according to the 
acceptability STERN as a model of discovery.
In the review of previous work (in Chapter 2) it was concluded that it is 
desirable for discovery systems to (i) possess a richness of heuristics to match 
KEKEDA (Kulkami & Simon, 1988) but (ii) organized in a principled manner
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rather like the SDDS process hierarchy (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). STERN's 64 rules 
in 16 groups, organized in the structure given in Figure 4.3, satisfy this dual 
requirement.
4.5.3 Production System Implementation
STERN's processes are represented as condition-action rules implemented in a 
production system like architecture. The system is loosely based on Hasemer & 
Domingue's (1989) production system, but has substantial alterations. In STERN, 
the working memory is the complex structure of frames described above plus a 
current frame. This frame has slots for the three types theory and the three levels of 
experiments. The slots {hypothesis, model, instance, exptparadigm, exptsetup 
expttest) are filled by hypotheses, models, etc. that are being actively considered at 
a particular time. The rules themselves are represented as rule frames with 
antecedent and consequent slots for the conditions and actions, respectively. Each 
rule has a name slot and a counter slot that is incremented each time the rule is 
fired. The conditions and action are CL functions. The condition can examine,.but 
never change, the contents of slots of any of the systems knowledge structures. The 
actions, however, have full access to knowledge structures; they can manipulate the 
stored information and instantiate new items in the structure. (Table 4.17 gives the 
CL code for one rule.^)
Like more classical productions systems STERN has cycles that involve: (i) the 
matching of rules against working memory; (ii) conflict resolution to select one rule 
to fire from amongst those that are successful in a cycle; (iii) firing the rule and the 
looping back to the matching stage. The conflict resolution strategy used by STERN 
normally chooses the rule with highest priority not fired in the last cycle. The order 
of the rules in a class determines their priority. In certain cases the not-fired-in-the- 
last-cycle condition is suspended as some classes of rules iterate over .a list of items 
(i.e. strategy chooser and generate models).
3 A disk with all the CL code for STERN is included with this thesis (or may be obtained on 
application to HCRL).
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TahlP 4 t7 n .  Code For R1 HYPO ASSF.SS WRT MODELS Rule.
R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS_ANT
Function to instantiate rule antecedent for assessment 
of an hypothesis with respect to a model 
Condition; there is a current hypo & a current model that has been tested 
Version 1.2 29/3/90 (VI 20/9/89)
Returns: T if Condition satisfied, nil otherwise 
Calls: untested? current c_slot
Arguments : —
Variables : —
Structures : current hypo model
(defun Rl_hypo_assess_wrt_models_ant ()
;;an active hypothesis 
(cond ((and (current hypo)
;;an active model 
(current model)
;;the model has been successfully tested 
(or (null (untested? (c_slot model adequacy)))
; ;unsuccessful attempts have been made to test the model 
(c_slot model not_tested))))))
R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS_C0N
Function to instantiate rule consequent of hypo assessment 
with respect to a model.
Version 1.1 13/3/90 (VI 20/9/89)
Action : Assesses the hypothesis acceptability, deactivates the model,
and clears expt paradigm if all models have been tested.
Calls: statement clear_current. current. amend_measure 
Arguments : —
Variables : —
Structures : hypo model measure
(defun Rl_hypo_assess_wrt_models_con ()
(setf (c_slot % p o  adequacy)
(amend_næasure (c_slot hypo adequacy)
(/ (measure-degree (cslot model adequacy))
(measure-number (c_slot nfodel adequacy) ) ) ) )
(clear_current model)
(statement *rules_l "hypo adequacy =" (c_slot hypo adequacy)
"and current model cleared")
; ; clear current paradigm only if all models have now been tested 
(cond ((null (antested_hypo_models (c_slot hypo models)))
(clear_carrent exptparadigm)
(statement 'rules_l "All models tested, exptparadigm cleared ))))
N otes:
All frames are inseantiated as def structs
(c slot frame s lo t )  - retrieves the filler of slot in the Qctiw&frajne 
(untested? measure) - checks whether the item with the specified measure 
frame has been tested 
(statement itesis) - prints the items to the output stream 
(ciear_Gurrent frame) - makes t h e i n a c t i v e
(amend_measure measure amount) - increments the frame by the
given amount.
STERN
In conventional production systems with large numbers of rules, the rules are 
often packaged into groups with common tests in their conditions. However, 
STERN's sixteen sets of rules need to be organized hierarchically as shown in 
Figure 4.3, so a different technique is employed. This technique involves recursive 
calls to the PS with particular class of rules. A new class of rules (on level m-1 of 
the hierarchy) can be invoked from a single rule (on level m) by recursively calling 
the PS with the new rules. For example, the action of the RO_START_CONFIRM rule, 
in the strategy chooser class, calls the PS with the hypothesis testing rules. The 
PS to cycle through the hypothesis testing rules until, eventually, none match. 
Control is then popped back up one level to the PS with the strategy chooser rules. 
Two of the hypothesis testing rules make recursive calls (to generate models and 
model testing). The whole hierarchical structure of rules is implemented using this 
simple technique.
4.6 EXPERIM ENT SIMULATION
Unlike previous systems, where the user is responsible for supplying hand 
calculated experimental results, STERN possesses an experiment simulator. All but 
one of the experimenter (EXPT_RULES) class of rules comprise the subprogram 
that simulates the performance of experiments (the exception designs experimental 
tests). This has no bearing of STERN's discovery abilities but obviates the need for 
user to supply experimental results as inputs. STERN has no access to the contents 
of the simulator other than via its inputs and outputs. The simulator is given 
specified experimental parameters as inputs and calculates the values of the 
parameters as its outputs.
4.6.1 Black Box S im ulator
The black box conceptualization of experiments given by the framework 
suggests a technique for the simulation of the phenomenon in an experiment.
-96-
STERN
Generally, in science the objective is to discover the contents of the "black box" 
phenomenon that functionally relates the input and output parameters. However, for 
the Galilean motion domain, a high level characterization of the phenomena already 
exists; namely the conservation of energy, as expressed as the constant magnitude 
of the sum of potential (height) and kinetic (speed) energies, throughout the 
movement of a body. Thus, given an input parameter and its successive values, it is 
possible to determine the corresponding output parameter values, by calculating the 
transfer of potential to kinetic energy .This is a feasible proposition because the all 
the experimental paradigms in the domain have parameters that are related to height 
and speed by their physical geometry. This forms the conceptual basis of STERN’s 
rules that simulates the performance of real experiments.
4.6.2 Im plem entation And Perform ance
The experimenter is the set of rules instantiating experimental performance. All 
but one simulates the performance of experiments under particular experimental 
setups. (The exception is used to prepare experimental tests when an instance is 
available. It will be described in Chapter 5.) The rules are instantiated by such a 
central function, that incrementally varies the input parameter in order to calculate 
the series of output values. However, the rule to perform combined experiments is 
different, because separate simulations are required for the initial and terminal parts. 
However, the same principle is used for each of the parts in turn, and then the two 
are combined.
Noise is artificially added to the calculated output values. Each value is altered 
by a random amount within a band given by a certain specified percentage of the 
calculated value. The new noisy value can be any where within the band, with an 
approximately uniform probability. Settle's (1961) experiments show that the noise 
level given by a half band width of 2 percent is realistic for the Galilean domain.
We have just seen how STERN simulates experiments. Earlier we considered 
STERN's knowledge representations and classes of rules. Now we can begin to
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examine how STERN brings all these pieces together to make discoveries. The next 
section describes how STERN chooses which of the four main discovery processes 
to carry out.
4.7 TOP LEVEL CONTROL - Strategy Chooser
STERN has four main discoveries making processes (i.e., confirming 
hypotheses, generalization from experimental results, generating new hypotheses 
from old, and the invention of new experiments). Choosing which to cany out at 
any particular time is the task of the strategy chooser rules. They constitute 
STERN's top level of global control. Invoking the production system with strategy 
chooser runs the program.
Four rules comprise the strategy chooser class (see Table 4.18). The priority of 
the rules in production system conflict resolution is the same as their order in Table 
4.18. The action of all four rules is to make recursive calls to the production system 
with sets of rules to carry out the particular strategy chosen. STERN chooses the 
confirmation strategy (using RO_START_CONFIRM) when there are hypotheses that 
have not been used to account for all experimental paradigms, successfully or 
otherwise. For example, given the effective weight law (hypothesis) as an input, 
STERN tries to confirm the hypothesis by applying it to the pendulum and inclined 
plane experiments. The generalization of experimental results into hypotheses 
(RO_START_INDUCE) occurs when experimental paradigms have not been 
successfully accounted for by a hypothesis. For example, STERN performs 
experiments on the pendulum experiments to find equations and qualforms for 
generalization. New hypotheses are inferred from old (RO_NEW_HYPOS) when 
attempts to (dis)confirm all existing hypotheses have been made and hypotheses 
have been generalized from experimental results. The law of free fall is found by 
STERN using this strategy. New experimental paradigms are considered when 
hypotheses have not been (dis)confirmed but all existing paradigms have been tried
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Tahle 4.18 Strategy Chooser Rules (RULES Q)
RO_START_CONFIRM*
C ondition:
There are stored hypotheses that are completely untested or have not been tested against all 
manufactured experimental paradigms.
A ction:
Call PS with Hypothesis testing (RULES_1) to examine the untested hypotheses in conjunction 
with the experimental paradigms with which they have not yet been tested by generating 
models.
RO_START_INDUCE
C ondition:
All hypotheses have been examined irrespective whether they were tractable, 
and not all the manufactured experimental paradigms have been successfully accounted for by a 
hypothesis.
A ction:
Call PS with Models into hypotheses (RULES_3) to perform experiments on the unaccounted for
experimental paradigms in an attempt to generalization the results into hypotheses via models.
RO_NEW _HYPOS
C ondition:
All stored hypotheses have been tested using at least one model 
A ction:
Call PS with the set of rules in the theory frame generate_hypos slot (i.e., New Hypotheses, 
RULES_14) to gerieiated new hypotheses from existing ones.
RO_NEW_ EXPTPARADIGMS 
C ondition:
There are stored hypotheses that remain untested.
A ction:
Call PS with rules in the experiment frame new_experiments slot, (i.e.. New paradigms, 
RULES_13) to make new combined experiments
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
STERN
(RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS). For example, STERN needs the combined inclined 
plane and projectile experiment as the law of free fall cannot be tested using the 
pendulum or inclined plane paradigms.
We now know the circumstances in which STERN chooses to employ each 
strategy. The four main strategies will be considered in their own chapters, 5 to 8. 
Chapter 5 - The confirmation or otherwise of existing hypotheses;
Chapter 6 - The performance of experiments to obtain results that are generalized 
into hypotheses via models;
Chapter 7 - The generation of new hypotheses from a stock of existing hypotheses 
with varying degrees of acceptability; and.
Chapter 8 - The consideration of new experiments and the pragmatic selection of 
paradigms.
The chapters will also compare STERN's abilities and those of existing discovery 
systems, with particular attention to the manner in which STERN attempts to 
overcome their limitations.
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Chapter 5
Confirming Existing Hypotheses
%
5.1 INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of his investigations Galileo adopted the Aristotelian laws 
current in his day. He attempted to demonstrate these laws were correct by making 
predictions about the behaviour of balls rolling down inclined planes and the motion 
of swinging pendulums. Through successive experimental trials, Galileo tested 
these predictions but found they were poor. Much later in the episode Galileo 
inferred his law of free fall. The acceptability of this law was determined by the 
making of predictions for comparison with experimental results. These two 
examples show that predictive (dis)confirmations of known hypotheses plays an 
important part in, scientific discovery.
STERN models this important aspect of discovery. On four occasions during 
STERN's run (see Chapter 4) known hypotheses came to be tested against 
experimental outcomes. Each time this happened STERN acted in a theory-led 
fashion and invoked the confirmation strategy (rule RO_START_CONFIRM in 
Strategy chooser).
This chapter considers the details of how STERN models the process of 
predictive confirmation of existing hypotheses. After an overview of the process is 
given, I will present a detailed account of the stages in the process. Finally, 
comparisons to previous work will be made.
5.2 STAGES IN CONFIRMING A HYPOTHESIS
Confirming a known hypotheses requires many different classes of rules 
invoked on many occasions to perform specific tasks. However, the whole process
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Figure 5.1 STERN's Confirmation Strategy
Tahle 5.1 HYPOTHESIS TESTING Rules (RULES^l)
Rl_CHOOSE_M ODEL*
C ondition:
There is no active model, but an active hypothesis and experimental paradigm, 
and the active hypothesis has 1 or more models and no attempts have been made to test them. 
A ction:
Make active the first stored model on which no attempts at testing have been made.
R 1_H Y P 0-> M 0D E L S
C ondition:
There is no active model, but an active hypothesis and an active experimental paradigm,
and there are no stored hypotheses with models that account for the active ejqperimental 
paradigm.
A ction:
Call the PS with the domain specific rules whose name is in the generate_models slot of the 
theory frame (i.&.,Generate models, RULES_5) to infer models from the active hypothesis 
and paradigm.
On return amend tractability, and if no models have been generated deactivate the experimental 
paradigm.
R 1_C H 00SE _PA R A D IG M _W ITH _H Y P0
C ondition:
There is an active hypothesis, but no active experimental paradigm, 
and there are stored manufactured experimental paradigms that have not been tested with the 
active hypothesis.
A ction:
Make active the manufactured experimental paradigm with the greatest product of number of 
setups and ease of manufacture.
R 1_H Y P 0_A S S E S S
C ondition:
There are no active models,
and there is an active hypothesis that has been tested with all manufactured paradigms, 
and attempts have been made to test all stored models of the active hypothesis.
A ction:
Store the hypothesis (ie. make it inactive),
and if it is acceptable and a member of a group, then make the other members unacceptable.
R 1_H Y P 0_A SSE SS_W R T _M 0D E L S
Condition:
There is an active hypothesis and an active model, 
and attempts have been made to test the model.
A ction:
Calculate the acceptability of the model using equation 4.1 and use it to amend the acceptability 
measure of the hypotheses.
And make the model and the experimental paradigm inactive.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
continued. .  .
Tahle 5.1 Continued HYPOTHESIS TESTING Rules
R1 T E S T M O D E L  
C ondition:
There is an active model and no attempts have been made to test i t  
A ction:
Call the PS with Model testing (RULES_2) to test the model by instance generation.
R l_C H O O SE_H Y PO
C ondition:
There is no active hypothesis,
and there are stored hypotheses that are have not been or only partly tested against all the 
manufactured experimental paradigms. .
A ction:
Make active a stored hypothesis that has not already been fully tested preferring quantitative 
hypotheses.
Rl_CH O O SE_PARADIG M _NO _H YPO
C ondition:
There is an active hypothesis, but no experimental paradigm,
and some paradigms have not already been tried with the hypothesis.
A ction:
Make active the manufactured experimental paradigm with the greatest product of number of 
setups and ease of manufacture.
Confirmation
can been be summarized diagrammatically, see Figure 5.1. The boxes are levels of 
knowledge in the framework, and the circles are inference processes. STERN uses 
the hypothesis testing rules (Table 5.1) to control the confirmation process.
STERN begins the assessment of the acceptability of a hypotheses by choosing 
an experimental paradigm (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) and a hypothesis 
(Rl_CHOOSE_HYPO). The hypothesis is not one that has previously been tested with 
all the stored experimental paradigms. Models are then generated using not only the 
hypothesis but also knowledge about the experimental paradigm (R1_HYP0- 
>M ODELS). STERN chooses one model to test (Rl_CHOOSE_MODEL &  
R1_TEST_M0DEL). This involves selecting an experimental setup with which the 
model is used to generate predictive instances. For each instance an appropriate 
experimental test is designed and performed. The instance and experimental test 
results are then compared; this involves STERN calculating the degree of predictive 
accuracy of the instance. This value is used to determine the acceptability of the 
model and the acceptability of the model is used to assess the acceptability of the 
hypothesis (R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS). When a hypotheses has been tested 
against all experimental paradigms it is stored and another hypothesis chosen 
(Rl_HYPO_ASSESS).
STERN may generate several instances from one model. Thus, STERN 
employs repeated cycles of the processes to test a model using each instance (i.e. 
the Instance testing rules. Table 5.2). The cycles are comprised of (i) the design 
and performance of an experimental test, (ii) comparing the test results and the 
instance, and (iii) assessing the model given the degree of success of the instance. 
Similarly, several models may be generated from one hypotheses. Thus, there are 
cycles of processes to test each hypothesis using the models (i.e. the Model testing 
rules. Table 5.3). These cycles include: (i) selecting an experimental setup; (ii) 
generating the instances from the model; (iii) testing all the instances to assess the
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Table 5.2 INSTANCE TESTING Rules (RULES_9)
R9_TEST_INSTANG E*
C ondition:
There is an active instance,
and an active experimental test with a fully specified set of results.
A ction:
Call PS with rules named in the instance_vs_expttest slot of the theory frame (i.e.. Compare, 
RULES_12) to compare the instance and experimental test, 
and deactivate the experimental test.
R9_NO _TEST_PERFO RM ED
C ondition:
There is an active instance,
and an active experimental test but no experiment has been successfully performed. 
A ction:
Make the experimental test inactive,
and set the instance acceptability (degree slot) to -1 as flag noting that no experiment was 
performed.
R 9_P E R F 0R M  EXPT TEST  
C ondition:
There is an active instance that has not been compared with an experimental test, 
and an active model and experimental setup, 
and no active experimental test.
A ction:
Call PS with the set of rules named in perform_expttest of the experiment frame (i.e.. 
Experimenter, EXPTJRULES) to design and perform an experiment to match the active 
instance using the active setup.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
Table 5.3 MODEL TESTING Rules (RULES^2)
R2_NO _M ORE_INSTANCES*
C ondition:
There is an active experimental setup, and no active instance,
and an active model with no stored instance on which attempts have been to test with the active 
setup.
A ction:
Make the current experimental setup inactivate
R 2_A S S E S S _M 0D E L
C ondition:
There is an active model,
and an active instance on which attempts at comparison with experimental tests have been 
made.
A ction:
Amend the acceptability of the model paying attention to non comparison situations because of 
failures to perform an experimental test.
R2_TEST_IN STA N C E
C ondition:
There is an active instance and no attempt has been made to compare it with an experimental 
tests.
A ction:
Call PS with Instance testing (RULES_9) to test the instance.
R 2_C H 00S E _IN ST A N C E
C ondition:
There is an active experimental test,
and an active model with associated instances,
and no active instance.
A ction:
Make active the first instance stored with model.
R 2 _C H 00S E _S E T U P
Condition:
There is no active experimental setup, and an active model, 
and stored setups that have no been tried with the model.
A ction:
The first untried experimental setup is made active.
R 2_0B T A IN _IN ST A N C E S
Condition:
There is an active experimental setup and an active model,
and no instance associated with the model,
and the setup has not been considered before by the model.
A ction:
Call the PS with the named rules in the generate_instance slot in the theory frame (i.e.. 
Generate instances, RULES_8) to make instances; if successful amend the model's 
tractability and store the instances under the model, otherwise deactivate the experimental 
setup.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
Confirmation
model (i.e. sets of the cycle just described); and (iv) assessing the hypothesis with 
respect to the model. Hence, the confirmation of hypotheses by STERN can be 
viewed as a process with nested cycles of sub-processes (see also Figure 4.2).
However, STERN's confirmation strategy can be broken down in to three 
distinct stages. We can think of the process as being comprised of: (i) m ^ n g  
predictive instances from a hypothesis; (ii) comparing the predictions with 
experimental tests; and (iii) assessing the acceptability of the hypothesis using the 
instances. We will now consider the details of confirmation strategy using these 
three stages. Seven classes of rules are involved in the confirmation process (see 
Tables 5.1 to 5.7). The priority of the rules in each class are given by their order (in 
each table).
5.3 MAKING PREDICTIONS
STERN begins the confirmation processes by choosing the pendulum 
experinient, from amongst those that have been made available (see Chapter 8). It 
is selected as it is the most easily manufactured and has the most setups. The first 
hypothesis to be (dis)confirmed by STERN is one of the effective weight 
hypotheses, with the equation:
(=T_VT_DEN), . . . ( 5 . 1 )
where T_V and T_DEN are speed and density terms. This hypothesis is chosen 
because it has not been considered before with the pendulum paradigm. STERN can 
now attempt to generate models from hypothesis for the chosen experimental 
paradigm.
5.3.1 G enerating Models
STERN generates models from quantitative and qualitative hypotheses (using 
the Generate models rules. Table 5.4).
53.1.1 Typical Quantitative Model Generation
The effective weight law. Equations 5.1, is a typical form hypothesis that
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Table 5.4 GENERATE MODELS Rules (RULES, .5)
R5_COM B_COM PLEX_EQNt
Condition:
There is an active quantitative hypothesis and all of its associated models have been tested, 
and there is an active paradigm that is a combined experiment, 
and the equation does not have terms that are all measurable.
A ction:
Attempt to generate models for the combined experiment in the initial and terminal modes in 
turn, by trying to find a substitute for one theoretical term that is not measurable by 
examining suitable background knowledge, 
and amend the tractability of the hypothesis according to the success of the action.
R 5_C 0M PL E X _Q U A L F0R M
C ondition:
There is an active qualitative hypothesis and all of its associated models have been tested, 
and at least one of the terms of the qualform is not measurable.
A ction:
Generate a qualitative model, if the two terms of the qualform of the hypothesis are observable 
terms, by copying the qualform into a new model frame stored under the active hypothesis, 
and amend the tractability of the hypothesis appropriately, even if no model is generated.
R 5_SIM PLE_Q U A LF0R M
C ondition:
There is an active qualitative hypothesis and all of its associated models have been tested, 
and the terms of the hypothesis qualform are aU measurable.
A ction:
Generate a qualitative model by copying the qualform into a new model frame stored under the 
active hypothesis, 
and amends the tractability of the hypothesis appropriately.
R 5_SIM PL E _H Y P0_EQ N
C ondition:
There is an active quantitative hypothesis and all of its associated models have been tested, 
and there is an active paradigm that is not a combined experiment, 
and all the equation's terms are measurable.
A ction:
Generates a quantitative model by copying the equation into a new model frame stored under the 
active hypothesis, 
and amends the tractability of the hypothesis appropriately.
R 5_M A IN _W 0RK ER
C ondition:
There is an active quantitative hypothesis and all of its associated models have been tested, 
and an active paradigm that is not a combined experiment, 
and the equation does not have terms that are all measurable.
A ction:
Attempt to generate a quantitative model from an hypothesis equation (or a term* frame) using 
background knowledge or definitions to infer alternative combinations of tenns for 
unmeasurable terms, paying attention the necessary qualitative conditions, by substitution 
of the terms; several alternatives may possible, just 1 is considered and the rest are stored as 
term* frames in the partial_forms slot of the under the active hypothesis: 
and amends the tractability of the hypothesis appropriately.
^The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
Confirmation
STERN considers (R5_MAIN_W0RKER). Generating quantitative models from such 
a quantitative hypothesis involves replacing terms that do not have corresponding 
measurable experimental parameters. STERN knows the T_V and T_DEN terms are 
not directly measurable, in this sense. This is just one of many examples of how 
experimental knowledge influences theoretical inferences. Two sources are 
investigated by STERN to replace them; (i) the definitions of the terms, and (ii) 
background knowledge.
Some terms are defined by combinations of other terms that are measurable. For 
example, T_V is related to T_D (distance) and T_TIME (time), by the equation:
(= T_V (/ T_D T_TIME)) . . . .  (5.2)
STERN finds this equation (by looking for a filler in the equation slot the term's 
T! frame) and substitutes T_V, in Equation 5.1, for ( /T_D T_TIME). In general, 
this can only be done when certain necessary qualitative conditions obtain for the 
term to be eliminated (as specified in the necjqualform slot of the T! frame). T_V 
can be replaced so long as T_V is constant. STERN knows (as one of its inputs) that 
the Aristotelian instantaneous acceleration is acceptable and thus the speed in the 
pendulum experiments is constant. (The Aristotelian law is later disconfirmed.) In 
this case STERN can perform the substitution.
The second way STERN can replace non-measurable terms is by appealing to 
background knowledge. STERN finds that the density term, T_DEN (of Equation 
5.1), is one that maps onto a variable in the "spherical body" background 
knowledge relations; that is BODY_DEN. Background knowledge possessed by 
STERN is in the from of lists of entry frames (see Table 4.14). STERN chooses 
the entry that contains the BODY_DEN variable, and retrieves an equation that relates 
BODYJDEN to other variables from the entry frame. STERN converts this equation 
into theoretical terms and finds that T_DEN equals (/ T_W T_VOL) (the quotient of 
weight and volume). This formalism is substituted for T_DEN in equation 5.1.
The result of both substitutions is the model equation:
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(= (/T_DT_TIME) (/T_WT_DEN). . . . (5.3)
STERN manufactures a model frame and this equation is placed in its equation 
slot.
However, the examination of background knowledge is really more complex 
than just described. STERN possesses more than one set of background knowledge 
and several entries may have variables that map on to the term to be substituted. 
Further, when the entry contains a qualform (rather than equation), the qualform 
must be converted into an equation before substitution can take place. Several 
equations may be generated from a single qualform. STERN only considers one 
possibility at a time, so all the remaining alternatives are stored for future reference 
(in terrn^ frames).
When STERN considers the other effective weight law:
(= T_V T_W*) , . . .  (5.4)
the substitution of the T_V term is the same as before. However, Ae T_W* term (that 
stands for effective weight) is replaced using geometric background knowledge. 
This mimics Galileo’s geometric-pictorial form of reasoning. Furthermore, STERN 
finds a qualform, rather than an equation, from the entry for T_W*. As qualforms 
cannot be used for in substitutions, STERN must find an equation based on the 
qualfrom. The program possesses several inference processes for converting 
qualforms into equations. For example, when the qualform has an increase 
predicate, STERN proposes a linear equation. The equation inferred is used for 
substitution, as before.
All new equations found by STERN are checked for new non-measurable terms 
that the substitution processes may have introduced. Such terms are themselves 
treated by recursively re-applying the same procedures to the new equation.
5 3 .1 3  Model Generation For Combined Experimental Paradigms
The process we have just considered for generating models deals with more
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typical experimental paradigms like pendulums. When STERN has an active 
combined experimental paradigm things are different (R5_C0MB_C0MPLEX_EQN). 
For example, STERN uses the combined inclined plane and projectile paradigms to 
confirm the law of free fall, given by:
(=T_V (exptT_H 2)), ...^(5.5)
where T_H is height STERN cannot eliminate T_V by substitution of its definition, 
as was the case for equation 5.1 above. The instantaneous acceleration law has, by 
now, been disconfirmed by STERN. So, the qualitative condition that the speed 
must be constant no longer obtains. This is why STERN uses the combined 
inclined plane and projectile experimental paradigm (see Chapter 8).
The are two inodes in which STERN uses a combined experimental paradigm 
(see Chapter 3). In the initial mode, the manipulated input parameter is one 
belonging to the inclined plane, and the measured output parameter is from the 
projectile. In the terminal mode both the manipulated input and measured output are 
projectile parameters; with the inclined plane merely serving as a feeder for 
projectile. Variations in the model generation procedure are required for each of the 
two modes.
First, the initial mode: STERN initially applies Equation 5. to the inclined plane 
part of the combined experiment. This can be used to find the speed at the end of the 
plane for a given vertical height though which the ball drops. STERN then attempts 
to find a relationship describing the projectile part of the experiment that includes the 
T_V term. The program finds that:
(=T_V(/T_LT_TTME)), . . . ( 5 . 6 )
where T_L is the projectile's horizontal distance and T_TIME is time. This asserts 
that the horizontal speed of the projectile is uniform. Hence, substituting out V from 
both equations 5.5 and 5.6 STERN obtains the model equation:
(= (expt T_H 2) (/ T_L T_TTME)). . . . ( 5 . 7 )
This equation is then treated like any other model equation by STERN.
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Second, for terminal mode, STERN's generation of the model equation is 
almost the same as that just considered. The difference being that the free fall. 
Equation 5.5, is applied to the projectile rather than the inclined plane. By doing this 
STERN describes the shape of the projectile's path, just like Galileo.
53.1.4 Qualitative Models Generation
Generating qualitative models firom hypotheses is a much simpler process for 
STERN than generating quantitative models.
To generate qualitative models STERN checks that all the terms in the 
hypothesis qualform have corresponding experimental parameters that are directly 
measurable in the active experimental paradigm (R5_SIMPLE_QUALF0RM). When 
this is the case, STERN constructs a model firame and puts a copy of the qualform 
in its appropriate slot. However, when there are terms that are not measurable 
STERN checks that they are at least observable (see §4.2.4.1) (R5_C0M - 
PLEX_QUALFORM). The instantaneous acceleration law is one such qualform as it 
contains a term for speed. When the qualform has terms that are neither measurable 
nor observable STERN simple amends the hypothesis's measure of tractability to 
indicate that no model could be found.
Once STERN has found quantitative or qualitative models for the active 
hypothesis and experimental paradigm it uses each model to generate instances 
{Generate instances rules. Table 5.5).
5.3.2 Instance Generation
To generate instances STERN first chooses an experimental setup 
(R2_CH00SE_SETUP). When considering the first Aristotelian, Equation 5.1, 
STERN selects one of the pendulum setups. STERN only uses two processes to 
generate instances; one for quantitative and one for qualitative models.
53 2 .1  Qualitative Instances
STERN generates qualitative instances from  qualitative m odels by first 
reproducing the m odel's qualform in an instance frame (R8_GEN_QUAL_INS-
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Tahle S.5 GF.NF.RATK INSTANCES Rules (RULES 8>
R8_G EN_Q U AL_INSTA N CESt
C ondition:
There is an active qualitative model but no associated instances.
A ction:
Construct a new instance, select terms to be the independent and dependent terms based on the 
manipulation and observation ease of the corresponding experimental experimental % 
parameters (ie. matching kinds), and copy the model's qualform into the instance.
R8_G EN_Q UANT_INSTANCES
C ondition:
There is an active quantitative model but no associated instances.
A ction:
A five stage process: (i) make all possible combinations of pair of terms found in the equation; 
(ii) eliminates aU pairs that have one or more terms without experimental equivalents in the 
active experimental setup; (iii) removes all pairs that are trivially related by comparison 
with relevant background knowledge (iv) makes new instances for all the pairs of terms 
where the independent and dependent terms are chosen by reference to the manipulation ease 
of corresponding experimental parameters, and the values of the independent and fixed terms 
are also specified by interrogating experimental parameters; and (v) calculates the values of 
the dependent term by rearrange the equation so the term is on the left hand side, and 
substituting in the values.
t lb e  order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution..
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TANCES). STERN then specifies which terms are to be independent and dependent 
by examining the experimental parameters of the active experimental setup. The 
term that corresponds to the parameter that is most easily manipulated is chosen by 
the program to be the independent term. The other term from the qualform is then, 
by default, the dependent term.
5 3 2 2  Quantitative Instances
The generation of quantitative instances in STERN also employs the same 
correspondence procedure to choose its independent and dependent terms, but only 
after a number of other stages (R8_GEN_QUANT_INSTANCES). STERN's aim when 
generating instances is to find values for independent and dependent terms. The 
values of the dependent terms are calculated from an equation like 5.3 using 
independent term values, with the values of all other terms held constant. This is a 
three step process.
In the first step of the process, STERN finds all the possible combinations of 
pairs of terms from Equation 5.3:
(T_D T_TIME), (T_D T_W), (T_D T_VOL),
(T_W T_TIME), (T_VOL T_TIME), (T_VOL T_W). . . . (5.8)
Second, since an experimental setup need not instantiate aU the parameters available 
in its paradigm, STERN removes any pairs from the list that include terms that are 
not measurable in the active setup. Third, further pairs are also eliminated if they are 
found to be trivially related. STERN does this by applying background knowledge 
to the experimental setup. Fourth, new instances are made employing the 
correspondence procedure just mentioned above; for the list of pairs (5.8) the 
(independent dependent) order of the terms is same as they are printed. Fifth, 
STERN calculates a number of evenly spaced independent term values within the 
range given by the maximum and minimum values of the term's corresponding 
experimental parameter. The values of the fixed terms are specified as the mid range
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values of their corresponding parameter ranges. Sixth, magnitudes of the dependent 
term are calculated. STERN rearranges the Equation 5.3 so that the dependent term 
stands alone. Then the independent values and fixed term values are substituted into 
the equation to find the dependent values. That completes the steps in quantitative 
instance generation. All the generated instances are stored under the active model.
STERN has thus generated instances from the effective weight law (hypothesis) 
via models. This, in turn, completes the first stage of the confirmation processes. 
The next stage is the comparison of experimental test results and the instances.
5.4 COMPARISON WITH EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Here we will consider the third stage of the confirmation processes. During this 
stage STERN compares predictive instances and experimental test results in such a 
way that both predictive accuracy and noise in the experimental data are taken into 
account. But first, before comparisons can be made, STERN must obtain the 
experimental results.
5.4.1 The Design & Performance Of Experiments
STERN does two things when trying to obtain experimental results: (i) it 
designs an experimental test; and (ii) it performs the test {Experiment rules. Table
5.6). .
STERN uses the active instance to design an experimental test from the given 
experimental setup. This ensures that the experiment will be relevant to the instance. 
Designing an experiment requires two things: (i) specifying the input-m, output and 
fixed parameters; and (ii) setting all their values, except the output. STERN does 
both by referring to the active instance (E_PREPARE_wrTH_INSTANCE). The instance 
has terms and values that are equivalent to those required by the experimental test. 
For example, STERN uses the independent theoretical term to identify the input-m 
experimental parameter and gives the input-m identical values to those of the 
independent term.
-108-
Table 5.6 EXPERIMENTER Rules (EXPT RULES)
E_COM BINED_EXPTS+
C ondition:
There is an active experimental setup and test,
and the experiment is the incplane+projectile or double pendulum combined experiment, 
and the input-m and output parameters are of specific kinds.
A ction:
Perform the combined experiment using the experimental test input values to calculate the  ^
output values with added noise.
The other five experimental performance rules have a similar form to the 
E_COMBINED_EXPTS rule except that different experimental setups and 
parameters are specified. The rules are:
E_DO W N_INCPLANE_SPECIAL  
E_PEND ULU M _SPECIAL  
E_SW ING_PENDULUM  
E_DOW N_INCPLANE  
E DOW N PENDULUM
E_PREPARE_W ITH_INSTANCE
C ondition:
There is an active instance but no experimental test, 
and an active experimental paradigm.
A ction:
For a qualitative instance the experimental setup is made with input and output parameters that 
have the same kinds and the instance independent and dependent terms.
For a quantitative instance the input, output and fixed parameters of the experimental test have 
the same kinds as the instance's independent, dependent and fixed terms, and the input and 
. fixed parameter values are set according to their related instance term values.
tThe order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
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The performance of the experimental test is a job for STERN's experiment 
simulator {Experimenter rules, see Table 5.6). The simulator determines output 
values for all the input-m values. The output values are given an amount of noise 
that is realistic for experiments like the pendulum and inclined plane.
5.4.2 Assessing Predictive Accuracy
To assess how well his predictions matched experimental results Galileo 
employed various methods. For qualitative predictions, such as the one from the 
instantaneous acceleration law, it was sufficient for Galileo just to watch the motion 
of bodies when performing experiments. For his qualitative predictions, he 
compared the numerical values of terms directly and plotted graph like diagrams 
(eg. Drake, 1975; and Drake & MacLachlan, 1975).
STERN also uses different methods to assess qualitative and quantitative 
predictions {Compare rules. Table 5.7). However, STERN’s methods are quite 
different from Galileo's, because STERN is not able to "see" the motion of bodies 
in experiments and does not have the ability to reason using diagrams.
Qualitative comparisons in STERN involves modelling the simple observations 
made during the performance of experiments. This is a three stage process 
(R12_TEST_QUAL_INSTANCE). First, since the results produced by the experiment 
simulator are quantitative, they have to be changed into qualitative forms before 
STERN can compare them with its instances. STERN infers qualforms from the 
inputrin and output values of the test using regularity spotters (see Chapter 6). 
Second, the experimental qualforms are interpreted; that is, theoretical terms are 
substituted for their corresponding experimental parameters. Finally, STERN 
simply sees whether the instance qualform is amongst those just found. If it is, the 
instance is acceptable, if not the prediction has failed. The acceptability of the 
instance is set to zero or unity accordingly.
The comparison of quantitative instances and experimental tests by STERN is 
somewhat more involved. Basically, STERN determines how accurately the values
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Table 5.7 COMPARE Rules (RULES 12)
R12_TEST_Q U A N T_IN STA N C E
C ondition:
There is an active quantitative instance that has not been compared with an experimental test, 
and an active experimental test 
A ction:
A two stage process: (i) check that neither the instance dependent term nor the experimental test 
ouq)ut parameter are invariant; (ii) calculate the degree of match between the instance and 
experimental test according to equation (5.8) and set the instance acceptability.
R12_TEST_Q U A L_IN STA N C Et
C ondition:
There is an active qualitative instance that has not been compared with an experimental test, 
and an active experimental test 
A ction:
A three stage process: (i) infer qualforms from the input and output experimental test values; 
(ii) re-express these qualforms in theoretical terms by matching kinds and qualkinds; (iii) if 
one matches the instance qualform set instance acceptability to unity, otherwise zero.
t lb e  order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
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of the instance independent and dependent terms match up to the values of the 
input-m and output experimental parameters. There is no simple way to distinguish 
whether an instance and experimental test differ because the instance is a poor 
prediction or because the test data is noisy. Thus, STERN employs a single method 
to determine predictive accuracy and to take experimental noise into account. The 
technique comprises two main tests. (Bear in mind that the independent term and 
input-m parameter have identical sets of values.) The first test is the established 
product-moment correlation technique. It is applied to the dependent theoretical 
term and the output experimental parameter to find the degree to which two 
variables are related. A correlation coefficient, r, is found (where -1  < r < 1). 
The second test relies on the fact that the ratios of the dependent term and 
experimental output parameter would all be identical if there is a perfect match. The 
second tests measures how far actual instances are from this ideal, by seeing how 
the ratios vary with respect to the independent term. Ideally the ratio's values should 
fall on a straight line with zero gradient. Thus STERN employs least squares 
analysis to find the gradient, m, of the line that is the closest fit to all the ratios. 
When m is zero the match is ideal, but when m it is significantly far from zero the 
match is poor. For typical domain data, this second test is more than an order of 
magnitude more sensitive than product-moment correlation technique. However, the 
second technique may also find very poorly correlated data has m «l if it is fairly 
evenly scattered. Hence, STERN combines both techniques to overcome each 
other's weaknesses (R12_TEST_QUANT_INSTANCE). STERN calculates the value of 
predictive accuracy using the formulas:
degree = [(1 - lml).r]i  ^> - . . .(5.9a),
when r < Rnmit,
and lml>Miimit;
otherwise degree = 0 . . . .  (5.9b)
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Zero indicates no match between instance and experiment test, and a value near 
unity means good predictive accuracy. The user specified emphasis index, n, is 
used to further distinguish the degree by skewing values much less than unity 
towards zero (typically n=5). Rumit and are user specified parameters
(typically both=0.5). When the absolute magnitude of r is too low or m too far 
from zero, the degree of match is set to zero. Thus the lowest degree calculated by 
Equation 5.9a will be no greater than 3 per cent (with n=5). STERN stores the 
value of predictive accuracy in the instance frame.
In our example involving the Aristotelian effective weight law, most of the 
comparisons between instances and experimental tests do not yield values that 
satisfy the two limits. The acceptabilities of the instances are consequently set to 
zero. However, for one instance, with T_D and T_TIME as the independent and 
dependent terms, the prediction of the motion on the inclined plane is rather good 
and the degree of match found by STERN was 0.966. We will see how these value 
are now used to help assess the acceptability of models and hypotheses, as we 
move on to the last stage of the confirmation process.
5.5 ASSESSING THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE
We have seen how STERN compares instances and experimental results using a 
function that calculates values of predictive accuracy of instances. In this section we 
will consider the third, and final, stage of the confirmation process. During this 
stage STERN (i) assesses the acceptability of models with respect to the predictive 
accuracy of the instances generated from it and (ii) assesses the acceptability of 
hypotheses with respect to the acceptability of models.
In both cases STERN applies the acceptability criterion defined by Equation 4.1 
(see §4.2.2.5) (R2_ASSESS_M0DEL & R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS). For 
example, when STERN was (dis)confirming the effective weight law. Equation 
5.1, using the inclined plane paradigm, one model was generated and three
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instances from that model. The instances were tested and just one was found to 
have a non -zero acceptability of 0.996. Thus the overall acceptability of the model 
is 0.332 (= (0.0 + 0.0 + 0.996) /  3). In addition to the inclined plane's model, one 
model was inferred for the pendulum paradigm, but was found to have an 
acceptability of zero. Thus the overall acceptability of the hypothesis is 0.166 (= 
(0.0 + 0.332) /  2).
Typically, once a hypothesis has been considered with all the existing 
experimental paradigms STERN simply moves on to the next hypothesis. 
However, if the hypothesis is a member of a group of related hypotheses, such as 
the law of free fall (IV, Table 4.1), STERN may perform an additional inference. 
Such groups of hypotheses are formed by STERN's strategy for generating new 
hypotheses from old (Chapter 7). The group of hypotheses has mutually exclusive 
members; that is, only one can be acceptable. Thus when STERN confirms the law 
of free fall all the others in the same group must be unacceptable (IV, Table 4.1). 
STERN makes the other hypotheses unacceptable by setting their acceptability 
measure to zero. This prevents STERN from unnecessarily attempting to confirm 
hypotheses it knows to be unacceptable by other means.
We have considered the three stages of STERN's confirmation strategy. The 
sheer number of knowledge types used and processes modelled gives an initial 
impression of the completeness of STERN. In the next section we will consider this 
in more detail and we will see how STERN has managed to overcome limitations of 
existing systems.
5.6 STERN ASSESSMENT ON CONFIRMATION
The quality of STERN's ability to confirm hypotheses can be assessed in two 
ways; (i) how well it models this aspect of the Galilean episode and (ii) how 
STERN compares with previous discovery systems that perform similar types of 
processes.
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5.6.1 Completeness Of The Confirmation Strategy
In Chapter 4, we saw that STERN models the whole of the Galilean episode 
rather well. The confirmation strategy is called upon by STERN four times: first to 
disconfirm the Aristotelian laws; second to test the hypotheses that were generalized 
from experimental results; third to examine new hypotheses that have been 
generated from old hypotheses; and fourth after new experimental paradigms had 
been invented. In each case STERN successfully judged as acceptable the 
hypotheses that Galileo thought were true. Further, no hypotheses were considered 
as acceptable when they were not generally valid - STERN did not produce false 
positive hypotheses.
The overall success of the confirmation strategy argues for the acceptability of 
the criterion of acceptability assumed in STERN. The criterion is basically one of 
explanatory breadth, but it does not just consider numbers of items of evidence. The 
acceptability of hypotheses is assessed in terms of the relative successes of its 
models, that are in turn assessed in terms of the relative success of its instances. 
The instances are compared directly with experimental tests. In this way the law of 
free fall was found to be the only generally-acceptable hypothesis in the domain.
Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of both qualitative and quantitative 
reasoning in Galileo's inferences. The modelling of the confirmation strategy 
acknowledges this by dealing with both quantitative and qualitative hypotheses, 
models and instances. Although STERN considers individual hypotheses in turn, 
previously-assessed qualitative hypotheses may influence the way later quantitative 
hypotheses are assessed. For example, the instantaneous acceleration law was 
initially thought to be valid and thus permitted speed terms to be substituted for 
distance and time in equations early on. However, later in the episode the law was 
shown to be unacceptable and other means were required to deal with the speed 
term.
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The results provided by the experiment simulator contain a realistic amount of 
noise. STERN is able to cope with this adverse influence on experiments during the 
comparison of instances and experimental tests. The function that determines the 
predictive accuracy of an instance takes noise into account The greater the noise the 
less the degree of acceptability. Dealing with noise in experimental data is one of the 
aspects of determining the reliability of the experiments.
The importance of the communication between theory and experiments during 
the confirmation strategy is clearly seen in STERN. When choosing which 
hypothesis to test it is necessary to know if the hypothesis has already been 
considered with all the manufactured experimental paradigms. The generation of 
models and the making of predictions relies on the knowledge of the experimental 
paradigm and experimental setup that is to be accounted for. The design and 
performance of experimental tests needs information about the predictive instance so 
that the two can eventually be compared.
STERN models the ability of scientists to recognize mutually exclusive or 
contradictory theories and to differentially assess their acceptabilities when just one 
has been successfully tested. A simple mechanism groups together hypotheses that 
are obtained simultaneously from a single inference. STERN uses information 
during the confirmation strategy to reduce the size of the hypothesis space. For 
example, when the law of free fall was found all the other hypotheses with similar 
terms were known to be unacceptable. Their measures of acceptability were set to 
reflect this and from then on they were simply ignored.
In general, STERN is well able to model the confirmation of hypotheses. As we 
will see its abilities go beyond those of previous systems.
5.6.2 Advances On Previous Work
In Chapter 2 we saw that most previous computer models of scientific discovery 
have tended to concentrate on the generalization of instances into models (eg. all the 
programs of the BACON school), so only a few programs can be compared directly
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with the confirmation strategy in STERN. However, none of these follow a 
discovery path anything like STERN's and none model a domain like the Galilean 
one. MetaDendral, SDDS and KEKEDA will be considered in detail.
MetaDendral (Buchanan & Feigenbaum, .1978) does possess a representation 
that can be considered as a hypothesis from which models are generated. However, 
this hypothesis is simply the most general rule that describes how a molecule may 
fragment. Models in this view, are the child rules that are successive specializations 
of a original parent rule, as generated by the RULEGEN subprogram. Thus the 
hypothesis merely serves as the root of the search tree of possible fragmentation 
rules, without being related to its children and grand children in any substantive 
sense. In STERN, however, many different hypotheses (not just one) are 
considered. Furthermore, the structure of model equations depends on the particular 
form and terms of hypotheses, and instances are specific instantiations of a model.
The SDDS model of discovery (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) has not been 
implemented in a running program, however it does propose processes that are like 
those instantiated in STERN, including a subset of those employed in the 
confirmation strategy. One possible pattern of discovery permitted by SDDS's 
processes hierarchy starts by fully specifying a proposition using prior knowledge 
or old outcomes (see Figure 2.2). The testing of the proposition involves: (i) 
designing an experiment by focusing  on some aspect of it and choosing and 
setting  variables; (ii) mdkmg di prediction; (iii) running the experiment and 
observing the outcome; and (iv) matching the prediction and outcome. Finally, the 
decision  is made whether to accept or reject the proposition by reviewing  
outcomes. This pattern maps neatly onto STERN's processes of; generating 
instances from a model, designing and performing an experimental test, and 
comparing the instance and test result to assess the model (see Table 2.2). 
However, Klahr and Dunbar (1988) do not have quantitative measures of 
proposition acceptability.
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A similar situation occurs between STERN and KEKEDA (Kulkami & Simon, 
1988) as just described for STERN and SDDS. KEKEDA simulates the discovery 
of the Urea Cycle by formulating a model that involves several different reactions in 
sequence. Each of these reactions, or propositions, is formulated and tested in turn 
by making predictions about the nature of the reaction with specific participating 
substances. The confidence that the reaction is correct is determined in part by the 
number of correct predictions made from it. All this is similar to that part of 
STERN's confirmation process that just focuses on model confirmation. To map 
KEKEDA into STERN read; model for reaction, prediction for instance, substance 
for term or parameter, and confidence for measure of acceptability. The essential 
point is that KEKEDA and SDDS are subsumed by STERN.
A limitation of STERN's confirmation strategy is that it only considers one 
hypothesis at a time. Sleeman et.al.'s (1989) Architecture for Theory-Driven 
Scientific Discovery notes that well established core theories in conjunction with 
less general weak theories may both play a part in the generation of new theories. 
The work on problem solving in the domain of physics problems (eg. Larkin 
et.al., 1980; Bundy et.aL, 1979; and Luger, 1980) shows that scientists can use 
several principles (hypotheses) in combination to account for a particular situation. 
When considering more than one hypothesis at a time, heuristics like those found in 
AM and EURISKO (Davis & Lenat, 1982; Lenat 1983; Lenat & Brown, 1984) that 
consider the "interestingness" and "worth" of concepts may be required to choose 
between competing hypotheses with the same degree of acceptability. The ability to 
deal with multiple hypotheses at one time may be needed by STERN in the future, if 
it is to cope with more complex theories. However, in the Galilean domain dealing 
with one hypothesis at a time approach is sufficient.
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5.6.3 Conclusion
Clearly STERN's confirmation strategy is compatible with previous successful 
scientific discovery systems and proposed models. However, STERN also 
overcomes some of their limitations. In particular:
• All the types and levels of scientific knowledge posited by the framework are 
represented.
• Processes operating on all the types and levels of knowledge are modelled 
including many that require communication between theory and experiment
• The acceptability of hypotheses and models is assessed in terms of breadth of 
experimental evidence as indexed by the acceptability and numbers of models and 
instances, respectively.
• Noise in experimental results is dealt with whilst predictive accuracy is assessed 
using a function that considers all the available data at once.
• Many different types of communication occur between all levels of the theory and 
experiment components in a research programme.
• Background knowledge was used to help in the generation from hypotheses to 
models, and from model to instances.
• Mutually exclusive hypotheses are considered as groups to improve the efficiency 
of the discovery processes by dramatically cutting down the searched space.
Many of these abilities are are not unique to STERN's confirmation strategy but 
range across all of the program's main processes, as we wül see in the following 
chapters.
In this chapter we have seen how STERN assesses the acceptability of existing 
hypotheses by generating models and making predictive instances. But where do 
the hypotheses come from in the first place? The next two chapters will answer this 
question. Specifically, in the following chapter we will see how STERN employs a 
strategy of experimental-led inductive generalization to find hypotheses.
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Chapter 6
Generalization From Experiments To 
Hypotheses
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Galileo’s original intention was to confirm the Aristotelian laws by comparing 
predictions made from them against experimental results. However, as we saw in 
Chapter 5, the laws were found to be unacceptable and he was left with a small 
number of experimental results. In the next stage of this episode of discovery 
Galileo found new hypotheses by generalizing experimental results. This involved 
designing and performing a wider range of experiments than before to establish a 
body of experimental results. These results were then generalized to form 
hypotheses. Such a generalization strategy is an important constituent of the overall 
discovery process.
The generalization of empirical data into higher level theoretical knowledge is 
the area in which most previous work on scientific discovery has focussed (see e.g. 
Langley et.aL, 1987; Thagard, 1988a; Falkenhainer & Michalski, 1986; Gerwin, 
1973; Qin & Simon, 1990). In terms of the framework for scientific discovery all 
such work has typically concentrated on the formation of a model from a set of 
instances.
STERN instantiates .the inductive process in a more complete manner. It deals 
with the selection of experimental paradigms, the design and performance of 
experimental tests and the interpretation of the results into instances. The instances 
are generalized to form models and the models generalized to form hypotheses. 
Whereas previous systems have only found models, STERN finds a large variety of 
quantitative and qualitative hypotheses. These hypotheses give STERN a deep
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understanding of the domain; for example, the qualitative hypotheses tell STERN 
which terms are relevant or irrelevant to the characterization of the phenomena. 
During the generalization stage of of its modelling, STERN also makes a "genuine" 
discovery - the law governing the period of swing of pendulums.
STERN chooses to invoke the strategy that generalizes experimental results into 
hypotheses when all existing hypotheses have been tested and show n to be 
unacceptable but experim ental paradigms remain to be accounted for (rule 
RO_START_INDUCE o f Strategy chooser).
This chapter considers the experimental-led inductive generalization to 
hypotheses, beginning with an overview of the process (§6.2); this is followed by a 
detailed examination of the stages in the strategy (§6.3 to §6.5). Finally, 
comparisons are made between this aspect of STERN's abilities and previous 
discovery systems (§6.6).
6.2 STAGES IN MODELLING GENERALIZATION
The strategy employed by STERN to generalize from experimental results into 
hypotheses can be summarized diagrammatically (see Figure 6.1). The boxes in 
Figure 6.1 are levels of knowledge as given by the framework and the circles are 
inference processes. STERN uses the models into hypotheses class of rules to 
control the process (Table 6.1).
The process starts with the selection of an experimental paradigm, such as the 
pendulum. It has not been accounted for by any acceptable hypotheses stored on the 
theoretical side of the research programme (R3_CH00SE_PARADIGM). From the 
paradigm, an experimental setup is chosen; such as the setup allowing the pendulum 
to swing freely in a periodic manner. This in turn permits STERN to design various 
experimental tests with different parameters as the INPUT-M and the OUTPUT. For 
example, one test may involve manipulating the length of the pendulum to see how
-119-
ExperimentTheory
SelectStore
Expt.
ParadigmsHypotheses
SelectGeneralise
Expt.
Setups
Models
Design 
& PerfromGeneralise
E xpt
tests
InterpretInstances
Figure 6.1 STERN's Generalisation Process
Table 6.1 MODELS INTO HYPOTHESES Rules (RULES,.3)
R3_CHOOSE_PARADIGM *
C ondition:
There is no active experimental paradigm, 
and the active hypothesis (if there is one) is firame,
and there are stored experimental paradigms for the research programme of which at least one 
has not been acceptably accounted for by previous hypotheses or is being considered with 
active hypotheses now.
A ction:
Construct and make active an hypothesis frame for the storage of models if none already exists, 
and make active the manufactured experimental paradigm that has the greatest product of 
number of setups and manufacture ease that has not been acceptably accounted for by 
previous hypotheses,
and add the name of the paradigm to the list of names stored under the active hypothesis
R 3_G E T _M 0D E L S
C ondition:
There is an active experimental paradigm, 
and no active model(s).
A ction:
Call the PS with Instances into models (RULES_7) to obtain models from experimental 
setups and instances to generalize the models into hypotheses.
R 3_S T 0R E _M 0D E L S
C ondition:
There an active list of models.
A ction:
Store the models under the active hypothesis (ie. copy the list of models and then clear them).
R 3_G EN ER A LISE_M 0D ELS
C ondition:
There is a single active hypothesis with associated models.
A ction:
Call the PS with the domain specific rules in generalise_models slot of the theory frame (i.e.. 
Generalize models, RULES_10) to generalise the models into hypotheses.
On return make inactive any current models or experimental paradigms
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
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the period of swing varies. STERN then performs the experiment to obtain 
experimental results (using its experiment simulator). To be able to work with the 
results theoretically STERN must convert them into instances. This interpretation 
process mainly involves finding the corresponding theoretical terms for particular 
experimental parameters. Many instances are obtained from many experiniental 
tests. Once all the experimental tests for a given experimental paradigm have been 
performed and interpreted into instances, STERN can go about generalizing the 
instances to form models. Both qualitative and quantitative models are inferred and 
the experimental paradigm to which they applied is noted. One of the models that 
STERN finds at this stage is the law relating the length of a pendulum to its period 
of swing. In the same way STERN obtains many other models for the same 
experimental paradigm and stores them (R3_GET_M0DELS & R3_ST0RE_M0DELS). 
The whole processes is repeated for the other available experimental paradigms. 
STERN finally generalizes the many models associated with specific experimental 
paradigms into hypotheses (R3_GENERALISE_M0DELS).
STERN designs many experimental tests for each experimental setup. Thus it 
employs repeated cycles of the processes that perform the testing and interpretation 
of experimental results into instances (i.e. the tests into instances rules, Table 6.2). 
Similarly, an experimental paradigm may have more than one experimental setup. 
Hence, cycles of processes are also associated with each setup (i.e. the instances 
into models rules. Table 6.3). One of theses cycles consist of four processes in 
sequence: (i) selecting an experimental setup; (ii) designing experimental tests; (iii) 
performing all the tests and interpreting their results into instances (i.e. sets of 
previous cycle just described); and (iv) generalizing the instances into a model. 
Hence, in overview, STERN's generalization strategy consists of cycles of 
processes which employ sub-processes that also comprise cycles of nested 
processes at a deeper level (see also. Figure 4.2).
This rather complex corpus of processes can fortunately be broken down into
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Tahle 6.2 TESTS INTO INSTANCES Rules (TtULES 11)
R ll_IN T E R P _T O _IN ST *
C ondition:
There is no active instance,
and an active experimental test that has been performed.
A ction:
Call the PS with the rules in the theory frame interp_expttest slot Interpret, RULES_6) 
to interpret the experimental test into an instance.
R 11_PE R F0R M _E X PT _T E ST
C ondition:
There is an active experimental setup, 
and no active instance,
and an active experimental test yet to be performed (ie. the output parameter values are yet to be 
found).
A ction:
Call the PS with the rules in the experiment frame perform_expttest slot (i.e.. Experimenter, 
EXPT_RULES) to carry out the experiment
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
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stages. We can think of the overall generalization as having three stages: (i) 
obtaining experimental test results from experimental paradigms; (ii) interpreting test 
results into instances; and (iii) generalizing instances into hypotheses via models. 
We will consider details of the generalization in STERN in terms of the three stages 
in the next three sections. STERN uses seven classes of rules to model this strategy 
(Tables 6.1 to 6.5 & 6.7). The priority of the rules is given by their order (in each 
table).
6.3 OBTAINING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As we saw in the summary of the whole generalization strategy (in the previous 
section), just obtaining experimental results requires STERN to: (i) choose an 
experimental paradigm and setups; (ii) design experimental tests; and (iii) perform 
the tests to obtain the results.
6.3.1 Selecting Experimental Paradigms & Setups
STERN chooses an experimental paradigm from amongst those that are 
available (see Chapter 8). The exact choice depends on (i) whether a paradigm has 
been adequately accounted for by an existing hypothesis and (ii) a pragmatic value 
that is calculated for each paradigm. For a given paradigm this pragmatic value is 
the product of the number of setups and their ease of manufacture. The experimental 
paradigm with the lowest value is chosen (R3_CH00SE_?ARADIGM). This just 
happens to be the pendulum paradigm, because it is so easy to manufacture its 
setups. At this point an active hypothesis is also constructed as a repository for 
models found later on.
For the active experimental paradigm STERN now needs to choose an 
experimental setup, with the long term aim of obtaining models (R3_GET_M0DELS 
invokes the instances into models rules. Table 6.3). When selecting an 
experimental setup STERN simply chooses the first that has not already been 
considered, provided that it does not need to be part of a combined experiment
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Table 6.3 INSTANCES INTO MODELS Rules (RULES 7)
R7_OBTAIN_EXPTTESTS*
C ondition:
There is an an active experimental paradigm,
and an active experimental setup with no associated (stored) experimental tests, 
and no active experimental tests,
and no active instance. ^
A ction:
Make a list of active experimental tests by: (i) making a list of experimental parameters 
preferring those from the active setup over the active paradigm; (ii) making all 
combinations of pairs of parameters without duplication (iii) eliminating pairs that are 
trivially related by examining pertinent background knowledge; (iv) making an experimental 
test for each pair in turn, choosing the input-m and output parameters according to their 
values of ease of manufacture, and setting the range of input-m and fixed values using their 
maximum and minimum permitted values given by the fillers of those slots in the 
parameter.
R7_M AK E_INSTA NCES
C ondition:
There is an an active experimental paradigm,
and an active experimental setup,
and active experimental test that is a frame.
A ction:
Call the PS with Tests into instances (RULES_11) to obtain instances from experimental 
tests.
R7 EXPTTEST PREFERENCES  
C ondition:
There is an an active experimental paradigm and experimental test, 
and the experimental setup does not have any associated tests.
A ction:
Store all experimental tests that have speed or time as input-m or ouQ)ut parameters (ie. are 
actually concerned with accelerated motion) in the setup’s list of tests.
R 7_ST 0R E _IN ST A N C E S
C ondition:
There is an active experimental paradigm 
and active instance(s).
A ction:
Add the instance(s) to the list of instances in the models instance slot, 
and deactivate the instance(s).
R 7_C H 00SE _E X P T T E ST
C ondition:
There is an an active experimental paradigm,
and an active experimental test with associated experimental tests,
and no active experimental tests.
A ction:
Remove the and make active the first experimental test associated with the experimental setup.
continued
Table 6.3 Continued INSTANCES INTO MODELS Ruks
(RULES .7)
R 7_C H 00SE _SE T U P *
C ondition:
There is an an active experimental paradigm, 
and no active experimental setup,
and an active model that is a frame, ^
and experimental setups that have not yet been tried that do not have to be part of a combined 
experiment.
A ction:
Construct an active model if one does not already exist,
and make active an experimental setup that has not already been covered by the model that does 
not have to be part of a combined experiment, 
and add the setup's name to the model's list of such names.
R7_G ENERALISE_INSTANCES
C ondition:
There is an an active experimental paradigm,
and an active model that is a frame with associated instances,
and their is no active instance.
A ction:
Call the PS with the rules stored in generalisejnstance slot of the theory frame (i.e.. 
Generalize instances, RULES_4) to generalise instances into models.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
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(R7_CH00SE_SETUP). At this point an active model is constructed as a repository 
for instances that are made later on. Now that an active setup exists STERN uses it 
to design experimental tests.
6.3.2 Designing Experimental Tests
The procedure STERN employs to design experimental tests from an active 
setup involves five stages. First, a list of all the experimental parameters is made, 
preferring those from the active setup over the active paradigm 
(R7_0BTAIN_EXPTTESTS). For the pendulum setup these paradigms are ones for 
tim e, d ista n ce , heigh t, length , w eigh t, vo lum e, size, angle  and speed . 
Second, all the combinations of pairs of parameters are made without duplication; 
36 for the pendulum setup. Third, pairs of parameters are eliminated if they are 
known to be trivially related using pertinent background knowledge. For the 
pendulum setup, those pairs with any combination of distance, height, length, 
size, and angle are eliminated using the geometric knowledge. The {weight 
volume) pair is eliminated using the relations for spherical bodies, leaving 27 pairs. 
Fourth, experimental tests are made for each pair in turn (i.e. their frames 
constructed). The parameters to be the input-m and output are chosen from the pairs 
according to their relative ease of manipulation and observation (e.g. for the {time 
size), input-m = size, output = time). A  series of evenly spaced values are 
calculated for the input-m parameter using its maximum and minimum permitted 
values. The magnitude of each fixed parameter is set to its mid-range value. (The 
series output parameters values are to be found by performing the test.). Fifth, 
those experimental tests that have no relevance whatsoever to the domain are 
weeded out (R7_EXPTTEST_PREFERENCES). When modelling the Galilean domain 
STERN removes tests that have nothing to do with motion; that is, those that do not 
include either a time or a speed parameter as an input-m or an output. Thus a total 
of 15 experimental setups are finally designed for the pendulum setup.
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In this way STERN makes many experimental tests. Each experimental test is 
considered in turn, with the aim of obtaining instances (R7_MAKE_INSTANCES 
invokes the Tests into instances rules). Each experimental test is performed and its 
results interpreted into instances.
6.3.3 Performing An Experimental Test
STERN performs an experiment on active tests using its experiment simulator 
(see see §4.5) (Rll_PERFORM_EXPT_TEST invokes the Experimenter rules). The 
details of this processes were considered when we looked at the confirmation 
strategy (see §5.3.2). The net effect of performing the test is that the output 
parameter values of the experimental test are found. STERN's test results may now 
be interpreted into instances.
6.4 INTERPRETING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
STERN attempts to find both quantitative and qualitative instances from the 
experimental test results (R11_INTERP_T0_INST invokes Interpret, Table 6.4).
The interpretation to instances with quantitative data has two parts: (i) finding 
corresponding theoretical independent and dependent terms for the input-m and 
output experim ental parameters; and (ii) copying their respective series o f  
m agnitudes (R6_SIMPLE_TRANSFER). An instance is constructed for each set o f  
quantitative data. The acceptability o f  the instance is set to 1 to reflect the fact that 
the magnitudes o f the instance were obtained directly from experiment.
When STERN looks for qualitative instances it is in effect modelling the 
observations (rather than measurements) that Galileo made during the performance 
of experiments. Thus STERN must convert the quantitative experimental data into 
qualforms (R6_FIND_QUALF0RMS). STERN recognizes many qualforms (Table 
4.13) and possesses functions that spot whether such qualforms apply to two 
related series of values. For example, the test for the relevance of the INCREASE 
qualform requires that all magnitudes in both series are monotonically increasing.
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Table 6.4 INTERPRET Rules (RULES 6)
R6_SIM PLE_TR AN SFER *
C ondition:
There is an list of active instances,
and an active experimental setup that has input-m and ouQ)ut parameters that are measurable and 
are not unrelated (ie. the independent and steady qualforms do not apply to the input-m and 
output).
A ction:
Construct a new instance using the experimental test parameters to find the conresponding 
theoretical terms to fill the ^propriate slots, 
and set the degree of acceptability slot of the instance to unity, 
and make inactive the experimental test
R 6_F IN D _Q U A L F 0R M S
C ondition:
There is an active experimental setup, 
and no active instance.
A ction:
Identify qualforms based on the input-m and output parameters of the experimental test 
converted into their corresponding theoretical terms, 
and construct an instance for each qualform with the degree of acceptability set to unity.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
Generalization
These functions are applied to the lists of values from the experimental test input-m 
and output parameters. If a function finds an applicable qualform STERN 
constructs an instance for the qualform.
The instances that STERN finds by interpreting each experimental test result are 
stored (R7_ST0RE_INSTANCES). When all the experimental tests for an active 
experimental paradigm have been considered (via its setups), STERN starts to 
generalise the stock of instances into higher theoretical knowledge beginning with 
models.
6.5 GENERALIZING INSTANCES INTO HYPOTHESES
STERN does the generalization of instances into hypotheses in two stages: (i) 
models are found from the instances; (ii) the models are generalized to form 
hypotheses.
6.5.1 Instances In to  Models
When STERN has finished performing and interpreting experimental tests from 
a particular experimental paradigm there will be many stored instances (in the model 
acting as a repository). STERN generalizes the instances into models (R7_GENERA- 
LISE_INSTANCES inwokts Generalize instances. Table 6.5). STERN finds 
qualitative models from qualitative instances, and quantitative models from 
instances with numerical data.
The aim of STERN when generalizing qualitative instances into models is to 
obtain model-qualforms that validly apply to each of the experimental setups, under 
the active experimental paradigm (R4_M0DEL_QUAL). STERN groups together 
instances with identical qualforms. For example, all instances with 
(INCREASE T_V T_H) are put together. Those groups that have fewer than a user- 
specified number of qualforms are rejected. The qualform that is common to each 
group is used directly in the construction of a new model, with acceptability and 
tractability measures set according to the number of instances in the group.
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Table 6.5 GENERALIZE INSTANCES Rules (RULES 4)
R4_M ODEL_QUAL*
C ondition:
There is an list of active instances some of which have qualforms.
A ction:
Generalization of instances into qualforms by: (i) finding all instances that have qualforms; (ii) 
making a list of just qualforms from instances; (iii) constructing a model for those 
qualforms that occur X or more times, where X is a user specified integer.
R 4_M 0D E L _E Q N S
C ondition:
There is an list of active instances,
and some of the instance have dependent terms.
A ction:
For each quantitative instance make a model by: (i) obtaining the index of the power function 
that b^t fits the independent and dependent terms by finding the gradient of line of the graph 
of the logs of the terms using the least squares fit technique; (ii) finding a fraction that is 
equal to the index within a user specified accuracy, and maximum integer range of the 
numerator and denominator; (iii) when a rational index is found construct a model with an 
equation in terms of the independent and dependent using the fractional index, with the 
tractability and acceptability set accordingly, 
and make the instance(s) inactive.
R 4 P R E P A R E
C ondition:
There is an active model that is a frame with associated instances, 
and no active instance(s).
Act ion:
Remove the instances stored under the active model and make them active.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
Generalization
However, when modelling, the Galilean episode STERN has few experimental 
setups for each experimental paradigm. Thus the user-defined number of instances 
per group is set to one: that is, all qualitative instances become models with 
qualforms. This simply reflects that fact that the experiments in this domain do not 
have the same degree of complexity found in many other fields. However, this does 
not mean that there is no difference between instances and models in STERN. Some 
models are generalized from more than one instance and quantitative instances are 
very different from quantitative models, as we will now see.
The generalization to quantitative models in STERN involves finding an 
equation relating together the instance independent and dependent terms, given their 
lists of values (R4_M0DEL_EQNS). This is exactly the sort of task that BACON. 1 
(Langley et.al., 1987) performs. However, a rather different approach is adopted 
in STERN.
Consider the power function of two terms. A graph of the terms with values 
plotted as logarithms will be a straight line whose gradient is equal to the power, or 
index, of the function. Thus given a set of data the best fitting power function can 
be found by plotting a log-log graph and finding the straight line that intersects most 
points. This procedure is exploited by STERN in its three stage process for finding 
equations. First, the index of the power function is found. Graphs cannot be plotted 
by STERN so the least squares fit  method is applied to the logarithms of the values 
of the instance's independent and dependent terms. The result is an index, n, 
whose value is a positive real number. However, Galileo only considered simple 
power equations with rational indices. Similarly, in STERN the second stage of the 
processes involves finding a fraction of equal magnitude to the index. Let the 
fraction be p!q, where q is the denominator and p  the numerator. Now, STERN 
only considers values of p  and q that are integers below a certain user-specified 
limit (typically 3). So a search of the rational index takes place in the space of
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fractions defined by the different combinations of p  and q. A deviation test 
determines whether p!q is sufficiently close to n by testing if the difference 
between n and ptq is less than some user-specified value (typically 0.015). If and 
when a suitable value of p!q is found, the third stage constructs a model that has a 
power equation relating the two terms with p!q as the index. When the index is 
itself an integer (e.g. 2p=q) the standard form of equation is used with multiples 
of one term. For example, STERN finds the equation relating the period (T_TIME) 
of swing of a pendulum to the length of its chord (T_S):
(= T_S (* T_TIME T_TIME)). . . . (6.1)
A model is constructed for the equation, and the tractability and acceptability of the 
model are set. In the case when no rational index is found, no model is constructed.
Overall this procedure differs in three significant ways from the technique 
employed in BACON. 1 (Langley et.al., 1987). First, the first stage of STERN's 
procedure uses just the one process to find the relation between the terms, in effect 
condensing BACON's multiple applications of regularity spotters into a single 
operation. Second, the procedure is more efficient because the search processes in 
the second stage only examines the space defined by the integer values of p  and q, 
where a new state is generated by adding (or subtracting) 1 to p  or q. BACON's 
search, however, is in a space of terms; each state is generated by finding a new 
term but also calculating a whole new series of values for that term. Third, the least 
squares technique that initially finds the index also has the effect of averaging out 
any noise in the data. BACON on the other hand employs a technique that examines 
whether each individual value is within a band centred on the mean of a constant 
term.
STERN discovers many models with qualforms and equations (see Table 6.6). 
Thirty three models are found that apply to the pendulum paradigm, and 21 that 
apply to the inclined plane. The qualforms with REPEAT+ and REPEAT- predicates 
only occur under the pendulum paradigm, indicating that repetitive motion (i.e. the
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Tablg-.6t6 Model Qualforms And Equations For Two Experimental 
ParadigTTijs
PEN DULUM
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_0) 
(REPEAT+ T_V T_S)
(STEADY T_V T_VOL)
(STEADY T_V T_W)
(REPEAT+ T_V T_L)
(REPEAT+ T_V T_H)
(REPEAT+ TjriME T_@) 
(REPEAT- TJTIME T_VOL) 
(REPEAT+ T_TIME T_W) 
(FROM_ZERO TJTIME TJL) 
(FROM_ZERO TJTIME T_H) 
(INCREASE T_V T_0) 
(REPEAT- T_V T_VOL) 
(INCREASE T_V T_L) 
(INCREASE T_TIME T_0) 
(INCREASE T_TIME TJL)
(= T S (* T TIME T TIME))
(REPEAT+ T_V T_0) 
(REPEAT+ T_V T_VOL) 
(REPEAT- T_V T_W) 
(FRQM_ZERO T_V TJL) 
(FRŒJZERO T_V T_H) 
(FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_0) 
(REPEAT+ T_TIME T_S) 
(STEADY T_TIME T_VOL) 
(STEADY TJTIME T_W) 
(REPEAT+ T_TIME T_L) 
(REPEAT+ T_TIME T_H) 
(INCREASE T_V TjS) 
(INCREASE T_V T_W) 
(INCREASE T_V T_H) 
(INCREASE T_TIME T_S) 
(INCREASE T TIME T H)
INCPLANE (inclined plane)
(STEADY T_V T_VOL)
(STEADY T_y T_W) ' 
(INCREASE T_V TJL) 
(INCREASE T_V T_H) 
(INCREASE T_V TJ))
(STEADY TJTIME T_W) 
(FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_L) 
(FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_H) 
(FROM_ZERO T_TIME TJ))
(= T J  (* T_TIME T_TIME) ) 
(= T L (* T TIME T TIME) )
(INCREASE T_V T_VOL) 
(FROMJERO T_V TJ) 
(FROMJERO T_V T_H) 
(FROMJERO T_V TJ) 
(STEADY T_TIME TJ/OL) 
(INCREASE T_TIME T_W) 
(INCREASE T_TIME TJ) 
(INCREASE TJIME TJ) 
(INCREASE TJIME TJ)
(= T H (* T TIME T TIME))
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swinging) is unique to that experiment. Equation 6.1, found under the pendulum 
paradigm, correctly describes the relationship between the period of swing of a 
pendulum and its length (size). This is arguably a "genuine" discovery made by 
STERN, because there was no intention that this model should be found on the part 
of the programmer. However, with hindsight it is not completely unexpected given 
STERN’s realistic experiment simulator. Notice that the three model-equations 
found under the inclined plane paradigm have the same form. This is not surprising 
because distance, height and length are related by the geometry of the inclined 
plane. Of the three equations, the two covering distance & time, and height & time, 
are expressions of Galileo's law of free fall. However, in this form these equations 
are not completely general.
Thus many models are inferred by STERN for each experimental paradigm. The 
models are stored (R3_ST0RE_M0DELS) and further experimental paradigms are 
considered. Once all available paradigms have been considered an attempt is made 
to generalize the models into hypotheses.
6.5.2 Models In to  Hypotheses
The generalization of models to form hypotheses also considers qualitative and 
quantitative knowledge separately (R3_GENERALISE_M0DELS invokes Generalize 
models. Table 6.7).
The generalization of qualitative models into hypotheses by STERN is a three 
stage process, whose aim is to obtain hypotheses that range over a sufficiently large 
number of experimental paradigms (R10_HYPO_QUALS). First, all qualitative models 
are grouped according to similar qualforms. Second, those groups that have one 
model for every available experimental paradigm are chosen; that is, the one type of 
qualform common to the group is applicable across all the experimental paradigms. 
In STERN there must be two models to the group as two experimental paradigms 
have been considered. In the third stage, hypotheses are constructed that contain a 
qualform from each chosen group. The acceptability and tractability of each
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Table 6.7 GENERALIZE MODELS Rules (RULES^lQl
R10_H YPO _Q UALS*
C ondition:
There is an active list of models some of which are qualitative.
A ction:
Generalization of qualitative models with into qualitative hypotheses by: (i) grouping together 
all models with similar qualforms; (ii) choosing groups that have more than a user specified 
number o f models that account for different experimental paradigms; and (iii) constructing a 
hypotheses for each of the groups using the group's qualform and set the acceptability and 
tractability appropriately.
And remove qualitative hypotheses from the current list of models.
R10_H Y PO _EQ N S
C ondition:
There is a list of active quantitative models.
A ction:
For each quantitative model a model is made with the same equation and the acceptability and 
tractability are set appropriately.
R 10_PR E PA R E
C ondition:
There is an hypothesis that is a frame with associated models, 
and no active model.
A ction:
Remove the models from the hypothesis and make them active.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
Generalization
hypothesis is set according to the number of models in the group. In the modelling 
of the Galilean episode, STERN reduces the 50 qualitative models down to just 12 
hypotheses (II, Table 4.1). This demonstrates the importance of modelling the 
hypothesis and experimental paradigm levels of scientific research programmes. 
Previous discovery systems have tended not to do so and have consequently had to 
deal with explosive numbers of models.
The twelve qualitative hypotheses that STERN has found contain some very 
valuable information (II, Table 4.1). For example, the qualform (STEADY T_TIME 
T_VOL) indicates that T_TIME is unrelated to T_VOL, because T_TIME is constant as 
T_VOL is varied. Now as the qualforms:
(STEADY TJIM E T_VOL) (STEADY TJIM E T_W)
(STEADY T_VT_VOL) (STEADY T_V T_W), . . . (6.2)
are all found in hypotheses, this means that the terms T_VOL and T_W (volume and 
weight) are not relevant to the characterization of naturally accelerated motion. By a 
similar argument using the INCREASE and FROMJERO qualforms, and STERN's 
other qualitative hypotheses (II, Table 4.1), we can see that STERN knows that 
T_V, T J IM E , T_H and T_L (speed, time, vertical and horizontal distances) are 
important to the characterization of the phenomena.
A simpler process performs the generalization of quantitative models into 
hypotheses. The desirability of quantitative hypotheses is contrasted by the 
comparative rarity of quantitative models, thus it seems worthwhile considering all 
models with equations as potential hypotheses. Hence, STERN simply constructs 
an hypothesis using the model's equation to fill the equivalent slot in the hypothesis 
(RlO_HYPO_EQNS). The measures of hypothesis acceptability and tractability are set 
to indicate the hypothesis is so far acceptable even though it has only been 
generalized from one model; later (dis)confirmatory testing will find out if the 
hypothesis is really acceptable. Four hypotheses are constructed by STERN in this
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manner (in, Table 4.1).
Since STERN has now found hypotheses using the strategy for the 
generalization of experimental results into hypotheses, control returns to the top 
level in STERN {Strategy chooser rules). New hypotheses have been found: the 
qualitative ones are applicable to all available experimental paradigms but the 
quantitative ones are not. Thus STERN chooses to try the confirmation strategy 
(described in detail in Chapter 5) on the quantitative hypotheses. For completeness, 
we will briefly consider what happens to the four new quantitative hypotheses 
during confirmation.
6.5.3 Partly Disconfirming The New Quantitative Hypotheses
The four hypotheses discovered by generalization are shown to be unacceptable 
by the confirmation process. The hypotheses are unable to account for the 
experimental paradigms that were not involved in their original formation. Attempts 
at making predictions fail when the hypothesis (law) describing the period of swing 
of a pendulum is applied to the inclined plane paradigm. This is because there is no 
parameter in that paradigm that coiresponds to the size parameter (i.e. the length of 
the pendulum cord). STERN has thus correctly demonstrated that the pendulum law 
is just a model. Two of the other three hypotheses are variations of Galileo's law of 
free fall. STERN manages to generate predictions for the pendulum experimental 
paradigm with both hypotheses. However, their predictive instances do not match 
well with the experimental test results. The equations were originally inferred from 
the linear motion of the inclined plane. Thus STERN has correctly found that these 
equations cannot apply to the curved path of the pendulum. In other words the two 
variations of Galileo's law are not the most general form of the law.
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6.6 STERN ASSESSMENT ON GENERALIZATION
6.6.1 Completeness Of The Generalization Strategy
Significant discoveries have been made by STERN using the strategy for the 
generalization of experimental results into hypotheses. All the terms that are relevant 
to the characterization of the phenomenon (i.e. speed, height, time and length^, and 
those that are irrelevant (volume, weight), have been identified. Further, those 
terms that are relevant to only one experimental paradigm have also been delimited 
(such as the size and angle of the pendulum). Thus, STERN possess a full (mainly 
qualitative) understanding of the phenomenon. Quantitative models that describe the 
phenomenon in specific experimental paradigms have also been discovered (and 
shown by the confirmation strategy to be specifically limited to particular 
experimental paradigms).
Being able to deal with noisy data is something that computational models of 
scientific discovery should be able to do. The experimental simulator adds noise to 
instances but STERN is well able to cope with it. During the generalization of 
instances into quantitative models, noise in the data is naturally dealt with by the 
combination of: (i) the least squares method applied to the log-log "graph" of 
independent and dependent terms; and (ii) the accuracy of the match between the 
rational fraction and the index. Furthermore, this method allows STERN to find 
several correct model-equations without producing a false positive equation.
Designing experiments is a significant part of scientific discovery. STERN’s 
design abilities are sophisticated. Of the many experimental tests designed by 
STERN, no experiments are produced that consider trivial relations between 
parameters or that are irrelevant to the phenomena being investigated. The use of 
background knowledge and pragmatic knowledge about experiments are essential 
components of this ability.
The extent of communication between the theoretical and experimental sides of 
the research programme is less than in the confirmation strategy. However, this
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should not be considered a deficit. The reduced amount of communication simply 
reflects the fact that the design and performance of experiments, to build up a body 
of empirical results, does not require any theoretical considerations. Nevertheless, 
the correspondence between experimental parameters and theoretical terms has an 
underpinning role in the interpretation of experimental results into instances/It is 
only by the use of correspondence relations that STERN is able to determine that the 
law governing the period of pendulum swing was limited just to the pendulum 
paradigm.
In general, we have seen that STERN is well able to model the generalization 
from experimental results to hypotheses.
6.6.2 Advances On Previous Work
The generalization of empirical data into higher-level theoretical knowledge is 
the area that many previous scientific discovery systems have modelled. Typically, 
the current systems model the generalization of one set of data into a parsimonious 
description that constitutes a model (derived from several instances). Some of the 
computer models have considered quantitative inferences in this respect (e.g. 
BACON, Langley et.al, 1987; FARENHIET, Zykow, 1987), others have 
considered qualitative inferences (e.g. STAHL, Langley et.al, 1987; GELL- 
MANN, Fisher & Zytkow, forthcoming). Two program have even combined both 
types of inferences (e.g. IDS, Nordhausen & Langley, 1987; ABACUS, 
Falkenhainer & Michalski, 1986).
The generalization strategy in STERN not only models the generalization of 
instances into models, but also considers: the design and performance of 
experiments; the interpretation of experimental results; and the generalization of 
models into hypotheses (for both quantitative and qualitative representations). 
STERN clearly covers more ground than previous programs, but it does more than 
that Previous systems are in effect subsumed by STERN. For example, BACON. 1
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could in principle be substituted for the Generalize instances rules and not make 
any difference to STERN's overall performance.
BACON (Langley et.al, 1987) and ABACUS (Falkenhainer & Michalski, 
1986) use regularity spotters in the inference to equations from numerical data. To 
discover power relations STERN uses the more efficient log-log "graph" technique 
described in §6.5.1. However, STERN also uses regularity spotters in the shape of 
its qualforms but they differ in many ways from "conventional" regularity spotters. 
First, STERN's qualforms constitute explicit declarative knowledge in the program. 
Second, the number of different qualforms in STERN is more than double that of 
"conventional" regularity spotters. Third, the qualforms are considered at all levels 
of theory. These advances on the use of regularity spotters underlie many of 
STERN's powerful qualitative reasoning abilities. We will see how these abilities 
extend beyond the generalization to the generation of new quantitative hypotheses 
from old (Chapter 7).
STERN's qualforms are like the qualitative schema of IDS (Nordhausen & 
Langley, 1987) but are somewhat simpler. STERN and IDS differ in that IDS's 
qualitative schemata attempt to characterize the behaviour of a phenomenon as it 
progresses through a number of discontinuous states (e.g. melting, boiling). The 
schemata are induced as a preliminary step and form the basis for quantitative 
reasoning. STERN also uses its qualforms to infer quantitative theoretical 
knowledge but also employs them in other ways; for example to test the validity of 
substitutions of terms when confirming hypotheses (Chapter 5).
Previous models that have had some ability to design experiments have done so 
when some theoretical prediction is to be tested (i.e. Rajamoney et.al., 1985; 
Kulkami & Simon, 1988). STERN can do the same (as we saw in Chapter 5) but it 
can also design and perform a comprehensive range of experimental tests without 
reference to theory. This depends on the rich representation of experiments STERN 
possesses and the ability to use background knowledge.
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In terms of Klahr & Dunbar’s (1988) SDDS model one pattern of discovery is 
similar to STERN’s generalization strategy (see Figure 2.2). The process covers the 
induction of a. frame by the generation of experimental outcomes. This involves 
focusing on, choosing and setting the experimental variables to permit a trial to be 
run and outcomes to be observed. The outcomes are generalized into a frame. 
This SDDS process is equivalent to the design and performance of an experimental 
test and the generalization of the results into a model. Thus STERN subsumes 
SDDS as well as partly implementing its processes hierarchy.
6.6.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how STERN is able to obtain experimental results 
and generalize them into hypotheses. STERN also overcomes the limitations of 
previous discovery systems that generalise data into models. In particular, STERN:
• Designs experiments in the absence of (and also with) any theoretical predictions 
using background knowledge and the pragmatic information on experiments.
• interprets experimental results into theoretical inferences (STERN does not simply 
assume that experimental results are true data that feed straight into theoretical 
inferences).
• Employs a wide range of explicitly represented regularity spotters (i.e. 
qualforms), on all the levels of theoretical knowledge, that are used in many 
diverse ways throughout the program.
• Takes into account noise in experimental data during its generalization of instances 
into quantitative models.
• Obtains a deep and broad understanding of a domain by finding a wide range of 
qualitative hypotheses that indicate which terms are relevant or irrelevant for the 
characterization of the phenomena.
• Avoids an explosion in numbers of models that apply to experimental setups by 
generalizing models into hypotheses that apply to experimental paradigms.
STERN can perform the generalization of experimental results into theories. In
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the modelling of the Galilean domain many qualitative hypotheses were formed but 
no successful quantitative hypotheses. In the next chapter we will see how STERN 
finds successful quantitative hypotheses from the acceptable qualitative hypotheses 
and the unacceptable quantitative hypotheses discovered here. In particular, we will 
see how STERN infers the most general form of the law of free fall.
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Chapter 7
New Hypotheses From Old
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Galileo did not find the law of free fall by a direct process of inductive 
generalization from quantitative experimental data. We have seen in previous 
chapters how the Aristotelian laws were rejected and how experiments were 
performed to gather more information about the phenomenon in question, using two 
different strategies. Thus a wealth of information about the phenomenon is 
available, including: some definitely incorrect hypotheses, others that are only 
applicable in specific circumstances, and many generally-acceptable qualitative 
hypotheses. It was from this extensive body of knowledge that the law of free fall 
was eventually proposed. The law of free fall was finally accepted by Galileo when 
all of the proposed hypotheses had been tested against experimental results.
STERN models this important aspect of scientific discovery using its strategy 
that infers new hypotheses from old. The type of new hypotheses that STERN 
seeks are quantitative ones; that is ones with equations. To generate new hypotheses 
from old there must be some existing hypotheses. STERN chooses the strategy 
when attempts have been made to test the existing hypotheses against all the 
manufactured experimental paradigms. The strategy is instantiated in STERN’s 
New Hypotheses rule class (Table 7.1). STERN uses the strategy to find not only 
the correct law of free fall but many other quantitative hypotheses (although only the 
free fall hypothesis will eventually be shown to be acceptable). This chapter 
considers the details of how STERN generates new hypotheses from old. We will 
first consider the theoretical basis for generating new hypotheses and then see how 
STERN actually finds new hypotheses. Finally, we will consider how STERN
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Table 7.1 NEW HYPOTHESES Rules (RULES 14)
R 14_Q UA L_TO _EQ N S
C ondition:
All the hypotheses in the research programme have been tested experimentally.
A ction:
A multi-stage procedure with four processes to specifically find new equations:
(1) from all adequate qualforms find the set of pairs of increase and from_zero qualforms that 
have the same terms; (2) eliminate from the set any pairs of qualforms that have terms that 
are referred to by a semi acceptable quantitative hypothesis; (3) isolate the terms from the 
qualforms and generate exponential equations from the pairs of terms, with the term last in 
each of the pairs of qualforms being the term on which the exponential function operates, 
and the index ranging over all combinations of fractions that have denominator and 
numerator number equal to or less than 3; 
and for each equation generated construct a new hypothesis with the group slot filled by a 
symbol that relates all the equations that were originally inferred from the same pair of 
terms.
New Hypotheses
overcomes the limitations of previous discovery systems which perform similar 
discovery tasks.
Before we considered the specific way in which STERN generates new 
hypotheses, we should note that STERN's approach is just one of several different 
methods that exist. For example, scientist may generate new hypotheses by analogy 
to theories found in related research programmes or even in quite different fields of 
science. Investigations of alternative approaches will be interesting work for the 
future that will build upon STERN's present abilities.
7.2 GENERATING NEW HYPOTHESES FROM OLD
Before we consider how STERN actually generates new hypotheses from old, 
we need to understand why STERN employs the techniques it does. Existing 
hypotheses can be used in three ways in the inference to new hypotheses. Known 
hypotheses can: (i) indicate which theoretical terms are relevant and irrelevant to the 
characterization of the domain; (ii) rule out specific forms of equations; and (iii) 
suggest likely forms of potentially acceptable equations.
7.2.1 Relevant And Irrelevant Terms From Qualforms
The strategy that STERN uses to generalize experimental results into hypotheses 
involves the discovery of many acceptable hypotheses with qualforms. STERN 
uses many different qualforms (Table 4.13). Qualforms state qualitative 
relationships that have been found between two terms; for example, 
(INCREASE A B), indicates that the magnitude of A increases monotonically with 
B. Qualforms in acceptable hypotheses thus contain valuable information that is 
useful in the present task. One way the qualforms can be used is in determining 
which terms are relevant or irrelevant for characterizing the phenomena.
Consider a qualform with a STEADY predicate; for example (STEADY T_V T_W). 
This qualform indicates that T_V is constant as T_W varies. Thus, T_W is not
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functionally related to T_V. When the qualform belongs to an acceptable hypothesis 
this means that the qualform has been found to apply in a way generally applicable 
to the phenomena. Therefore, we can conclude more generally that the phenomena 
will not be characterized by any equation that relates T_V and T_W. Similarly, an 
INDEPENDENT qualform indicates that there is no known relation between the two 
terms, thus its terms would not appear in an acceptable equation either.
Furthermore, most of the qualforms indicate definite relations between terms 
(e.g. (INCREASE T_V T_H)). Thus any term that does not appear in any qualforms 
whatsoever is unlikely to be relevant. For example, the term for the length of the 
chord in a pendulum, T_S, does not appear in any of the acceptable qualforms that 
STERN has found (Table 4.1). This is hardly surprising as this term only refers to 
a parameter that occurs in the pendulum paradigm.
Relevant terms can also be found using qualforms from acceptable hypotheses. 
For example, (INCREASE T_V T_H) indicates that T_V and T_H are in a functional 
relationship. Thus we would expect an equation to include both terms. The same 
argument applies to all the other qualforms except those with the STEADY or 
INDEPENDENT predicates (Table 4.13).
By a combination of aU three techniques just described, all the terms in a research 
programme can be classified as relevant or irrelevant. For example, STERN finds 
that T_TIME, T_V, T_L and T_H are relevant when modelling the Galilean episode. 
The irrelevant terms found include T_S, T_VOL and T_W, amongst others.
7.2.2 Unlikely Terms And The Forms Of Equations
STERN has existing hypotheses with equations in addition to hypotheses with 
qualforms. None of these equations are acceptable. Some are unacceptable and 
some partly acceptable. However, it is because they are not completely acceptable 
that they can play a part in the generation of new hypotheses in one of two ways, 
depending on their degree of acceptabihty.
First, an equation that is partially acceptable indicates that its terms cannot form
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the basis of a generally acceptable equation. Consider an hypothesis with an 
equation that is only partly acceptable; for example:
(= T_D (* T_TIME T_TIME)) , . . .  (7.1)
This is an expression of the law of free fall that is only applicable to the inclined 
plane experiment. From this equation we can deduce that the generally acceptable 
hypotheses will not include just T_D and T_TIME. On the one hand Equation 7.1 
only applies to the inclined plane experimental paradigm, so it is not generally 
acceptable; and on the other hand, any other equation in terms of T_D and T_TIME 
alone cannot apply to the inclined plane paradigm, so again is not acceptable. 
Therefore, no equation in T_D and T JIM E  will be acceptable. In general, a partly 
acceptable hypothesis cuts down the range of potential new hypotheses dramatically 
with respect to the terms that are considered in its equation.
Second, a completely unacceptable hypothesis helps to cut down the space of 
new equations to be considered by explicitly ruling out one equation. For example, 
the two Aristotelian effective weight laws were found to be unacceptable by the 
disconfirmation processes. Thus, the processes to generate new hypotheses need 
not bother to consider them during its processing. An unacceptable quantitative 
hypothesis only indicates that a particular equation does not account for any 
experiments. The modification of the equation may in fact produce a generally- 
acceptable hypothesis. For example, it cannot be inferred from the unacceptable 
Aristotelian effective weight laws that no other equation in those terms could be an 
acceptable hypothesis. However, in this case, a new acceptable equation is unlikely, 
because the effective weight and density terms do not appear in any acceptable 
qualforms (see §7.2.1).
7.2.3 Suggesting The Form Of Equations
To recap, there are inferences that can be made which will find likely 
combinations of terms as candidates for new hypotheses and qualitative formalisms 
have significant role in this. However, qualforms are also important when it comes
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to postulating the structure of equations that may relate previously-selected terms. 
Because qualforms indicate that certain regularities obtain, equations which satisfy 
those regularities are likely to be good candidates.
Given the two acceptable hypotheses with the qualforms (INCREASE A B) and 
(INCREASE C B) a likely form that an equation involving A and C may take is:
f(A) = g(C), . . . ( 7 . 2 )
where /  and g are monotonie functions of A and C. The rationale behind this
inference is that as both A and C increase in magnitude with respect to the term
B, so A and C may themselves be directly related.
Conservation laws are often favoured by physical scientists (Feynman, 1965). 
So combinations of qualforms that suggest that two terms may be combined to yield 
a constant quantity are worth considering. For example, consider the pair of 
qualforms (REPEAT+ A B) and (REPEAT- C B). The first one states that as B 
increases monotonically, A increases from an initial value, rises to a maximum 
value and returns to the initial value. Similarly with the second qualform, except that 
C decreases to a minimum value. Reasonable equations that fit this pair of 
qualforms are:
f(A) + g(C) = const, . . .  (7.3a)
f(A ). g(C) = const, . . .  (7.3b)
where the /  and g are again simple monotonie functions and const is some 
arbitrary constant. Other combinations of qualforms may also imply conservation 
equations. For example, two qualforms of the same type [e.g. (increase A B) and 
(increase C B)] may be satisfied by equations 7.3a and b with their operators 
replaced by and V ,  respectively.
Clearly, only the general form of the equation is implied by a combination of 
qualforms so the potential range of one type of equation is infinite; there is no limit 
to the range of form that the monotonie functions /  and g may take. However,
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only a small proportion would be considered by a scientist, for example exponential 
relationships with rational indices under 3. Search methods like those embodied in 
BACON.6 (Langley et.al., 1986) might also be employed.
Thus we have seen the different methods that will form the basis of STERN's 
ability to generate new hypotheses from old. In the next section the particular 
manner in which they are used in STERN will be discussed.
7.3 STERN'S NEW HYPOTHESES MECHANISM
7.3.1 Exponential Equations
STERN models the generation of new hypotheses from old using some of the 
the techniques discussed (QUAL_TO_EQNS in New Hypotheses, Table 7.1). The 
equations that STERN finds are exponential equations with small rational indices. 
Such equations have two properties that are particularly relevant here: (i) they are 
monotonically increasing functions; and (ii) they pass through the origin. STERN 
has qualforms that can identify when the values of two terms have these properties; 
namely the INCREASE and FROM_ZERO qualforms. To be specific; 
(FROM_ZERO A B)  means that A and B pass though the origin and 
(INCREASE A B) indicates that A increases as B increases. Thus both can be 
considered as necessary conditions for an exponential equation of the form
(= (expt B n) A ) , . . .  (7.4).
where n is the index of the function. The next subsection describes in detail how 
STERN goes about searching for such equations.
7.3.2 Inferring Equations
The generation of new hypotheses in STERN is a four stage process (see Table
7.1 & Figure 7.1). First, existing qualitative hypotheses are analysed for pairs of 
INCREASE and FROMJERO qualforms that have identical terms. Four such pairs of 
qualforms are found. Second, those pairs of qualforms with terms referred to in 
partially-acceptable hypotheses are eliminated, leaving only two pairs. Third, the 
terms themselves are isolated and exponential equations are generated for each pair
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(- T_V (EXPT T_H 1/2)) 
(- T_V (EXPT T_H 1/3)) 
(- T_V (EXPT T_H 2))
(- T_V (EXPT T_H 2/3)) 
(- T_V (EXPT T_H 3))
(- T_V (EXPT T_H 3/2)) 
(- T_V T_H)
{V} Final Hypotheses • 
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(- T_V (EXPT T_L 1/2)) 
(- T_V (EXPT T_L 1/3)) 
(- T_V (EXPT T_L 2))
(- T_V (EXPT T_L 2/3)) 
(- T_V (EXPT T_L 3))
(- T_V (EXPT T_L 3/2)) 
(■ T_V T_L)
Figure 7.1 New Hypotheses From Old
Italics indicates qualfroms that will be eliminated or will 
be ignored by the next process.
See Table 7.1 for a description of numbered processes
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of terms according to equation 7.4. The values taken by the index n are all the 
different combinations of fractions, piq, given by numerator and denominator 
integers up to a user defined limit. The limit typically chosen is 3; Galileo never 
consider power equations in which p or q were greater than 3 and very few laws 
of nature have values of p  and q above 3 (when they can be expressed as power 
equations with rational indices). As each pair of terms yields more than one 
equation, the several hypotheses generated are given a unique symbol indicating that 
they belong to particular set inferred by the same process. In Chapter 6, we saw 
how this information was used to cut down significantly the number of hypotheses 
considered, once one had been found to be acceptable.
Fourteen hypotheses originating from two pairs of terms were in fact generated. 
The hypothesis with the equation
(= T_V (EXPT T_H 1/2)), : . . (7.5)
is the correct law of free fall, although at this stage any hypothesis could be 
acceptable. When the generation of a new hypothesis is complete, control is 
returned to the top level {Strategy chooser). STERN now chooses the confirmation 
strategy to attempt to test the new hypotheses against the available experiments. 
However, as the Aristotelian law is no longer believed to be tme, the process fails 
to generate models from the hypotheses. The necessary constant speed condition no 
longer applies, so speed term (T_V) cannot be substituted by its definition. Thus, 
the tractability of the hypotheses is in effect reduced whilst their acceptability 
remains to be considered. To test the new hypotheses the invention of new 
experimental paradigms is required, as we will see later (in Chapter 8).
7.3.3 Summary
The formation of new hypothesis from old ones can be conceived of as a serial 
search of two spaces, guided by the existing hypotheses and their various degrees 
of acceptability. The first search is in the space of all the theoretical terms in the 
research programme. This search finds the terms that are relevant to the
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characterization of the phenomenon in all the experimental paradigms of the research 
programme. The second search is through the space of general forms of equations 
for ones that are compatible with accepted findings. The first and second processes 
in Figure 7.1, perform the search of the space of terms in STERN, and the third 
process attempts to find equations with suitable forms.
The processes taken together can also be considered as one of specialization, 
modifying qualforms into equations that cover a very much more restricted set of 
interrelations between the terms.
7.4 STERN ASSESSMENT ON NEW HYPOTHESES
7.4.1 Completeness
From the nineteen hypotheses obtained from the previous discovery stages, 
STERN was able to generate 14 new hypotheses in two sets, one of them 
containing the correct law of free fall. The techniques used are a powerful means of 
finding potentially acceptable hypotheses that may be generally applicable. The 
power of the processes resides in the fact that all previous hypotheses are 
considered. Relevant and irrelevant terms are found from the qualitative hypotheses 
and partially acceptable quantitative hypotheses. Likely forms of equations are 
found using the acceptable qualitative hypotheses and unacceptable quantitative 
hypotheses.
Without this strategy to generate new hypotheses from old, STERN would not 
have been able to find the true law of free fall. Furthermore, in using this method to 
find the law, STERN is closely modelling the way in which Galileo found the same 
law. Galileo used the knowledge which he had gained from performing experiments 
to postulate possible forms of a general law of motion (See Chapter 3).
7.4.2 Advances On Previous Work
The processes to generate new quantitative hypotheses described above paid
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particular attention to the degree of acceptability of all existing hypotheses. STERN 
relies on the extent to which hypotheses have been applied successfully to all the 
experimental paradigms in the research programme. No previous model of scientific 
discovery has considered the inference to new theoretical knowledge using both 
qualitative and quantitative knowledge of such varying degrees of acceptability. 
However, some previous systems have employed techniques that are interesting to 
compare to STERN's abilities.
First, let us consider programs that modify one unacceptable model (or 
hypothesis) to form a model that is potentially more acceptable. A range of different 
methods are used in different programs. REVOLVER (Rose & Langley, 1986; 
Rose, 1988) revises inconsistent chemical reactions by adding or subtracting atoms 
from premises about the structure of molecules. Various item of information are 
stored about the types of inference made and when they were made {reduced lists 
& sources tags). These items are used by REVOLVER in a function that evaluates 
how best to revise the reactions. Amongst KEKEDA's (KuUcami & Simon, 1988) 
proposition generators and proposition modifiers are heuristics that suggest how 
reaction equations may be changed when unexpected experimental outcomes are 
obtained. The evoke fram e and use prior knowledge processes in Klahr & 
Dunbar’s (1988) SDDS process hierarchy are possible locations for the strategy 
considered above. Thus, a range of methods to modify existing unacceptable 
theoretical knowledge are used by previous systems. However, unlike STERN 
which takes into account all known hypotheses to infer a new one, the previous 
systems only attempt to modify individual laws that have been found to be 
inconsistent or inadequate. The power of STERN’s new hypothesis generation 
strategy comes from its use of all available hypotheses.
Several programs have made use of regularity spotters. These roughly resemble 
STERN’s qualforms in the way they function. BACON (Langley, et.al., 1987) 
employs regularity spotters in its heuristics that look for simple increase, decrease.
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linear and constant relationships between terms. When a regularity is found it is 
not explicitly represented but immediately used to define a new term. The regularity 
spotters in ABACUS (Falkenhainer & Michalski, 1986) are used for a similar 
purpose, but in a more sophisticated manner. ABACUS attempts to find all the 
relevant variables by applying regularity spotters to all the different combinations of 
pairs of variables (to find the maximal cycles in the proportionality graph) before 
making any quantitative inferences. The result is similar to STERN's search though 
its qualforms for relevant terms, but in ABACUS the search is data-led and only 
two types of substantive qualitative relation are considered. STERN can use nine 
qualforms so is able to find a much great variety of relations amongst terms. 
Furthermore, STERN qualforms are used in other inference processes throughout 
the program (Chapters 5 & 6). Qualitative knowledge about processes is stored 
explicitly in EDS (Nordhausen & Langley, 1987) but is only used in a most 
rudimentary way to infer quantitative laws. The main differences between STERN 
and previous systems in this respect is that STERN: (i) explicitly represents the 
qualitative relations it finds; (ii) assesses their acceptability across different 
experimental paradigms; and (iii) then uses them to find new quantitative 
hypotheses in a theory-led fashion. Other systems have tended to only use such 
knowledge implicitly in the generalization from observations to descriptive 
equations in a data-led manner.
7.4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how STERN can generate new hypotheses from its 
existing ones. One of the laws found is the correct law of free fall. STERN's 
powerful strategy for generating new hypotheses encompasses many abilities. 
These include:
• Using acceptable qualitative hypotheses, and unacceptable and partially acceptable 
quantitative hypotheses, to distinguish terms that are either relevant or irrelevant 
for the characterization of the phenomena.
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• Proposing the form of likely equations based on acceptable qualitative hypotheses 
and unacceptable quantitative hypotheses.
♦ The grouping together of mutually exclusive hypotheses generated from a single 
process, for future reference.
Although many new hypotheses have been generated, STERN has not managed 
to find any which are acceptable. In the next Chapter we will see how STERN has 
to invent new experiments to be able to test the new hypotheses successfully.
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Chapter 8
Inventing New Experiments
8.1 INTRODUCTION
We have already seen how experiments have played a large part in the modelling 
of the discoveries in the Galilean domain by STERN. Experiments have been used 
to (dis)confirm hypotheses by allowing experimental test results and predictions to 
be compared. Experiments have also been designed and performed to obtain a large 
body of results that have been generalized into hypotheses. Now, in this chapter we 
will consider some quite radical things: the manufacture and use of new 
experiments; and the high level control of the availability of experimental 
paradigms.
Galileo invented new experiments by combining the experiments he already 
knew (see Chapter 3). For example, he realized that the inclined plane could be used 
as a launcher for the projectile experiments. The initial part of the combined 
experiment (inclined plane) allows the terminal part (projectile) to be investigated for 
the first time as the terminal part cannot be used in isolation. Galileo invented other 
combined experiments, such as the pendulum with shortening cord and the 
combined curved ramp and projectile (see Figure 8.1). Inventing new experiments 
by combing existing experimental paradigms is ubiquitous in science. For example, 
Newton used a double pendulum experiment (Figure 8.2) in which the two 
pendulums with bobs of different mass were placed side by side (Magie, 1935,41). 
The initial pendulum is released and swings down to collided with the terminal 
pendulum. This experiment is one that Newton employed in the discovery of the 
conservation of momentum. In fact, it depends on a knowledge Galileo's law of 
free fall to determined the relative speeds of the pendulum bobs just before and after
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(A) Curved Ramp And Projectile
(B) Pendulum With Shortening Cord
Figure 8.1 Two Of Galileo’s Combined Experiments
terminal initial
Figure 8.2 Newton's Double Pendulum Experiment
Key: p - release of initial pendulum, q - collision, 
r & s - final positions.
Adapted from Magie (1935).
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their collision. This is an example of how Newton's discoveries were built on the 
foundation provided by Galileo. More recently, subatomic physics experiments, 
like those performed at CERN, can be considered as combined experiments. The 
particle generator and accelerator constitutes the initial part that generates high 
energy particles. The bubble chamber in which the particles are smashed together is 
the terminal part. Although combining experimental paradigms is an important and 
widely used method to obtain new experiments it is not the only means that exists. 
For example, new experiments may be devised by examining paradigms used in 
other domains and adapting them, by analogy, to one's own research programme. 
Often new types of experiments come into being by the invention of new 
technologies. However, here we will just consider the combination process to 
devise new experiments; and in particular, the combination of just two experimental 
paradigms.
Inventing new experiments provide new variations of experimental parameters 
and conditions which can circumvent the limitations of previous experiments. 
Furthermore, new experiments may also allow solutions to be found for problems 
that have occurred during theoretical inferences. Galileo used his combined inclined 
plane and projectile experiment to do exactly that. Galileo had found his law of free 
fall but was only able to test it once the combined inclined planed and projectile 
experiment had been invented (we will see exactly why below).
Inventing new experimental paradigms had a crucial role in Galileo's 
discoveries. Thus, the modelling of this episode would be incomplete without some 
consideration of this important aspect. Fortunately STERN can cope with new 
experimental paradigms and setups. STERN does not devise new experimental 
paradigms just because it runs out of experiments; it is given many paradigms as 
input and they are not exhausted before STERN needs to consider new ones. 
STERN constructs new experimental paradigms to overcome the intractability of
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certain hypotheses in theoretical inferences. Devising experiments involves 
combining known experimental paradigms; for example, the use of the inclined 
plane in conjunction with projectiles (see Figure 3.2).
Galileo knew of many simple experiments that he could perform and had the 
means to invent many new experiments. Clearly he did not manufacture and 
perform experimental tests on all the experiments he ever conceived. It seems that 
Galileo only used a relatively small number of experiments, in the main preferring 
pendulums and the inclined plane. STERN also considers a limited number of 
experiments at a time. The limiting of the availability of experimental paradigms in 
STERN has been found to be important to how efficiently STERN is able to make 
discoveries. Simply stated, if there are too many experimental paradigms the 
discovery process becomes to cumbersome. Hence, a mechanism is used by 
STERN to limit the availability of experiments.
In this chapter we will consider why STERN needs to consider new experiments 
and how it finds new combined experiments. We will also consider in detail why 
STERN needs to hmit the availability of experimental paradigms and its mechanism 
for doing so.
8.2 NEW EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGMS & SETUPS
8.2.1 Why STERN Employs New Experiments
The are several reasons why STERN constructs new experimental paradigms. 
The first and the most important one is that new experiments make intractable 
hypotheses tractable; for example free fall hypotheses. These hypotheses are 
intractable for theoretical inferences because the speed term (T_V) cannot be 
eliminated when modelling either the pendulum or inclined plane experiments. In 
the confirmation strategy, STERN can only replace a term by its definition when 
certain specific conditions apply. To eliminate the speed term, speed must be 
constant. Previously, speed could be replaced because the Aristotelian law of
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instantaneous acceleration was applicable, but it has by now been disconfirmed. 
Thus STERN is left with an intractable hypothesis. Considering new experiments 
may allow the speed term to be eliminated. For example, the free fall hypothesis can 
be applied to an inclined plane to find an expression for the speed down the plane. 
A second expression for the horizontal speed of the projectile can also be inferred. 
One expression can thus be substituted into the other to eliminate the speed term, 
leaving a single equation that just has measurable terms (see §5.3.1.3).
Second, new experiments are sometimes needed because certain experiments 
cannot be carried out in isolation. For example, experiments on the motion of 
projectiles cannot be considered without some means to launch the body into the air. 
The inclined plane is one suitable candidate for the role of launcher. In general, such 
an arrangement is one in which the initial part of the experiment (inclined plane) 
instantiates the phenomenon so that it can be observed in the terminal part 
(projectile). This is a technique widely used in experimental science.
The third and final reason why STERN might consider new experiments is if 
runs out of experiments to use. However, this eventuality does not arise when 
modelling the Galilean episode.
8.2.2 How STERN Constructs New Experiments
The basic strategy that devises new experiments in STERN involves combining 
two old experimental paradigms in to one new paradigm. This models what Galileo 
did, at least twice, in his investigations of naturally accelerated motion.
The most important new experimental paradigm devised by STERN is the 
combined inclined plane and projectile experiment (see Figure 3.2). A combined 
experiment has two parts. The initial part (the inclined plane) acts as a feeder into 
the terminal part (the projectile). Some means may be required to modify the exact 
behaviour of the phenomenon during the transition from the initial to terminal parts 
(e.g. the lip at the end of the inclined plane to convert the ball's angled descent into 
purely horizontal motion just as it becomes the projectile). In domains like
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Galileo's, human scientists can see whether two experiments can be combined. 
How such inferences are made using real world knowledge is an interesting topic, 
but is beyond the scope of the present work. Thus, STERN is told as one of its 
inputs which paradigms can be legally combined. What is of particular interest here 
are the circumstances that lead to the invention of new experiments and how they 
are subsequently employed. Experiments may be performed on combined 
experiments in one of two modes that depend on whether the input-m parameter is 
in the initial or terminal part. As the names of the modes suggest, the input-m 
parameter is in the initial part in the initial mode, and in the terminal part in the 
terminal mode. In STERN, devising new combined experimental paradigms is a 
three stage process {new paradigm class of rules. Table 8.1).
In the first stage a single experimental paradigm is chosen to be the terminal part 
(R13_CH00SE_TERM INAL). STERN prefers available (already manufactured) 
paradigms over ones that have only just been conceived and also chooses the 
paradigm with the most setups. The chosen paradigm, say the projectile paradigm, 
is made active.
To begin the second stage, initial parts for the terminal projectile are sought 
(R13_MAKE_C0MBINES). STERN knows which paradigms have setups that are 
suitable initial parts for the projectile paradigm (they are named in the combine slot 
of its frame). For example, down_incplane is the name of one of the inclined 
plane's setups that is a suitable initial part. The construction of the combined 
experimental paradigms from the inclined plane and the projectile paradigms is a 
matter of instantiating a new paradigm frame and filling the slots that relate to each 
part, using the information available for the existing paradigms (see. Table 4.8). 
For example, the ease of manufacture of the new combined experimental paradigm 
is calculated from the values of its two parts. This measure is always a value 
between zero and unity; the larger the value the easier the paradigm is to
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Table 8.1 NEW PARADIGMS Rules (RULES_13)
R13_CO M BINED_SETUPS*
C ondition:
There is an active list of experimental paradigms.
A ction:
For each active experimental paradigm in the list, construct experimental setups from the 
paradigm;
the name of the setup is made by concatenating the initial and terminal setup names with a '+' 
between.
R13_M AK E_CO M BINES
C ondition:
There is a single active experimental paradigm,
and other experimental paradigms exist in the experimental side of the research programme. 
A ction:
The active experimental paradigm that is considered as a terminal part of a combined 
experiment;
search for suitable initial paradigms from amongst those in the research programme by 
examining the combine slot of the terminal paradigm's setup frames;
construct a combined experimental paradigm for each suitable initial paradigm with the active 
terminal paradigm, filling the slot of the paradigm frame from the two existing paradigms;
and calculate the ease of manufacture using the formula (i.t)/(i+t), where i and t are the values 
of manufacturing ease of the initial and terminal paradigms, respectively.
R 13_C H 00SE _T E R M IN A L
C ondition:
There is no active experimental paradigm,
and there are hypotheses stored in the theoretical part of the research programme,
and no combined experiments have been made under the active paradigm before.
A ction:
Make active the experimental paradigm that has the greatest number of experimental setups that 
can act as terminal parts in a combined experiment, preferring those that have been 
manufactured over those that are just conceived, but not ones that are in combined 
experiments.
R13_REDU CE_*_TH RESH O LD
C ondition:
There is no active experimental paradigm,
and there are paradigms in the research programme that have not been "manufactured".
A ction:
Choose the experimental paradigm with the greatest product of manufacture ease and number of 
experimental setups that has setups that are not just a terminal parts of combined 
experiments, and reduce the ease*setup parameter to a value as if the paradigm had been 
manufactured, thus making it available.
*The order of rules indicates their relative priority in conflict resolution.
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manufacture. STERN calculates the value using the equation:
manufacture ease = ( i . t) /  (i + 1), . . .  (8.1)
where i and t are the ease values for the chosen initial and terminal paradigms. 
Equation 8.1 always yields a value between 0 and 1, that is less than the magnitude 
of either i or t alone. The name of the new experiment is a concatenation of the 
names of its parts (e.g. 'incplane+projectile').
The third and final stage of the process involves making setups for the combined 
experimental paradigm (R13_C0MBINED_SETUPS). This involves constructing new 
experimental setups using the information stored in the new paradigm frame and 
storing the setups under the paradigm. STERN interrogates the terminal paradigm to 
find which combinations of setups are legitimate to combine (i.e the contents of the 
combine slot). The names of setups are concatenations like those of the paradigms.
STERN repeats all three stages of the process for all the experimental paradigms 
it knows. In addition to the combined inclined plane and projectile, STERN 
constructs five other new paradigms, such as the combined curved ramp and 
projectile, and a double pendulum with a shortening cord (See Figure 8.1). All the 
experimental paradigms are considered by STERN, when it decides to employ new 
experiments, because the process that controls the number of available experiments 
needs detailed information about the new experimental paradigms; as we will now 
see.
8.3 CONTROLLING THE AVAILABILITY OF EXPERIMENTS
8.3.1 Why Limit The Numbers Of Experiments?
STERN is given six experimental paradigms as its initial input and we have seen 
how it makes six more combined experiments. To cope with such a profusion of 
experiments STERN uses a mechanism to limit the number of available paradigms. 
There are three reasons why STERN needs to limit the availability of experimental 
paradigms. First, as Galison (1986) notes, scientists working in a particular field
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will not use all the experimental paradigms that are present in the field. They have 
preferences for particular experiments. Galileo seemed to concentrate on 
pendulums, inclined planes and projectiles, whilst other researchers favoured 
curved ramps.
Second, considering only a limited number experiments at a given time is a 
heuristic that improves STERN's efficiency. For example, attempting to confirm 
hypotheses using just two experimental paradigms saves considerable effort. Those 
hypotheses that are unacceptable can be been found using just two paradigms and 
so eliminated from further investigation. Thus effort is only expended on the testing 
of the remaining (partially) acceptable hypotheses with additional paradigms. A 
similar argument applies to the generalizing of experimental results into hypotheses. 
The minimum number of experiments that is necessary to base the generalization on 
is two, if there is to be a reasonable chance that the inferred hypothesis is general. 
Therefore, STERN only bothers to make generalizations from two sets of 
experimental results rather than wasting effort on more.
Third, the mechanism differentiates between experimental paradigms that are 
available for STERN to use and those that are not. This models the real difference 
that exists in science between experiments that have actually been physically 
constructed and those that have only been conceived.
8.3.2 Controlling Available Experiments In STERN
To limit the number of experiments that are available STERN calculates a 
pragmatic value for each experimental paradigm. This value is the product of (i) the 
measure of the ease of manufacture of experimental setups of the paradigm and (ii) 
the number of setups. STERN only considers those experimental paradigms that 
have a value of this product above a certain limit Initially this limit is chosen (by the 
user) so that typically two experimental paradigms will be available. Less than two 
paradigms means that STERN cannot assess the acceptability of hypotheses or 
generalize experimental results to hypotheses. Using two experimental paradigms
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also models Galileo's preference for his two favourite paradigms. Thus, STERN 
typically starts with the pendulum and inclined plane experimental paradigms as 
available experiments. Later when new experimental paradigms need to be made 
available, because the existing paradigms have been exhausted, the liiriit on the 
pragmatic value is lowered (by R13_REDUCE_*_THRESH0LD). STERN chooses the 
new value so that just one new paradigm becomes available.
Whilst modelling the Galilean episode, STERN decides to make a new 
experimental paradigm available just after new experimental paradigms have been 
constructed. The combined inclined plane and projectile experiment is made 
available ^ d  permits STERN to go on to confirm the free fall hypothesis.
8.4 STERN ASSESSMENT OF NEW EXPERIMENTS
8.4.1 Completeness
The construction and use of new experiments are important processes that 
STERN is able to model. STERN would not be such a complete discovery system 
if it did not have these abilities. Furthermore, STERN would have been unable 
successfully to model the Galilean domain, because there would have been no way 
to confirm that the law of free fall was correct. The main reason STERN considers 
experiments is to allow intractable hypotheses to become tractable.
STERN controls the availability of experimental paradigms. This enhances the 
performance of STERN by improving how efficiently it makes discoveries.
8.4.2 Comparison With And Advances On Previous Work
Previous discovery systems have not modelled the experiment component of 
scientific research programmes. This occurs even though the role of experiment has 
been acknowledged theoretically in Cognitive Science; for example in the cyclical 
account given by the BACON school (see Chapter 2). Typically, the only 
manifestation of experimentation is in the form of observational data that the
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program is given. However, there are three hmited exceptions.
HDD (Reimann, 1990), KEKEDA (Kulkami & Simon, 1988) and Rajamoney 
et.al.’s (1985) programs all have some representation of experimental tests. Their 
representations consider the input-m and output parameters of the experiment, and 
the values that the parameters take. However, there is no consideration of pragmatic 
knowledge, such as which parameters are the easiest to manipulate and observe. 
Such knowledge is essential for the selection and design of experiments, 
particularly when no specific prediction is being tested. None of the systems 
consider the higher setup and paradigm levels of experimentation. This means that 
they are not able to to assess the general applicability of models or hypotheses.
As the representation of experimental knowledge is so poor, few processes that 
involve elements of experiments have been modelled by previous systems. The 
interpretation of experimental results to instances has not been considered as most 
previous models do not even distinguish between experimental tests and instances. 
The assessment of the accuracy of predictions is absent for the same reason. There 
are many different types of communication that occur between theory and 
experiments, but none have really been examined in the existing systems. COPER 
(Kokar, 1986) for example has units for its theoretical terms, but they are given as 
program inputs and are not used to refer to parameters in experiments.
The three programs that do have limited representations of experiment use them 
is different ways. In HDD, the representation of experimental tests act as a store for 
the pre-designed tests that are given as input. KEKEDA does design experimental 
tests, but only when there is a particular reaction to be tested and using mainly 
domain specific heuristics. Rajamoney gf.a/.'s (1985) program is also theory led 
and domain-specific. Incidentally, SDDS (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988) gives locations 
for experimental design and performance in its processes hierarchy.
The experimental representations and processes modelled by previous systems 
are limited compared to STERN. STERN is much more complete, it can: select
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different experimental paradigms and setups using pragmatic experimental 
knowledge; design experimental tests in a general fashion using background 
knowledge, in the presence of a theory or not; construct and use new experimental 
paradigms from existing experiments; and control the availability of the experiments 
using pragmatic assessments of the experiments.
8.4.3 Conclusions
In this chapter we have seen how STERN constructs new experiments, by 
combining old experimental paradigms, and uses them to make further discoveries. 
STERN also controls the availability of experimental paradigms as a means to 
enhance the efficiency with which it makes discoveries. To summarize, the 
program's processes that deal with experiments allow STERN to:
• Construct new experiments by combining existing experimental paradigms.
• Employ new experiments to make further discoveries.
• Use combined paradigms as experimental solutions to intractability problems in 
theoretical inferences.
• Use combined paradigms to instantiate experiments that would otherwise have 
been impossible to perform in isolation.
• Control the availability of experimental paradigms as a way of enhancing the 
efficiency of the system, by cutting down wasted effort during the confirmation 
of, and the generalization to, hypotheses.
• Model the complex inter-play between the theory and experimental components of
a research programme at a high level.
This ends our consideration of STERN experimental abilities, and it also draws 
to a close our considerations of STERN's many and varied processes that constitute 
its extensive range of powerful discovery abilities.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions: The Cognitive Science Of 
Scientific Discovery
9.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the points we made at the beginning of this thesis was that our 
understanding of scientific discovery has not been reflexive. Science has advanced 
our knowledge of very many aspects of our universe in great detail. However, we 
do not have such a deep understanding of the nature of science and how scientists 
make discoveries. It is only recently that direct empirical investigations and 
theoretical studies have been carried out to further our knowledge in this area. 
Cognitive Science is the field in which much of this work has taken place. It is 
comprised loosely of three areas that have employed very different methods to 
investigate scientific discovery. Cognitive psychologists have performed empirical 
studies on simulated scientific discovery tasks. Philosophers of science have 
propounded many and varied theses of how science is performed, and even 
prescribed how it ought to be carried out. In Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
computational scientific discovery systems have been built to model episodes from 
the history of science.
This thesis is clearly located in the AI camp. However, the approach is 
somewhat different in that a framework for scientific discovery has been proposed. 
The framework proposes a minimum set of components that must be possessed by 
accounts and models of scientific discovery if they are to be acceptable (Chapter 1). 
The review of existing computational models and empirical studies was organized, 
and to some extent assessed, in terms of the framework (Chapter 2). STERN is a 
discovery system that models Galileo's discoveries on naturally accelerated motion
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(Chapter 3). STERN instantiates all the components of the framework and has 
successfully made the same discoveries as Galileo (Chapters 4 to 8).
So, we have the field of cognitive science which investigates scientific discovery 
and a framework that partially characterizes scientific discovery. It is interesting to 
consider what we might leam by using the framework to analyse reflexively the 
investigation of scientific discovery in Cognitive Science. This is main objective of 
this chapter. We will consider:
(§92) Mapping The Study Of Scientific Discovery Into The Framework. There are 
many different approaches to research on scientific discovery in Cognitive 
Science. The different types of study, and the entities in them, neatly map onto 
components and items in the framework.
(§9.3) The Experimental Component O f The Cognitive Science O f Scientific 
Discovery. The framework's experimental component encompasses the 
empirical studies and the historical episodes considered in Cognitive Science. 
(§9.4) The Theoretical Component O f The Cognitive Science O f Scientific 
Discovery. The framework's theoretical component encompasses the theories 
proposed by the researchers in all three areas and the computational models from 
AI in particular.
(§95) The Acceptability O f Computational Models O f Scientific Discovery. The 
theoretical work in cognitive science can be assessed according to criteria that 
are equivalent to those often used in other sciences. How well the existing 
computational models do according to these criteria is assessed.
We will also consider some other issues that are relevant to the computational 
modelling of scientific discovery; Remaining Issues And Thoughts (§9.6).
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9.2 MAPPING THE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY INTO 
THE FRAMEWORK
The framework proposes a minimum set of components that seem to be essential 
for the characterization of scientific research programmes. In it, a research 
programme consists of a theoretical component and an experimental component 
that together investigate and characterize some delimited set of phenomena. 
Theoretical knowledge is viewed as state transformation functions and three types 
of theoretical knowledge are distinguished - hypotheses, model and instances. 
The acceptability of theoretical knowledge is assessed using acceptability criteria; 
for example explanatory breadth. Similarly, there are three levels of experiments - 
experimental paradigms, setups and tests. On some phenomena no experiments 
can be performed and only observations made; in these cases the reliability of 
experimental test results is substantially reduced. The framework also 
acknowledges that multiple types of communication occur between all the levels of 
the two main components. We will consider the experimental component, the 
theoretical component, and theory acceptability in the analysis of work in Cognitive 
Science. The Galilean episode will be used for comparison throughout (see Table 
9.1).
9.2.1 The Experimental Component
Galileo's research programme was on the delimited phenomena of the motion of 
naturally accelerated bodies. On the experimental side Galileo used inclined planes, 
pendulums and invented new combined experiments; each of these is an 
experimental paradigm. A particular configuration of the inclined plane is an 
experimental setup. Performing a test on the setup is an experimental test that gives 
specific results, such as lists of values for input-m and output parameters. The 
comparison of the test result and a prediction relating to the inclined plane is an 
example of the communication that occurs between theory and experiment.
Now let us assume that the framework applies to the study of scientific discovery
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Table 9.1 Galileo Versus The Cognitive Science Of Scientific 
Discovery Under The Framework
Framework
Components
Galileo on the motion of naturally 
accelerated bodies*
Cognitive Science of Scientific 
Discovery*
Research
Programme
Naturally accelerated motion Scientific discovery
Experiment
Experimental
Paradigms
Experimental
Setups
Experimental
Tests
Activities
Reliability
Inclined planes, pendulums, 
combined experiments 
(An inclined plane with fixed 
height)
(Particular predictions on inclined 
plane)
(Inventing combined experiments 
and running tests on them) 
(Acknowledging the influence of 
noise)
Computer simulated environments, 
specific tasks 
(REFRACT, Wason's '2 4 6’)
Historical episodes of discovery & 
(results from REFRACT) 
(Designing REFRACT & '2 4 6' 
task, and running tests on them) 
("Averaging" behaviour of many 
subjects)
Theorv
Hypotheses
Models
Instances
Inferences
Acceptability
Criteria
Aristotelian effective weight laws, 
law of free fall, etc.
(Descriptions of motion on the 
inclined plane, with fixed height)
(Specific predictions on the inclined 
plane)
(Make prediction for inclined plane 
with free fall law)
Success of applying hypotheses to 
experimental paradigms
Philosophical & psychological 
theories (BACON school cyclic 
account, the Framework) 
Computational models: Previous 
discovery, e.g. BACON; e.g. 
STERN 
Runs of discovery systems on 
particular domains with specified 
inputs.
(Writing STERN using Framework, 
running STERN)
Completeness, generality, internal 
coherence.
Communi­
cation
(Comparing inclined plane 
prediction and test results)
Comparing discovery system output 
and with episodes (REFRACT 
findings built into HDD)
‘(Examples in brackets)
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in Cognitive Science. The crucial point to realize is that the delimited phenomenon 
that is being studied is the behaviour of human scientists as they make discoveries 
(see Table 9.1, for direct comparison to Galileo). Hence, accounts of past and 
present episodes of scientific discovery, and the results of empirical psychological 
studies of human scientists, constitute the basic data of this domain. These data are 
considered as experimental tests results in terms of the framework. The account of 
the Galilean episode (Chapter 3) is a case in point. In the empirical studies scientific 
discovery domains have been simulated with varying degrees of realism (e.g. 
Wason's, 1960, '2 4 6' paradigm; Klahr & Dunbar's, 1988, computer controlled 
robot). These environments are experimental setups in the framework. They allow 
experimental tests to be carried out on the behaviour of scientists. The use of a 
computer simulated environments and specific pen-and-paper tasks are contrasting 
experimental paradigms (e.g. Reimann's, 1990, REFRACT program; cf. Qin & 
Simon's, 1990, equation finding task). There is communication between the 
experiments and theory; for example the findings of an empirical study may be used 
in the design of a computational model (e.g. Reimann, 1990, used his REFRACT 
findings to to build HDD) (see Table 9.1).
9.2.2 The Theoretical Component
In the theoretical component of his research on the motion of bodies, Galileo 
characterized the phenomena using hypotheses such as the Aristotelian effective 
weight laws and his own law of free fall. The models he inferred from these 
hypotheses applied to specific situations; for example the inclined plane. Both 
hypotheses and models were expressed as simple mathematical equations, so are 
examples of the state transformation conceptualization of theoretical knowledge. 
Galileo's predictions of motion down the inclined plane, generated by applying the 
model, are instances consisting of values for specified independent and dependent 
terms.
On the theoretical side of Cognitive Science, the abstract characterization of the
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behaviour of the human scientist takes several forms. The theses proposed by 
philosophers of science, and the theories of some cognitive psychologists, are 
hypotheses. The computational models built in AI often instantiate such hypotheses 
and are considered as models. The specification of AI programs in terms of sets of 
heuristics and processes constitute state transformation functions. The 
transformation function's input state is given by the domain and inputs to the 
program on a particular run. The function's output is the description of how the 
program performs. Running a discovery system on a given domain generates an 
instance (see Table 9.1).
9.2.3 Criteria For The Acceptability Of Theories
Galileo assessed the acceptability of the free fall hypothesis in terms of the 
number of experimental paradigms to which it could be successfully applied. In AI 
the assessment of computer programs is typically in terms of performance (e.g. 
Kibler & Langley, 1988). However, when modelling scientific discovery in 
Cognitive Science the assessment of computational models is often considered in 
terms of the generality of the programs - explanatory breadth. The acceptability of 
computational models is something we will consider in more detail below.
We have seen how research in Cognitive Science into scientific discovery maps 
onto the framework. This neatly groups the various computer programs and 
different types of studies into distinct classes. This classification in turn reveals 
several different issues concerning the nature of the research on scientific discovery. 
We will consider: (§9.3) the limitations of the empirical research that has so far been 
carried out and how it may progress in the future; (§9.4) how computational models 
have, or very often have not, modelled the various components of scientific 
discovery; (§9.5) criteria for assessing the acceptability of discovery systems, and 
how well existing systems fared; (§9.6) other issues, for example, how the 
completeness of computational models may lead to emergent abilities.
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9.3 THE EXPERIMENTAL COMPONENT OF THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
According to the framework analysis, the experimental component of research in 
the study of scientific discovery in Cognitive Science is constituted by the historical 
episodes of discovery and the empirical research on human scientists. Both are 
involved in the development and assessment of hypotheses and computational 
models. How adequate they are for this purpose is an important issue in this field.
9.3.1 Historical Accounts Of Discovery
In terms of the framework accounts of episodes of discovery are mere 
observations; there is no manipulative control over the parameters that affect the 
discoveries made. This reduces substantially the reliability of the accounts as a 
means to assess or develop computational models or higher level characterizations. 
Without manipulative control of the phenomena, it is impossible to determine with 
certainty what has caused a scientist to perform a particular action.
It seems that the best that we can hope to achieve with historical cases studies is a 
detailed chronology of the events in an episode. The ordering of events is useful 
because a discovery system that manages to reproduce the same sequence of events 
is more likely to possess the right heuristics. In this sense we should prefer 
KEKEDA (Kulkami & Simon, 1988) and STERN, over PI (Thagard, 1988), 
because they make discoveries in the same order as the episodes they model.
However, the approach is still susceptible to the vagaries of the historian's 
reconstruction of the course of events and even the model builder's interpretation of 
the published account. The empirical studies do not suffer from the same lack of 
manipulative control over the phenomena, but the are lacking in other ways.
9.3.2 Empirical Studies
Empirical research on scientific discovery has not had the same emphasis as the 
building of computational models. One explanation is that most investigators prefer 
not to get their hands "dirty" so have stuck to building computational models.
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Another more technical explanation is that devising suitable simulated scientific 
discovery environments is difficult to do.
Many researchers have studied particular discovery tasks, these include: (i) how 
numerical data is generalized into laws (e.g. Gerwin, 1974); (ii) the solution of 
physics problems (e.g. Larkin et.al., 1980); and (iii) the proposing of expressions 
to explain data (e.g. Wason, 1960). Although these studies have led to some 
interesting conclusions (such as the existence of confirmatory bias) it is by no 
means clear that the conclusions are applicable more generally beyond the narrow 
range of tasks considered.
One solution to such limitations is the construction of simulated scientific 
discovery environments (e.g. Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). The making of discoveries 
by subjects in these environments resembles the making of real discoveries more 
closely. To make a discovery the subjects have to carry out many different tasks, 
including the performing of experimental tests and the inference to and testing of 
laws. However, the simulated environments are not without their own limitations. 
The two following criticisms are partly related. First, the simulated environments 
over-constrain the behaviour of the subjects, distorting or preventing them from 
expressing the full range of processes they might normally display. Second, the 
environments only simulate one experimental setup. Thus the subjects can only 
make inference to models and not hypotheses. To be able to find general theories 
several experimental paradigms must be made available to the subject. Future work 
may address these deficiencies. The problem of the lack of experimental paradigms 
could be overcome in, for example, Klahr & Dunbar's (1988) computer controlled 
robot environment by giving the subject a number of mystery functions to 
characterize. The generalizing of all the descriptions of functions into a higher level 
characterizations would yield hypotheses.
The experimental component of scientific discovery research in Cognitive 
Science has been considered. We now more on to the theoretical component.
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9.4 THE THEORETICAL COMPONENT OF THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
The theoretical side of Cognitive Science research programmes on scientific 
discovery contains theoretical knowledge of several types. There are the theses of 
philosophers of science, some theories proposed by cognitive psychologists, and 
computational models in AI. Following the central theme of the thesis, our main 
concern will be with computational models of scientific discovery, with some 
attention to the conclusions drawn for empirical studies.
Amongst the computational modellers there have been some distinct biases. 
Many researchers have tended to be driven by specific AI techniques rather than 
being led by the episodes being modelled. The consequence of this is that important 
, aspects of discovery have been ignored. In terms of the framework, discovery 
systems have typically focused on the models and instances of the episodes they 
consider. We will see how STERN has managed to overcome this and other 
limitations.
9.4.1 Theoretical Knowledge
AI has provided researchers with a means to model theoretical knowledge that no 
longer relies on the systems of logic used by philosophy of science (and all that that 
entails). The quality of the new representations is an important issue for the 
computational modelling of scientific discovery.
Early systems, like the programs in the BACON school, used simple 
representations of theoretical knowledge. Slightly later systems combined 
qualitative and quantitative representations into single programs (e.g. IDS, 
Nordhausen & Langley, 1987). Other systems have employed numerous classes of 
value-attribute pairs (e.g. KEKEDA, Kulkami & Simon, 1988; HDD, Reimann, 
1990). However, these representations have typically been domain-specific. Some
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representations do not even consider the semantic contents of theories (e.g. 
Thagard, 1989a).
STERN is different. It makes a clear distinction between domain-specific and 
domain-independent knowledge. Domain-specific knowledge are formalisms such 
as the equations and qualforms used to model Galileo's knowledge. Domain- 
independent representations are the knowledge structures that instantiate the 
framework. Thus, in principle, it should only be necessary to change the domain- 
dependent formalisms (and rules) when modelling different domains (such as an 
episode from the history of chemistry).
To see whether this scheme in STERN works out in practice will require another 
domain to be modelled. There are many to choose from and herein lies another 
issue. The types of theoretical knowledge that have been modelled are ones that can 
be easily represented; such as arithmetic equations, chemical reactions, classes of 
objects and so forth. Non-trivial realistic representations of more complex, but also 
more interesting, types of theoretical knowledge have been avoided. A few 
examples are infinitesimal calculus, quantum mechanics, theories expressed 
propositionally (as in psychology), and even Galileo's geometric-pictorial 
representation. A full understanding of scientific discovery may not possible 
without the consideration of these more complex types of knowledge. For example, 
we may require specific processes to break up detailed hypotheses into manageable 
parts for testing.
9.4.2 Theoretical Inferences
A similar picture to that just considered with representations emerges with the 
modelling of theoretical inferences; this is not surprising as they are so closely 
related in discovery systems. Earlier systems tend to consider just one task (e.g. 
generalization from data to laws in the BACON school). Later programs combine 
quantitative and qualitative inference in particular tasks (e.g. ABACUS, 
Falkenhainer & Michalski, 1986). The most complete systems employ a number of
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different processes that deal with one hypothesis or model at a time (e.g. SDDS, 
Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; HDD; KEKEDA). The hypotheses may be tested against 
experimental test results and modified according to the outcome.
STERN makes significant advances on previous systems, using three strategies 
to make theoretical inferences. The confirmation strategy not only tests quantitative 
and qualitative hypotheses against experimental tests but can make inferences with 
groups of mutually exclusive hypotheses (Chapter 6). The generalization strategy 
allows STERN to fully characterize the domain in a qualitative fashion, in which all 
relevant and irrelevant terms are identified. It also finds tentative quantitative 
hypotheses from the data. The strategy for the generation of new hypotheses from 
old considers qualitative and quantitative hypotheses using old hypotheses from the 
whole spectrum of acceptability.
Furthermore, STERN subsumes existing systems. The BACON programs have 
the same task as just one of STERN classes of rules; this is the generalizing of 
instances into models. The various types of knowledge and processes of HDD, 
SDDS and KEKEDA can also be mapped onto the components and rules of 
STERN.
Many different types of scientific reasoning have been modelled by STERN and 
other systems. However, there is one obvious omission -  inferences using pictorial 
representations. Qin & Simon (1990) found that graphs are important in the 
generalization of data into laws, in particular to help identify the form of the 
function describing the data. Galileo used a geometric-pictorial method to generate 
models from hypotheses. Simon & Larkin (1987) have considered why graphical 
summaries of information are often so effective.
STERN roughly models some of these abilities. The function to assess predictive 
accuracy uses a least squares technique that is equivalent to the plotting of points 
and drawing a line though them (Chapter 5). STERN uses qualforms (i.e. 
regularities found in experimental data) to help choose the form of equations in the
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Strategy that generates new hypotheses from old. This is rather like the process of 
function spotting using diagrams that Qin & Simon observed. Clearly there is much 
interesting work yet to be done on this topic.
9.4.3 Acceptability Of Theories
How scientists ought to and how they actually assesses the acceptability of 
theories is something that philosophers have argued over long and hard. The 
builders of computational models have been more pragmatic and given their systems 
particular techniques to see if they are effective. The acceptability criterion typically 
considered by researchers are variations of explanatory breadth. STERN is not an 
exception in this respect and even ECHO (Thagard, 1989a) seems to boil down to it 
(see §2.4).
The various systems that assess the acceptability of theories have successfully 
modelled episodes of discovery using just the one criterion, but this is far form 
conclusive proof that it is a necessary and sufficient one. Intuitively, internal 
consistency and fruitfulness are two that seem to be relevant. Furthermore, 
McAllister (1989) contends that aesthetic criteria are important too. Watson (1968), 
one of the discoverer's of the structure of DNA, recollects that the beauty of the 
model substantially increased their belief in the double helix. Simplicity is one 
aesthetic criterion that has been considered at length by philosophers of science 
(e.g. Lakatos, 1971; Sober, 1975; McAllister, 1989) that has to some extent been 
taken on board in AI (e.g. Harman et.al, 1988; Thagard, 1988a).
9.4.4 Experimental Knowledge
We now turn to experimental matters. The work on the theoretical component of 
scientific discovery outweighs the experimental component substantially. This 
parallels the neglect of experiment in the philosophy of science, that has begun to be 
rectified by the new experimentalists (e.g. Hacking, 1983; Galison, 1986; 
Franklin; 1987). In AI, STERN attempts to fulfil the same role, as we will see.
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Almost without exception, the representation of experimental knowledge in 
discovery systems in absent. Typically the programs take interpreted, tme, noise- 
free data as input. In the exceptional cases only the experimental test level of the 
experimental component of the framework is considered (i.e. KEKEDA, HDD).
STERN on the other hand considers experimental paradigms, experimental 
setups and experimental tests. Many types of experimental paradigms and setups are 
given to STERN as inputs. STERN also considers new paradigms and setups by 
itself. AU three levels of experiments have associated information; such as pragmatic 
measures of their relative ease of manufacture and use. Different types of 
experiments are also acknowledged; normal experiments (e.g. pendulum paradigm) 
and combined experiments (e.g. inclined plane and projectile paradigm) used in 
one of two modes. Like terms in theory, the experimental components have 
parameters. Parameters are not simply variables with assigned values but include 
information on (i) the range over which its values may vary and (ii) how easy the 
parameters are to manipulate and observe. Furthermore, STERN distinguishes 
between experiments that it has only conceived and those that have been 
manufactured.
9.4.5 Experimental Processes
Since most previous systems do not represent experiments they do not instantiate 
any experimental processes. HDD represents experiments, but all its experimental 
tests are given as inputs. KEKEDA designs domain-specific experimental tests but 
only when there is some instance to be tested.
The experimental processes in STERN are extensive. Unlike KEKEDA, it can 
design experiments when there is no instance to be tested (and when there is). 
When there is no instance the wealth of experimental knowledge is used to generate 
all possible tests and the background knowledge is used to eUminate designs that are 
trivial. STERN uses various rules for the selection of experimental paradigms and 
setups. The selection depends on (i) the hypothesis (or model) being tested, if any.
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(ii) the number of setups possessed by the paradigm, and (iii) whether the 
hypothesis and paradigm have been considered together earlier. Furthermore, 
STERN limits the manufactured experimental paradigms to a manageable number. 
Typically previous systems do not distinguish between experimental tests and 
instances. STERN, however, can compare experimental tests and predictive 
instances, and is able to interpret tests into instances. The pinnacle of STERN’s 
experimental abilities is the construction of new experiments by combining known 
experimental paradigms. STERN does this when there are theories that are 
intractable from a wholly theoretical approach. This is a good example of the 
interaction between theory and experiment in STERN.
9.4.6 Reliability Of Experiments
The framework for scientific discovery acknowledges the importance of the 
assessment of the reliability of experimental knowledge. This is something that the 
new experimentalists in the philosophy of science have shown to be crucial in 
scientific discovery. One aspect of experimental reliability concerns the presence of 
noise in experimental data and how to deal with it.
BACON uses a simple mechanism to cope with noise, but it is rather crude (see 
§2.2.1.1). Other systems have assumed that experimental data is noise free.
STERN deals with noise in different ways depending on the strategy being 
followed. During the confirmation strategy STERN compares predictive instances 
with experimental results. The function that assesses predictive accuracy takes noise 
into account, the greater the noise the lower the degree of accuracy. In the strategy 
that generalizes experimental results into hypotheses noise is considered as 
instances that are generalized to form models. A model is only formed when a 
deviation test, that ranges over all the data, is satisfied.
The many other strategies discovered by the new experimentalists for dealing 
with experimental reliability have been analysed by Cheng (1988) using the black 
box conceptualization of experiments.
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9.4.7 Communication
Communication between the theoretical and experimental components of a 
research programme is essential to scientific discovery. The implicit view of most 
researchers is that the only type of communication is the feeding of experimental 
data into theoretical considerations. However, in research programmes there is 
information transfer between all the levels of the two main components for all sorts 
of different reasons. On a mundane level, to test a prediction an experimenter needs 
to know which parameters are relevant when designing and performing an 
experimental test. More interestingly, there must have been some subtle 
interchanges between theory and experiments for Galileo to know that invention of 
combined inclined plane and projectile paradigm would allow the, otherwise 
intractable, law of free fall to be tested.
In previous work experiments are almost completely ignored, so there has been 
little modelling of communication. However, KEKEDA and HDD are both able to 
compare predictions and experimental results.
Since the theory and experiment components are instantiated in STERN many 
types of communication occur between the levels of theory and experiment. The 
confirmation of a hypothesis requires continual exchange of information (Chapter 5) 
and the generalization strategy requires a moderate amount of communication 
(Chapter 6). The correspondence between theoretical terms and experimental 
parameters is assumed to be the most fundamental level of communication by the 
framework. STERN models this in its rich representation of experimental 
parameters and theoretical terms.
9.4.8 Background Knowledge
Background knowledge certainly has a role in scientific discovery - the scientific 
life of researchers is not isolated from the rest of their knowledge and experiences. 
Galileo is a good case in point; he used his knowledge of geometry in many
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different ways to make discoveries.
Sleeman et.al.'s (1989) architecture for theory driven discovery acknowledges 
the importance of background knowledge. However, the architecture does not spell 
out how such knowledge is to be distinguished from the other forms of knowledge 
considered (e.g. meta-knowledge), nor does it indicate in detail how the knowledge 
is used. Holland et.al.'s Induction framework states that background knowledge is 
important. However, the PI program instantiation of the Induction framework does 
not seem to use such knowledge (Thagard, 1988a). None of the previous systems 
actually employ background knowledge to make discoveries.
In STERN background knowledge can be defined as any knowledge that does 
not fall within the theoretical or experimental components. Such knowledge may 
still be scientific, in a general sense, but it will be background information as far as 
the delimited set phenomena of the domain is concerned. STERN possesses 
background knowledge of geometry and relations for spherical bodies. This 
knowledge is used in the generation of models to form hypotheses and in the design 
of experiments.
We have considered a long list of features that we would expect an acceptable 
model of scientific discovery to instantiate. The extent to which models cover these 
features is one way to assess the acceptability of the models. We will now consider 
this and other criteria for the assessment of computational models.
9.5 THE ACCEPTABILITY OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
We have considered the investigation of scientific discovery in Cognitive Science 
as a scientific pursuit in terms of the framework. One of the aspects of the 
theoretical component of the framework are criteria by which to assess the 
acceptability of theories. In this section we will consider three important criteria.
170-
Conclusions
9.5.1 Completeness
In the previous section we considered many different aspects of the framework 
that computational models of scientific discovery ought to consider if they are to 
successfully model all parts of complex episodes of discovery in detail. The degree 
to which a model does this can be considered as a measure of its completeness. 
This way of assessing the acceptability of discovery systems does not seem to have 
been considered before; perhaps because no one has produced a model as complete 
as STERN.
Completeness is an important property for a discovery system to possess. 
Without it, it is impossible for a system to model an episode of discovery in any 
detail. Furthermore, completeness allows the modeller to consider tasks and 
heuristics at a higher level than before - at the level of the main tasks and processes 
within the research programme being modelled. There are interesting types of 
behaviour to be studied at this level that are not manifested in less complete and 
hence less complex systems (see §9.6.1).
Along the completeness dimension of acceptability the previous discovery 
systems are clustered at the incomplete end. For example, programs in the BACON 
school only generalize instances into models. ECHO only assesses the acceptability 
of propositions in terms of data. Although KEKEDA has many classes of heuristics 
it does not consider hypotheses, experimental setups and paradigms. STERN, 
however, is fairly complete as it instantiates all the components of the framework, 
that is: the three levels of theory and experiments; theoretical inferences and 
experimental processes; criteria for the acceptability of theories and the reliability of 
experiment; and communication between theories and experiments.
9.5.2 Generality
Another important criterion is generality; that is the range of different domains to 
which a model can be validly applied - explanatory breadth. This is a criterion that 
has been acknowledge in this field and which some researchers have striven to
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achieve (e.g. Thagard, 1988). Like any theoretical knowledge, the more domains a 
computational model validly applies to the more likely it is to be a characterization 
that captures some underlying essence of scientific discovery phenomena.
BACON and ECHO are two systems that have generality, both have been 
applied successfully to many domains. However, this generality is at the expense of 
being very incomplete. Other programs have much less generality. For instance, 
GELL-MANN (Zytkow, 1987) only considers the inference to quark models from 
data, and KEKEDA only models the discovery of the urea cycle; although in 
KEKEDA’s favour it is moderately complete.
STERN has only modelled the Galilean domain so far, so it has not been shown 
to be general. However, various facts indicate that it has potential to satisfy this 
acceptability criterion. First, STERN is based heavily on the framework, that is in 
turn quite general. Second, STERN's knowledge structures and processes largely 
subsume HDD, SDDS and KEKEDA that each relate to quite different domains. 
Third, STERN's knowledge structures and classes of rules have been carefully 
separated into domain-specific and domain-independent groups. This allows the 
domain-independent rules to be tested using other domains just by swapping the 
domain-specific formalisms and rules (at least in principle). The real test of 
STERN's generality will be to try to model other episodes of discovery in the 
future.
9.5.3 Internal Coherence
Applying the framework in a reflexive fashion, to the Cognitive Science of 
scientific discovery, focuses our attention on the relation between the various 
theoretical elements. These elements are the computational models and any general 
hypotheses about scientific discovery. Three examples are: (i) the BACON school's 
cyclic general description of science and the programs in the school (Langley et.ah, 
1987); (ii) the Theory of Explanatory Coherence and ECHO (Thagard, 1989a); and
-172-
Conclusions
closer to home, (iii) the framework for scientific discovery and STERN.
In this respect, there is another important criterion for assessing the acceptability 
of computational systems. This time it is the internal relationship between the 
computational model and the hypothesis which is of interest, rather than external 
reference to discovery episodes. In a Cognitive Science research programme that 
includes a computational model, the internal coherence of the theoretical component 
(of the research programme) is to a large extent determined by the quality of the 
relationship between its hypothesis and its computational model. The computational 
model should follow fully and rationally from the hypothesis; in other words the 
relationship should: (i) not be arbitrary or involve ad hoc assumptions; and (ii) 
have all the essential features of the hypothesis instantiated in the model. If these 
conditions are not satisfied, then the acceptability of the model cannot be used to 
assess the generality of the hypothesis.
Let us compare the BACON school with the research in this thesis. They are 
areas of research with very different degrees of internal coherence.
The general cyclic description of the BACON school considers four phases 
including: (i) data gathering; (ii) finding parsimonious descriptions of the data; (iii) 
formulating explanatory theories; and (iv) testing these theories. Of the four phases 
outlined, only the second (formation of parsimonious descriptions of data) phase is 
actually modelled in the programs. Furthermore, separate programs are required to 
deal with different domains. The school is far from internally coherent.
The framework in this thesis has been implemented in STERN. Everything 
posited by the framework reappears in the program (See Chapters 1 & 4 and §9.4). 
This is not only in terms of knowledge structures but includes inference processes 
and acceptability and reliability criteria. The work here has internal coherence. 
Furthermore, this coherence is clearly demonstrated by the reflexive abilities of the 
framework - STERN is based on it within the present research programme and the 
research programme is itself characterized by the framework.
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This completes the consideration of issues arising out the analysis of Cognitive 
Science research on scientific discovery using the framework. We will now 
consider other issues, some of which relate indirectly to what we have just 
considered.
9.6 REMAINING ISSUES AND THOUGHTS
We have considered various issues to do with computational models and how 
successful they have been so far at modelling scientific discovery. Now we will 
consider some tentative conclusions drawn from the performance of STERN and 
the best of the previous systems.
9.6.1 Completeness Leads To Emergent & High Level Abilities
One of the criterion for the assessment of the acceptability of computational 
models considered above was completeness. Apart from the fact that it gives more 
exact representations of scientific research programmes, there are two other related 
reasons why completeness is important.
First, a complete model possesses many different processes that instantiate 
particular tasks that make up the overall ability of a system. Compared with less 
complete models that only model one task, the more complete system allows 
processes and heuristics amongst the tasks to be considered. These higher or 
research programme level procedures are particularly interesting. Included amongst 
them are approaches that scientists use to speed up their research. For example, 
scientists often prefer "dirty" but fast approaches as in Crick and Watson's 
discovery of the Double Helix structure of DNA. They used the quickest, if not the 
most reliable, methods because they were attempting to beat Pauling to a discovery 
worthy of a Nobel Prize. Platt (1964) has formalized some heuristics derived from 
this episode into a prescriptive method he calls "strong inference".
In the most complete discovery systems such research programme heuristics 
have begun to be studied. KEKEDA has measures of the amount of effort spent on
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certain tasks. They are used to help control the path of discovery by forcing the 
system to abandon propositions when there has been too much work for too little 
reward, even if there is insufficient evidence to show the proposition is really 
unacceptable. KEKEDA can also recognize surprising outcomes and places a task to 
study the surprising effect at the top of its agenda; thus abandoning what it was 
previous investigating. STERN possess two heuristics at the level of the research 
programme to cut down the amount of search. First, the program groups together 
mutually exclusive hypotheses that were generated by a single process. Later, when 
one hypothesis is confirmed, STERN knows that the rest can simply be ignored. 
Second, the mechanism to control the availability of the experiments eliminates 
much wasted effort during the confirmation and the generalization strategies.
The second reason why completeness in a computational model is desirable is 
related to the first. Completeness allows the programmer to build in high level 
procedures, but it also means that discovery systems will start to exhibit behaviour 
that is emergent as they become more and more complex. By emergent behaviour 
we mean that the performance of the systems is no longer simple to predict from its 
structure and inputs. For example, STERN found the law governing the period of 
swing of a pendulum, even though there had been no intention on the part of 
STERN's designer that it would find this true law. Another, perhaps more 
significant, behaviour that is exhibited in STERN is chronological dependency.
STERN has four main strategies that use many processes to perform many 
different tasks to gradually increase and modify the knowledge about the 
phenomena. These processes are dependent on what previous processes have done. 
When a process modifies the knowledge in the system this indirectly affects later 
processes that use the knowledge. For example, in STERN the initial acceptability 
of the Aristotelian instantaneous acceleration law permitted the term for speed to be 
eliminated from equations using the term's definition. A bit later the instant
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acceleration law was disconfîrmed. Thus, when STERN came to consider the free 
fall equation it found it could not replace the speed term. Finally, to overcome the 
intractability of the theoretical inferences STERN considered the combined inclined 
plane and projectile experiment. It would have been difficult to predict that this long 
line of many different processes would have occurred just given the specification of 
STERN's four main strategies and the Aristotelian laws as input. This clearly 
shows how interesting behaviour over time emerges from complex and complete 
systems.
The completeness of models is clearly an important aspect to be pursued in the 
modelling of discovery. But there are also many other aspects of scientific 
discovery that are interesting to study.
9.6.2 Beyond The Single Scientist And Research Program m e
The framework for scientific discovery has been at the heart of this thesis. So far 
we have considered the framework as applied to a single scientist working more or 
less in isolation with the theoretical and experimental components fixed in several 
ways. A great deal has already been achieved using the framework in this manner, 
but loosening up some of the present constraints will allow the framework's 
potential to be explored even more fully.
The framework may be applied to research programmes that involve cooperating 
or competing scientists investigating a common class of phenomena. Such domains 
could be modelled by giving STERN one complete scientific knowledge hierarchy 
to represent the knowledge possessed by each scientist (see Figure 1.2). 
Interactions between the two would then be modelled using heuristics like those 
found by Frankel (1987) in his analysis of the continental drift debate. Frankel's 
heuristics consider how to challenge the work of opponents whilst improving one's 
own position.
The framework may also be used to model the reasons scientists have for 
working in a particular domain and why they choose to abandon or switch to
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another domains. For example, Crick (1988) decided to work in molecular biology 
by applying his "gossip test". This test was based on which fields of research were 
being talked about the most by scientists in general. Galileo switched research 
programmes when he learnt of the invention of the telescope. Perhaps astronomy 
fascinated him more, but it is also reasonable to consider whether discoveries in the 
natural motion domain were drying up. STERN might use some mechanism to 
measure the rate at which hypotheses and models were being generated to assess the 
fruitfulness of a domain.
These are just two examples of how the framework may be applied more 
generally than has so far been considered in this thesis.
9.7 CONCLUSION
A great deal has been achieved in this thesis. A framework for characterizing 
scientific discovery has been introduced. It has been used to organize a review of 
previous work in this area of Cognitive Science, and to some extent assess the 
acceptability of existing computational models. The STERN discovery system was 
based on the framework and has successfully modelled in detail the discoveries of 
an important historical episode of science. STERN overcomes the limitations of 
existing discovery systems, particularly with respect to the criteria of completeness 
and internal coherence.
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Appendix I
s t e r n 's Discovery Trace
The output trace produced by STERN when modelling the Galilean episode is 
presented below in a condensed form.
The cycles of the Production System (PS) begin on the numbered lines. The first 
figure is the cycle number and the second in square brackets is the depth PS 
nesting. On each cycle the matched rules are named in the parentheses and one 
chosen by conflict resolution is shown after the arrow (=>). The statements 
following the numbered lines give a brief description of the actions performed; the 
amount of indentation of these lines provides an additional indication the level of PS 
nesting.
The inputs to STERN are briefly discussed in §4.2.1.
I .l  Disconfirming The Aristotelian Laws
STERN is run by an initial call to the PS with RULES_0. In the first cycle the 
RO_START_CONFIRM rule is chosen from amongst the alternatives that have 
successfully matched. The action of this rule sends STERN down the route of 
hypothesis testing through the generation of models by a recursive call to the PS 
with RULES 1.
+++ P.s. called with RULES_0 +++
l-[0] (RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS RO_START_CONFIRM) => RO_START_CONFIRM 
Calling production system with rules_l 
+++ P.S. called with RULES 1 +++
One of the three Aristotelian hypotheses is chosen in cycle 2. The pendulum 
experimental paradigm is selected on cycle 3. A recursive call to the PS with 
RULES_5, cycle 4, permits the generation of models, in cycle 5. The model is 
inferred by substituting the definition of speed for the velocity term and the quotient 
of weight and volume for the density term. No further rules match at in the present 
PS level, [2], so control is returned to the PS with RULES_1 on level [1], in cycle
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6. The final action of the rule begun on cycle 4 is to store the new model.
2-[l] (R1_CHCX)SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CH00SE_HYP0) =>
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
hypo with (= T_V T_DEN) made current
3-[l] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0
PENDULUM m a d e  c u r r e n t
4-[l] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_HYP0->M0DELS) => R1_HYP0->M0DELS 
Calling production system with RULES_5 to generate models
+++ P. S. called with RULES 5 +++
5-[ 2] (R5_MAIN_W0RKER) => R5_MAIN_W0RKER
model with equation (= (/ T_D T_TIME) (/ T_W T_VOL) ) 
added to hypo's list and tractability now 
#S(MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 1)
6-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_5 to fire --
1 model(s) generated and stored
STERN now makes the model active, cycle 7, and proceeds to investigate it by 
calling RULES_2, cycle 8. The first action at the new level is the choice of an 
experimental setup from amongst those stored in the current experimental paradigm, 
cycle 9. Instances are then generated by RULES_8 in a further recursive call to the 
PS. Six instances are found, cycle 11, and control is popped back up a level. The 
instances are stored and the measure of tractability of the model is incremented, 
cycle 12.
7-[l] (R1_HYP0->M0DELS R1_CH00SE_M0DEL) => R1_CH00SE_M0DEL 
model with equation (= (/ T_D T_TIME) (/ T_W T_VOL) ) made 
current
8-[l] (R1_TEST_M0DEL) => R1_TEST_M0DEL 
call production system with RULES_2
+++ P.S. called with RULES_2 +++
9-[2] (R2_CH00SE_SETUP) => R2_CH00SE_SETUP 
DOWN_PENDULUM made current
10-[2] (R2_0BTAIN_INSTANCES) => R2_0BTAIN_INSTANCES 
Calling production system with RULES_8 to generate 
instances
+++ P.S. called with RULES_8 +++
11-[3] (R8_GEN_QUANT_INSTANCES) => R8_GEN_QUANT_INSTANCES
6 instance(s) and stored in current instance
12-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_8 to fire --
model tractability now #S (MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 1)
6 instance(s) made and stored in model, current instance 
cleared
Each instances is chosen in turn for comparison with an experimental test in cycles
13-20, 21-28, 29-36, 37-47, 48-58, and 56-66. The first and fourth sets of cycles 
will be considered as they are examples of the two patterns of instance testing. First 
cycles 13-20, that shows the failure to test an instance. At cycle 13, distance and
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time are chosen as independent and dependent terms, and the PS is called with 
RULES_9 to consider instances and experimental tests, cycle 14. Yet another 
recursive call is made to invoke the experimental performance rule, cycles 15 and 
16. However, no experiment is performed, cycle 17, because it is difficult to 
measure distances for swinging pendulums. So the adequacy of the instance is set 
to -1 to indicate the fact that no experimental results were available, cycle 18. No 
further experimental performance rules can fire, cycle 19, so the instance is simply 
made inactive and model adequacy is not incremented, cycle 20.
13-[2] (R2_CHCX)SE_INSTANCE) => R2_CHCX)SE_INSTANCE 
An instance with these variables made current 
independent = T_D and dependent = T_TIME 
their values are respectively -
( 0.000 0.337 0.673 1.010 1.346 1.683 2.020 2 . 3 5 6  )
( 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 )
14-[2] (R2_TEST_INSTANCE) => R2_TEST_INSTANCE
call production system with rules_9 to test the instance 
+++ P.S. called with RULES_9 +++
15-[3] (R9_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST) => R9_PERF0RM__EXPT_TEST
Calling production system to perform experiment 
++ +  P .S. called with EXPT_RULES; +++
16-[4] (E_PREPARE_WITH_INSTANCE) => E_PREPARE_WITH_INSTANCE
Test prepared
17-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in EXPT_RULES to fire --
Test Performed
18-[3] (R9_N0_TEST_PERF0RMED) => R9_N0_TEST_PERF0RMED
Instance degree set to -1 and current expt test cleared
19-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_9 to fire --
degree of match of instance and expt. test -1
20-[2] (R2_ASSESS_M0DEL) => R2_ASSESS_M0DEL
Model tractable but current instance not testable.
Current instance cleared.
The second set of cycles, 37-47, is the first to successfully compare an instance 
with experimental test results. The instance with time and weight terms is chosen, 
cycle 37, and the PS is called twice in succession, cycles 38 and 39, to test the 
instance that in turn requires the performance of an experiment. The 
down_pendulum experiment is performed and produces a list of experimental 
weight and time parameter values, cycles 40 to 42. The comparison of the two pairs 
of. values is the task of RULES_12, cycles 43 to 45, which finds there is no 
correlation (weight and time being independent). Cycle 46 ends the instance testing, 
and the adequacy of the model is calculated, cycle 47.
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37-[2] (R2_CH00SE_INSTANCE) => R2_CHCX)SE_INSTANCE 
An instance with these variables made current 
independent = T_W and dependent = T_TIME 
their values are respectively -
(0.000 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.000) 
(58904862254808624.000 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.001 )
38-[2] (R2_TEST_INSTANCE) => R2_TEST_INSTANCE
call production system with rules_9 to test the instance 
+++ P. S. called with RULES 9 +++
39-[3] (R9_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST) => R9_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST
Calling production system to perform experiment 
+ + +  P .S. called with EXPT_RULES +++
40-[4] (E_PREPARE_W ITH_INSTANCE) => E _PR EPA R E_W ITH _IN STANCE
Test prepared
41-[4] (E_DOWN_PENDULUM) => E_DOWN_PENDULUM
TIM E v a l u e s  f o u n d  f o r  o / p  v a l u e s  o f  c u r r e n t  e x p t t e s t
42-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in EXPT_RULES to fire --
Test Performed
i/p* and o/p vais are -
( 0.000 0.143 0.286 0.429 0.571 0.714 0.857 1.000)
( 0.710 0.687 0.696 0.707 0.687 0.697 0.690 0.693)
43-[3] (R9_TEST_INSTANCE) => R9_TEST_INSTANCE
Calling production system with RULES_12 
to compared instance and expttest
+++ P.S. called with RULES_12 +++
4 4- [ 4 ] (R12_TEST_QUANT_INSTANCE ) => R12_TEST_QUANT_INSTANCE
degree of match = 0.000
45-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_12 to fire --
Degree of agreement between instance and expttest 
=  0 . 0 0 0
Current expt test cleared
46-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_9 to fire --
degree of match of instance and expt. test 0
47-[2] (R2_ASSESS_M0DEL) => R2_ASSESS_M0DEL
Model adequacy now #3 (MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 0)
& current instance cleared.
Once RULES_2 has cycled through all the instances, the active experimental setup 
is dropped, cycle 67. Beginning with the selection of the s w i n g _ p e n d u l u m  setup, 
cycles 68 to 126, the whole process of testing a model against an experimental setup 
is repeated (as in cycles 9 to 67). Control is passed back up to RULES_1 in cycle 
127, and the adequacy of the model is given; four instances have been tested but 
none compared well with experimental results. No.more suitable setups exist under 
the active paradigm so the adequacy of the hypothesis is incremented, cycle 128.
67-[2] (R2_N0_M0RE_INSTANCES) => R2_N0_M0RE_INSTANCES 
current setup cleared
68-[2] (R2_CH00SE_SETUP) => R2_CH00SE_SETUP 
SWING PENDULUM made current
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126-[2] (R2_N0_M0RE_INSTANCES) => R2_N0_M0RE_INSTANCES 
current setup cleared
127-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_2 to fire --
model adequacy now #S (MEASURE NUMBER 4 DEGREE 0)
128-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS 
hypo adequacy — #S (MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 0) and current 
model cleared.
All models tested, exptparadigm cleared
The whole hypothesis testing process is repeated with the i n c p l a n e  experimental 
paradigm (as per cycles 3 to 128) in cycles 129 to 197. The new model has the 
same form of equation as that in cycle 7. The comparison of the instance, with 
distance and time as independent and dependent terms, with its experimental test 
was good. The degree slot of the adequacy measure of the model is significantly 
above zero.
129-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0
INCPLANE made current
130-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_HYP0->M0DELS) => R1_HYP0->M0DELS 
Calling production system with RULES_5 to generate models
m o d e l  a d e q u a c y  now
#S(M EASURE NUMBER 3 DEGREE 0.96635554951792)
The hypothesis has thus been tested against two experimental paradigms and their 
various setups. The adequacy of the hypothesis is finally calculated in cycle 198. 
This is below the adequacy limit, so it is abandoned. The next Aristotelian 
hypothesis is chosen, cycle 200, and it is tested in a similar manner (a repeat of 
cycles 2 to 199) using the same two experimental paradigms to generate models, 
cycles 200 to 386.
198-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS 
h y p o  a d e q u a c y  =
#S(M EASURE NUMBER 2 DEGREE 0.3221185165059733)
a n d  c u r r e n t  m o d e l  c l e a r e d
A l l  m o d e l s  t e s t e d ,  e x p t p a r a d i g m  c l e a r e d
199-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS 
c u r r e n t  h y p o  c l e a r e d
200-[1] (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CH00SE_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
h y p o  w i t h  (= T V T W*) m a d e  c u r r e n t
385-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESSJWRT_M0DELS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS 
hypo adequacy = #S (MEASURE NUMBER 2 DEGREE 0) and current 
model cleared
All models tested, exptparadigm cleared
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386-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS 
current hypo cleared
The third Aristotelian law is the qualitative instantaneous acceleration hypothesis. 
The procedure has a similar structure to the two previous quantitative hypotheses 
except that qualitative heuristics for the domain specific generative processes are 
employed. The testing of the hypothesis with the first experimental setup of the first 
paradigm is shown below, cycles 387 to 409. The cycles 410 to 425 cover the 
second experimental setup and cycles 428 to 450 cover the inclined plane 
experimental paradigm.
387-[1] (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CH00SE_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
hypo with (INSTANTANEOUS T_V T_D) made current
388-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0
PENDULUM m a d e  c u r r e n t
389-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_HYP0->M0DELS ) => Rl_HYPQ->MODELS 
Calling production system with RULES_5 to generate models
+++ P.S. called with RULES_5 +++
390-[2] (R5_C0MPLEX_QUALF0RM) => R5_C0MPLEX_QUALF0RM 
model made with (INSTANTANEOUS T_V T_D) as qualform
391-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_5 to fire --
1 model(s) generated and stored
392-[1] (R1_HYP0->M0DELS R1_CH00SE_M0DEL) => R1_CH00SE_M0DEL 
model with qualform (INSTANTANEOUS T_V T_D) made current
393-[1] (R1_TEST_M0DEL) => R1_TEST_M0DEL 
call production system with RULES_2
+++ P.S. called with RULES_2 +++
394-[2] (R2_CH00SE_SETUP) =>'r2_CH00SE_SETUP 
DOWN_PENDULUM made current
395-[2] (R2_0BTAIN_INSTANCES) => R2_0BTAIN_INSTANGES 
Calling production system with RULES_8 to generate 
instances
+++ p.S. called with RULES_8 +++
396-[3] (R8_GEN_QUAL_INSTANCES) => R8_GEN_QUAL_INSTANCES
1 qualitative instance made and stored in current 
instance as a list
397-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_8 to fire --
model tractability now #S(MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 1)
1 instance(s) made and stored in model, current instance 
cleared
398-[2] (R2_CH00SE_INSTANCE) => R2_CH00SE_INSTANCE 
An instance with these variables made current 
independent = T_D and dependent = T_V
399-[2] (R2_TEST_INSTANCE) => R2_TEST_INSTANCE
call production system with rules_9 to test the instance 
+++ p.S. called with RULES_9 +++
400-[3] (R9_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST) => R9_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST 
Calling production system to perform experiment
+++ P.S. called with EXPTJRULES +++
401-[4] (E PREPARE WITH INSTANCE) => E PREPARE WITH INSTANCE
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Test prepared 
4 02- [ 4 ] (E_DOWN_PENDULUM) => E_DOWN_PENDULUM
SPEED values found for o/p values of current expttest
403-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in EXPT_RULES to fire --
Test Performed
404-[3] (R9_TEST_INSTANCE) => R9_TEST_INSTANCE
Calling production system with RULES_12 
to compared instance and expttest
+++ p.S. called with RULES 12 +++
405-[4] (R12_TEST_QUAL_INSTANCE) => R12_TEST_QUAL_INSTANCE
Qualform not matched
406-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_12 to fire --
Degree of agreement between instance and expttest 
=  0 . 0 0 0
Current expt test cleared
407-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_9 to fire --
degree of match of instance and expt. test 0
408-[2] (R2_ASSESS_M0DEL) => R2_ASSESS_M0DEL
Model adequacy now #S (MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 0)
& current instance cleared.
409-[2] (R2_N0_M0RE_INSTANCES) => R2_N0_M0RE_INSTANCES 
current setup cleared
model adequacy now #S (MEASURE NUMBER 2 DEGREE 0)
427-[1 ] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS 
hypo adequacy = #S (MEASURE NUMBER 2 DEGREE 1) and current 
model c le a r e d
A ll  m odels t e s t e d ,  exptparadigm c lea red
The final adequacy of the qualitative Aristotelian hypothesis is calculated at cycle 
451.
451-[1 ] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS 
hypo adequacy = #S (MEASURE NUMBER 3 DEGREE 1) and current  
model c le a r e d .
A ll  m odels t e s t e d ,  exptparadigm c le a r e d
The whole discomfirmation procedure is finished by cycle 452. AU the Aristotelian 
hypotheses have been experimentally tested and found to be unacceptable. So the 
RULES_1 has nothing else to do but return control to RULES_0, which now 
decides to foUow the generalization strategy.
4 52-[1 ] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS 
cu rrent hypo c lea red
4 53-[1 ] (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0) => R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 
PENDULUM paradigm made current
4 54 -[1 ] NIL => no r u le  to  f i r e
  No r u le s  in  RULES_1 to  f i r e  -----
F in ish ed  t e s t in g  e x i s t in g  hypos
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1.2 Generalizing Experiments Into Hypotheses
When generalizing experimental findings into hypotheses it is necessary to first 
obtain models and instances. To begin an experimental paradigm is chosen, cycle 
456, and the PS is called with RULES_7 in order to obtain models, cycle 457. 
RULES_7 prepares an model frame, with unfilled slots, and selects the 
DOWN_PENDULUM experimental setup is chosen, cycle 458. Experimental tests are 
prepared for all the possible permutations of experimental parameters, cycle 459, 
and then whittled down to a set of reasonable combinations, cycle 460.
455-[0] (RO_NEW_HYPOS RO_START_INDUCE) => RO_START_INDUCE 
current paradigm cleared
Calling production system with RULES_3 
+++ P.S. called with RULES_3 +++
456-[1] (R3_CH00SE_PARADIGM) => R3_CH00SE_PARADIGM 
New current hypo made
Selected paradigm PENDULUM
457-[1] (R3_GET_M0DELS) => R3_GET_M0DELS
Calling production system with rules_7 to get models 
+++ P.S. called with RULES_7 +++
458-[2] (R7_CH00SE_SETUP) => R7_CH00SE_SETUP 
A current model made
expt. setup DOWN_PENDULUM chosen
459-[2] (R7_0BTAIN_EXPTTESTS) => R7_0BTAIN_EXPTTESTS 
27 expt. tests made
460-[2] (R7_EXPTTEST_PREFERENCES) => R7_EXPTTEST_PREFERENCES 
15 expt. tests stored in setup and current expt test 
cleared
The performance and analysis of the fifteen different experimental setups falls into 
two patterns, as exemplified by the two sets of cycles, 461 to 465, and 466 to 476. 
In the first set no suitable experimental tests are performed. The test is chosen, cycle 
461, and the PS is called with RULES_11 to handle instances, cycle 462. This in 
turn calls the PS is with the experimental rules, but no test can be performed, cycle 
463 and 464, so control is return to RULES_7.
461-[2] (R7_CH00SE_EXPTTEST) => R7_CH00SE_EXPTTEST
Expt test with i/p* as DISTANCE and o/p as TIME removed 
from expt setup and made current
462-[2] (R7_MAKE_INSTANCES) => R7_MAKE_INSTANCES
Calling production system with rules_ll to make instance(s) 
+++ P.S. called with RULES_11 +++
463-[3] (R11_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST) => R11_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST
Calling production system to perform experiment 
+++ p.s. called with EXPT_RULES +++
464-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
 No rules in EXPT_RULES to fire--
current expttest cleared
465-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_11 to fire --
0 instance(s) made and made current.
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Current ex p t. t e s t  c lea red .
In the second pattern of cycles, STERN successfully performs an experimental test 
and interprets the results to obtain instances which are stored. The experimental test 
has height and time as input and output parameters, respectively, cycle 466. Again
the PS is called successively with RULES_7 and EXPT_RULES to obtain
instances and experimental tests, cycles 467 and 468. The appropriate experimental 
test is performed, cycles 469 and 470. RULES_6 is invoked to to interpreted the 
test results into instances, cycles 471 to 473. The new instances are stored, cycles 
475-6.
466-[2] (R7_CH00SE_EXPTTEST) => R7_CH00SE_EXPTTEST
Expt test with i/p* as HEIGHT and o/p as TIME removed from
expt setup and made current
467-[2] (R7_MAKE_INSTANCES) => R7_MAKE_INSTANGES
Calling production system with rules_ll to make instance(s) 
+++ p.S. called with RULES_11 +++
468-[3] (R11_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST) => R11_PERF0RM_EXPT_TEST
Calling production system to perform experiment 
++ +  P .S. called with EXPT_RULES +++
469-[4] (E_DOWN_PENDULUM) => E_DOWN_PENDULUM
TIME values found for o/p values of current expttest
470-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
-—  No rules in EXPT_RULES to fire ---
i/p* and o/p vais are -
( 0.000 0.179 0.357 0.536 0.714 0.893 1.071 1.250)
{ 0.000 0.234 0.334 0.404 0.493 0.562 0.654 0.758)
471-[3] (R11_INTERP_T0_INST) => R11_INTERP_T0_INST
Calling production system with RULES_6 
to expttest and make instance(s)
+++ P .S. called with RULES_6 +++
472-[4] (R6_FIND_QUALF0RMS) => R6_FIND_QUALF0RMS
Instance with qualform (INCREASE T_TIME T_H) 
made and appended to current instance 
Instance with qualform (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_H) 
made and appended to current instance
473-[4] (R6_SIMPLE_TRANSFER) => R6_SIMPLE_TRANSFER
Instance made with values copied from expt test and 
appended to current instance.
Current expt test cleared.
474-[4] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_6 to fire --
3 instance(s) made
475-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
— —  No rules in RULES_11 to fire--
3 instance(s) made and made current.
Current expt. test cleared.
476-[2] (R7_CH00SE_EXPTTEST R7_ST0RE_INSTANCES) => 
R7_ST0RE_INSTANCES
3 instance(s) now stored in current model 
current instance cleared
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The rest of the experimental tests are examined one of the two ways considered. 
Twenty two instances are found. The whole processes, from cycle 458 to 599, is 
then repeated with the next experimental setup of the current paradigm, starting at 
cycle 600 and ending at 742.
600-[2] (R7_GENERALISE_INSTANCES R7_CH00SE_SETUP) => 
R7_CH00SE_SETUP
ex p t. setu p  SWING_PENDULUM chosen
601-[2] (R7_GENERALISE_INSTANCES R7_0BTAIN_EXPTTESTS) => 
R7_0BTAIN_EXPTTESTS
27 expt. tests made
602-[2] (R7_GENERALISE_INSTANCES R7_EXPTTEST_PREFERENCES) => 
R7_EXPTTEST_PREFERENCES
15 expt. tests stored in setup and current 
expt test cleared
51 instance(s) now stored in current model 
current instance cleared 
742-[2] (R7_GENERALISE_INSTANCES) => R7_GENERALISE_INSTANCES 
Calling production system with RULES_4 to generalise 
instances
STERN now calls the PS with RULES_4 to generalise the 51 instances. Thirty 
three models are found, 32 with qualforms and 1 with an equation, cycles 743 to 
747. The models are stored, cycle 748. The quantitative model is in fact the correct 
law describing the relation between the length of a pendulum and its period of 
swing.
+++ P.s. called with RULES_4 +++
7 4 3- [ 3 ] (R4_PREPARE ) => R4_PREPARE
51 instance(s) moved from model and made current.
Current model instances cleared.
744-[3] (R4_M0DEL_EQNS R4_M0DEL_QUAL) => R4_M0DEL_QUAL
Instances with qualforms removed from current 
instance and generalised to models with qualforms 
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_0) (REPEAT+ T_V T_0) (REPEAT+ T_V T_S) 
(REPEAT+ T_V T_VOL) (STEADY T_V T_VOL) (REPEAT- T_V T_W) 
(STEADY T_V T_W) (FROM_ZERO T_V T_L) (REPEAT+ T_V T_L) 
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_H) (REPEAT+ T_V T_H)
(FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_0) (REPEAT+ T_TIME T_0)
(REPEAT+ T_TIME T_S) (REPEAT- T_TIME T_VOL)
(STEADY T_TIME T_VOL) (REPEAT+ T_TIME T_W)
(STEADY T_TIME T_W) (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_L)
(REPEAT+ T_TIME T_L) (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_H)
(REPEAT+ T_TIME T_H) (INCREASE T_V T_0)
(INCREASE T_V T_S) (REPEAT- T_V T_VOL) (INCREASE T_V T_W) 
(INCREASE T_V T_L) (INCREASE T_V T_H)
(INCREASE T_TIME T_0) (INCREASE T_TIME T_S)
(INCREASE T_TIME T_L) (INCREASE T_TIME T_H)
745-[3] (R4_M0DEL_EQNS) => R4_M0DEL_EQNS
1 model (s) made with equations (= T_S (* T_TIME T_TIME) ) 
Current instance cleared
746-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
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  No rules in RULES_4 to fire --
33 model(s) made and current expt paradigm cleared
747-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_7 to fire --
33 model(s) made
748-[1] (R3_ST0RE_M0DELS) => R3_ST0RE_M0DELS 
Models store in current hypo and current model 
and expt paradigm cleared
The inclined plane experimental paradigm is now chosen and the whole 
generalization processes to obtain models is repeated (as in cycles 456 to 748). 
Beginning at cycle 749, producing and storing 18 qualitative model and 3 
quantitative models, by cycle 878.
874-[3] (R4_M0DEL_EQNS R4_M0DEL_QUAL) => R4_M0DEL_QUAL
Instances with qualforms removed from current 
instance and generalised to models with qualforms 
(STEADY T_V T_VOL) (INCREASE T_V T_VOL) (STEADY T_V T_W) 
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_L) (INCREASE T_V T_L)
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_H) (INCREASE T_V T_H)
(FROM_ZERO T_V T_D) (INCREASE T_V T_D)
(STEADY T_TIME T_VOL) (STEADY T_TIME T_W) :
(INCREASE T_TIME T_W) (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_L)
(INCREASE T_TIME T_L) (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_H)
(INCREASE T_TIME T_H) (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_D)
(INCREASE T_TIME T_D)
875-[3] (R4_M0DEL_EQNS) => R4_M0DEL_EQNS
3 model (s) made with equations
(= T_D (* T_TIME T_TIME) ) (= T_H (* T_TIME T_TIME) )
(= T_L (* T_TIME T_TIME) )
Current instance cleared
876-[3] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_4 to fire --
21 model(s) made and current expt paradigm cleared
The models just stored and the ones obtained for the pendulum experimental 
paradigm are now generalised into hypotheses, cycles 879 to 884, using 
RTJLES_10; 12 qualitative and 4 quantitative ones are made.
879-[1] (R3_GENERALISE_M0DELS) => R3_GENERALISE_M0DELS
Calling production system with RULES_10 to generalise models 
+++ P.S. called with RULES_10 +++
880-[2] (R10_PREPARE) => R10_PREPARE
54 model(s) copied from hypo and made current.
Current hypo models cleared.
881-[2] (R10_HYPO_EQNS R10_HYPO_QUALS) => R10_HYPO_QUALS 
Models with qualforms removed from current model and 
generalised to hypos with qualforms
(INCREASE T_TIME T_H) (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_H)
(INCREASE T_TIME T_L) (FROM_ZERO T_TIME T_L)
(STEADY T_TIME TJW) (STEADY T_TIME T_VOL)
(INCREASE T V T H) (FROM ZERO T V T H) (INCREASE T V T L)
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(FROM_ZERO T_V T_L) (STEADY T_V T_W) (STEADY T_V T_VOL)
882-[2] (R10_HYPO_EQNS) => R10_HYPO_EQNS 
4 hypo(s) made with equations
(= T_S (* T_TIME T_TIME)) (= TJD (* T_TIME T_TIME) )
. (= T_H (* T_TIME T_TIME) ) (= T_L (* T_TIME T_TIME) )
Current model cleared
883-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_10 to fire --
16 hypo(s) made. Current hypo and exptparadigm cleared
884-[1] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_3 to fire --
Finished trying generalise new hypos strategy 
16 hypo(s) made and stored. Current hypo cleared
These hypotheses are adequate, because they have been successfully inferred from 
experimental results. They are also now candidates for the confirmation generative 
strategy, as considered in §1.1 above. However, only the quantitative hypotheses 
were not generalised from both manufacture experimental paradigms, so only they 
are tested. In cycles 885 to 890 STERN attempts to test the first new quantitative 
hypothesis against the inclined plane experiment. However, it fails to generate a 
model because the size term (t _ s  ) has no equivalent experimental parameter.
885-[0] (RO_NEW_HYPOS RO_START_CONFIRM) => RO_START_CONFIRM 
C a llin g  production  system  w ith  r u le s _ l
+++ P.S. called with RULES_1 +++
886-[1] (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CH00SE_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
hypo with (= T_S (* T_TIME T_TIME) ) made current
887-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0
INCPLANE made current
888-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS Rl_HYPO->MODELS) => Rl_HYPO->MODELS 
Calling production system with RULES_5 to generate models
+++ P.S. called with RULES_5 +++
889-[2] (R5_MAIN_W0RKER) => R5_MAIN_W0RKER
no model equation made, tractability now 
#S(MEASURE NUMBER 2 DEGREE 1) 
and current hypo cleared
890-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_5 to fire --
current paradigm cleared
The other three quantitative hypotheses are tested in turn in cycles 885-890, 891- 
926, and 927-999. Fewer instances and experimental tests are need because there a 
many fewer terms in the equations of the hypotheses. When finished there are no 
more hypotheses that need testing so control is passed back up to the top most level, 
cycle 1(X)0.
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1000-[1 ] NIL => no ru le  to  f i r e
  No r u le s  in  RULES_1 to  f i r e  -----
F in ish ed  t e s t in g  e x is t in g  hypos
1.3 N ew  H ypotheses From  Old
Both the generative and the generalization strategies have run their course with all 
the stored hypotheses and experimental paradigms, so STERN attempts to infer 
new hypotheses from the existing ones by invoking RULES_14, cycle 1001. 
Fourteen quantitative hypotheses are made, cycle 1002. Control is returned to 
RULES_0, cycles 1003.
1 0 01 -[0 ] (RO_NEW_HYPOS) => RO_NEW_HYPOS 
C a llin g  production  system  w ith  RULES_14 
t o  make new hypos form e x is t in g  ones
+++ P.S .  c a l le d  w ith  RULES_14 +++
1002-[1 ] (R14_QUAL_T0_EQNS) => R14_QUAL_T0_EQNS 
14 hypo(s) made and s to red , w ith  equations
(= T_V (EXPT T_H 1 /2 ) )  (= T_V (EXPT T_H 1 /3 ) )
(= T_V (EXPT T_H 2)) (= T_V (EXPT T_H 2 /3 ) )
(= T_V (EXPT T_H 3)) (= T_V (EXPT T_H 3 /2 ) )  (= T_V T_H)
(= T_V (EXPT T_L 1 /2 ) )  (= T_V (EXPT T_L 1 /3 ) )
(= T_V (EXPT T_L 2)) (= T_V (EXPT T_L 2 /3 ) )
(= T_V (EXPT T_L 3)) (= T_V (EXPT T_L 3 /2 ) )  (= T_V T_L)
1003- [1]  NIL => no ru le  to  f i r e
  No r u le s  in  RULES_14 to  f i r e  -----
F in ish ed  tr y in g  generate new hypos
and current exp t paradigm c lea red , i f  any
Untested hypotheses now exist, so STERN tries to confirm all fourteen in turn. 
Cycles 1004 to 1009 are the set o f cycles for the first hypothesis with the pendulum 
experimental paradigm; it is representative o f actions performed on the same 
hypothesis with the inclined plane paradigm, and other the other thirteen 
hypotheses, up to cycle 1146. From the chosen hypothesis, cycle 1005, and an 
experimental paradigm, cycle 1006, an attempt is attempt is made to generate 
models, cycle 1007. However, this fails because the speed term can no longer be 
replaced by its definitional equation (as in eg. cycle 5), as none o f its necessary 
qualitative conditions apply any longer (ie. the Aristotelian instantaneous 
acceleration law was disconfirmed earlier). Thus the hypothesis tractability is 
incremented the experimental paradigm cleared, cycles 1008 and 1009.
1004- [0]  (RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS RO_START_CONFIRM) => 
RO_START_CONFIRM
C a llin g  production  system  w ith  r u le s _ l  
++ +  P . S. c a l le d  w ith  RULES_1 +++
1005- [1]  (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CH00SE_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
hypo w ith  (= T V (EXPT T H 1 /2 ) )  made current
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1006-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0
PENDULUM made current
1007-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_HYP0->M0DELS) => Rl_HYPO->MODELS 
Calling production system with RULES_5 to generate models
+++ P.S. called with RULES_5 +++
1008-[2] (R5_MAIN_W0RKER) => R5_MAIN_W0RKER
no model equation made, tractability now 
#S (MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 0) 
and current hypo cleared
1009-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_5 to fire --
current paradigm cleared
1146-[1] NIL => no rule to fire
— —  No rules in RULES_1 to fire--
Finished testing existing hypos
1.4 New Experim ental Paradigm s
All the hypotheses have now been tested with all the stored experimental 
paradigms. So STERN decides to consider new experimental paradigms by 
combining existing paradigms using RULES_13, cycle 1147. This process 
involves: choosing a terminal, cycle 1148; finding suitable initial parts, cycle 1149; 
and making experimental setups, cycle 1150. The process is repeated five more 
times, in cycles 1152 to 1176, with other experimental paradigms as terminals.
1147-[0] (RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS) => RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS 
Calling production system with RULES_13 to make new 
expt paradigms
+ + +  P .S. called with RULES_13 +++
1148-[1] (R13_REDUCE_*_THRESH0LD R13_CH00SE_TERMINAL) =>
R13_CH00SE_TERMINAL
PENDULUM chosen as current expt. paradigm
1149-[1] (R13_MAKE_C0MBINES) => R13_MAKE_C0MBINES 
PENDULUM+PENDULUM combined expt paradigms created
1150-[1] (R13_C0MBINED_SETUPS) => R13_C0MBINED_SETUPS 
Expt setups made for each expt paradigm
1151-[1] (R13_C0MBINED_SETUPS) => no rule to fire 
  No rules in RULES_13 to fire --
1 expt paradigms made and stored
Of the six newly invented experimental paradigms, and the simple ones that have 
not previously been considered, one must be selected for manufacture and use. In 
cycles 1177 to 1179 RULES_13, reduces the value of the pragmatic parameter of 
manufacture ease and number of setups to a value that just brings one new 
experimental paradigm into reach. The paradigm is the combined inclined plane and 
projectile experiment.
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1177-[0]  (RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS) => RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS 
C a llin g  p roduction  system  w ith  RULES_13 to  make new expt
paradigms
+++ P.S .  c a l le d  w ith  RULES_13 +++
1178-[1 ] (R13_REDUCE_*_THRESH0LD) => R13_REDUCE_*_THRESH0LD 
Expt manf. ea se  and setup  product reduced to  0.6000
1179-[1]  (R13_REDUCE_*_THRESH0LD) => no r u le  to  f i r e  
 No r u le s  in  RULES_13 to  f i r e -----
0 exp t paradigms made and sto red
The confirmation strategy takes over once again, cycle 1180, starting with the size 
time hypothesis originating from the pendulum experiments. Cycles 1181 to 1185 
are a repeat of cycles 886 to 890, in which no model is generated, and the 
tractability is simply amended.
1180-[0]  (RO_NEW_EXPTPARADIGMS RO_START_INDUCE 
RO START CONFIRM) => RO START CONFIRM
The next hypothesis to be chosen is in fact the free fall hypothesis, cycle 1186. The 
combined experiment is chosen, cycle 1187, and two models generated, cycles 
1188 to 1190, One model applies to each of the modes of the combined 
experimental paradigm.
1186-[1] (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CH00SE_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
hypo with (= T_V (EXPT T_H 1/2) ) made current
1187-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0
INCPLANE+PROJECTILE made current
1188-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_HYP0->M0DELS) => R1_HYP0->M0DELS 
Calling production system with RULES_5 to generate models
+++ P.S. called with RULES_5 +++
1189-[2] (R5_C0MB_C0MPLEX_EQN) => R5_C0MB_C0MPLEX_EQN 
Model of INITIAL type, with
(= (EXPT T_H 1/2) (/ T_L T_TIME) ) as equation.
Model of TERMINAL type, with 
(= (EXPT T_H 1/2) (/ T_L TJTIME) ) as equation
1190-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
  No rules in RULES_5 to fire --
2 model(s) generated and stored
The initial mode model is chosen for examination first, cycle 1191. In cycles 1192 
to 1260, the model is tested in the established manner. For the combined model it is 
possible to eliminate the quantitative theoretical term for speed, because the speed at 
the end of the ramp is equal to the horizontal speed of the projectile. The 
comparison of the instance and experimental test is good so the acceptability of the 
model is set accordingly, cycle 1260.
-201-
Appendix I
1191-[1] (R1_HYP0->M0DELS R1_CH00SE_M0DEL) => R1_CH00SE_M0DEL 
model with equation (= (EXPT T_H 1/2) (/ T_L T_TIME) ) made
current
Model is of INITIAL type
1192-[1] (R1_TEST_M0DEL) => R1_TEST_M0DEL 
call production system with RULES 2
1260-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS 
hypo adequacy =
#S(MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 0.9299284370149901) 
and current model cleared
The terminal model is chosen and tested in the same way as the first, cycles 1261 to 
1329. The input and output experimental parameters in this experiment are both 
from the terminal part of the experimental setup. As parameters are the height and 
length this model describes the parabolic flight path of projectiles.
1261-[1] (R1_CH00SE_M0DEL) => R1_CH00SE_M0DEL
m o d e l  w i t h  e q u a t i o n  (=  (EXPT T_H 1/2) (/ T _L  T_TIM E) ) m a d e
c u r r e n t
M o d e l  i s  o f  TERMINAL t y p e
1262-[1] (R1_TEST_M0DEL) => Rl_TEST_MODEL 
call production system with RULES 2
1329-[2] NIL => no rule to fire
 No rules in RULES_2 to fire--
model adequacy now
#S(MEASURE NUMBER 1 DEGREE 0.9320678881749285)
The final acceptability of the hypothesis is high as both models were themselves 
acceptable.
1330-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS_WRT_M0DELS 
hypo adequacy = #S(MEASURE NUMBER 2 DEGREE 1.861996325189919) 
and current model cleared
A l l  m o d e l s  t e s t e d ,  e x p t p a r a d i g m  c l e a r e d
The current hypothesis is acceptable so its associated hypotheses (with t _ h  &  
T _ T IM E  terms) are unacceptable. The heuristic concerning grouped hypotheses 
generated by the same procedure thus applies and sets the measure of acceptability 
of the associated hypotheses appropriately, cycle 1331. This saves considerable 
effort as the six related hypotheses are not examined. It is purely an accident of 
ordering of the hypotheses (by RULES_14) that the Galilean hypothesis was 
investigated first. Had it been stored further down the list other hypotheses wound 
have been considered first
1331-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS) => R1_HYP0_ASSESS 
Adequacy of hypotheses related to current hypo
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decremented because current hypo adequate. 
current hypo cleared
STERN now tests all the hypotheses with the speed and length terms, starting at 
cycle 1332 and ending at cycle 1589. Again two models are generated for each, but 
none of the hypotheses are found to be adequate. STERN has to plough though 
every hypothesis, because there is no effort saving heuristic applicable for these 
disconfirmed hypotheses.
1332-[1] (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CHCX)SE_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
hypo with (= T_V (EXPT T_L 1/2)) made current
STERN has now modelled the main elements of the Galilean episode. Galileo 
stopped at this point because his attention was diverted by the invention of the 
telescope. However, STERN continues by attempting to confirm the qualitative 
hypotheses that have not been tried with the combined experimental paradigm, 
cycles 1598 onwards. The experiment performance rules have almost been 
exhausted, so STERN will simply find that it cannot obtain experimental results.
1598-[1] (R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_N0_HYP0 R1_CH00SE_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_HYP0
hypo with (INCREASE T_TIM E T_H) made current
1599-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0) => 
R1_CH00SE_PARADIGM_WITH_HYP0 
INCPLANE+PROJECTILE made current
1600-[1] (R1_HYP0_ASSESS R1_HYP0->M0DELS) => R1_HYP0->M0DELS 
Calling production system with RULES_5 to generate models
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